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Maria Coughlin of the Jewish Family and Children 
Services of Kansas City, Missouri; Arnold Marks, 
Lorraine Stevens and Kyle Collins of the Jewish 
Family Service of Dallas, Texas; Mallory Robinson 
of the Jewish Family Service of Houston, Texas.
These persons gave indispensable guidance and
practical aid to the accomplisliment of the field 
work connected with this research.
Professor Zvi Gitelman of the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Michigan and Vladislav 
Masur of the University of Oklahoma. These busy and 
most well-informed gentlemen graciously counseled 
me while I was formulating my research objectives 
and methods. Bob England of the Bureau of Govern­
ment Research at the University of Oklahoma made 
available his formidable skills at automatic data 
processing.
Professor V. Stanley Vardys of the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, 
my adviser. Professor Vardys, a pure and dedicated 
scholar, faced all of the problems with me and he 
personally vanquished several of the most difficult 
ones. If there is any balance in my analysis or 
precision in my writing, it is because of the keen 
eye, sharp pencil and good judgment of Professor 
Vardys.
Finally, the Soviet Jewish respondents themselves.
I am indebted to them for their courage and their 
candor. But most of all, I appreciate the trust 
they showed to me— to a stranger to them in a new 
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THE PRIVATE ZONE: A DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SINCE STALIN
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE AND PURPOSE, ORGANIZATION,
AND DEFINITIONS
This study deals with an issue in contemporary Soviet 
life. It seeks to demonstrate the process by which certain 
members of Soviet society have, on occasion, gained news 
information from sources outside regime control, and how 
this information has circulated in a society which nominally 
operates according to norms prescribed by the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU).* The purpose of the study is to 
suggest that the prescribed norms do not always dictate Soviet 
reality. Though the party press of the Soviet Union normally 
presents the point of view the regime intends the citizenry 
to adopt on important issues, the evidence developed in the 
course of this investigation suggests that many Soviet citi­
zens have a long-standing distrust of official information and
*See pages 16-17 of chapter 1 for a more detailed dis­
cussion of societal norms and behavior prescribed by the CPSU.
have actively sought out alternative sources. Though the 
regime nominally controls the information environment, it 
appears that at leaast some Soviet citizens have actively 
communicated information from alternative, unofficial sources 
with ease and confidence. The prime alternative source of 
unofficial information appears to have been shortwave radio 
broadcasts from the western nations.
This is not to say that the Soviet Union has become 
an open society, but that it may not longer be a completely 
closed society as far as western broadcasts are concerned. 
Many of these broadcasts were permitted by the regime to pene­
trate Soviet airspace unimpeded for extended periods in the 
1960s and 1970s. It seems fair to suggest that these broad­
casts were instrumental in providing news to a certain public 
quite ready to listen, and that the regime often acted with 
apparent restraint during the period as information of a dif­
ferent, sometimes conflicting nature to that provided by the 
controlled, party press circulated in the Soviet information 
environment. The reasons why the regime apparently decided 
to permit some Soviet reception of western broadcasts are not 
entirely clear. It seems likely that they were at first re­
lated to the process of de-Stalinization and later to the 
adjustment process the CPSU attempted to make to the policy 
of detente. But, in general terms, it seems that the CPSU, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, was attempting to adapt to 
change. Change, in this sense, was the product of those
socio-cultural forces at work in the modern world, which
required the CPSU to alter either its structure of its
policies.^ According to Karl Ryavec, as an institution of
cultural and social control, the CPSU has responded to change
in a selective fashion:
. . . [the Soviet leadership circles] emphasiz[e] 
the maintenance of existing political principles 
and practices while at the same time [they] 
attempt to modernize Soviet society and economy, 
particularly stressing efficiency and high-quality 
products. The leaders seem to be trying to return 
to the political situation which existed during the 
mid-1950s, the period just before the appearance of 
political opposition, widespread samizdat, political 
neutralism among professionals (such as scientists), 
and implicitly antiregime theses in literature and 
theater. The CPSU would, in this respect, seem to be 
culturally and ideologically conservaitve or static, 
while at the same time trying to be economically and 
scientifically progressive. Stated otherwise, there 
is an attempt to create a more developed economy and 
a more educated population, while still holding to a 
type of politics that existed during an earlier 
period. . . . The critical question here is what 
CPSU adaptations become necessary to deal with pres­
sures arising from newly created and energetic social 
and cultural elites and new social and economic
progress.2
In general terms, it seems that during the periods in 
the 1960s and 1970s when western broadcasts were not jammed, 
they were permitted by the CPSU for at least two reasons: 
First, permitting Soviet listeners to receive them probably 
did not appear to the CPSU to adversely effect its own control 
of the political situation. Second, permitting them could 
have appeared to the CPSU as a progressive step, one which 
might be well received by the social and cultural elites to 
which the CPSU has increasingly turned since World War II for
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execution of its policies and programs. It is important to 
stress that this process of adaptation can sometimes leave an 
apparent gap between CPSU principle and CPSU policy. In the 
case of information, the CPSU may claim total control of 
information, both in principle as well as fact, but CPSU 
policy, as in the case of western broadcasts, may have per­
mitted the flow of information to Soviet audiences over which 
the CPSU has exercised no control. As a result, many Soviet 
citizens during the 1960s and 1970s may have been relatively 
free to acquire and communicate unofficial information such 
as that provided by foreign radio broadcasts. In doing so, 
they may have experienced a form of privacy not traditionally 
associated with life in a totalitarian society. The totali­
tarian model* stresses collective obedience to authority and 
control, yet it seems that some Soviet citizens, by listening 
to foreign broadcasts, have been acting as individualists in 
communications matters. Perhaps we can go so far as to say 
that such people have been behaving as if they had a "private 
zone" around themselves in which they felt reasonably comfort­
able to acquire and communicate information from unofficial 
sources. This is both the hypothesis and central concern of 
this investigation.
A major part of this study is taken up with the com­
munications behavior in the Soviet Union of Soviet Jewish 
emigres who now live in the United States. During the period
*See page 16 of chapter 1 for a more complete expres­
sion of this concept.
June-September 1980, 104 emigres were interviewed about their 
reaction to the news of the 1973 Middle East war (the Yom 
Kippur War), an event which occurred while they still lived 
in the Soviet Union. One can reasonably expect that many 
Soviet Jews would have an interest in security matters relat­
ing to Israel, and the evidence developed in the course of 
interviewing showed that the emigre respondents were active 
users of information about the war from both the Soviet press 
and western radio broadcasts. The communications behavior of 
the emigres in reaction to the war may be suggestive of that 
which is hypothesized to exist on the part of all Soviet citi­
zens experiencing the phenomenon of the private zone. Though 
the Soviet press backed the Arab cause in print and word, and 
though the regime clearly did not wish Israel to humiliate the 
Arabs in 1973 as she had done in the 1967 war, many Soviet Jews 
apparently held views quite counter to those held by the regime. 
These Soviet citizens actively sought out news which did not 
support development of a collective point of view on the mat­
ter of the war. Insofar as many felt reasonably free to set 
themselves apart from the collective, regime-sponsored point 
of view, these people may have been exhibiting characteristics 
of the private zone.
This work is divided into four parts. The Introduc­
tion sets forth the scope and purpose of the project, 
defines several important terms and concepts, and outlines 
the organization of the piece. Part I is more lengthy.
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It provides a literature review, it offers a theoretical 
perspective, and it concludes with the statement of hypothesis. 
During the preparation of part I, it became clear that these 
three concerns were integrated and that they were best pre­
sented not in isolation or in sequence, but in tandem— in 
their joint context— as if on three parallel tracks. Part I 
consists of eight chapters which lay a basis in literature and 
theory for an excursion into the contemporary Soviet communi­
cations environment. In any of these eight chapters, the 
reader may find elements of literature review, theory or 
hypothesis; but I trust that this tandem approach, while 
possibly appearing a bit unstructured, will actually move the 
reader along at a more rapid pace, and to a more thorough 
grasp of my thinking than might another approach which treats 
these matters as segregated in intellectual or written form.
Chapters 1 and 2 of part I deal with political com­
munication in totalitarian society. The emphasis in these 
chapters is on western literature and theory, produced in the 
1940s, 50s, and 60s, which have both analyzed the goal of 
mass communication in societies under totalitarian rule and 
have described mass communication as a tool in the hands of 
totalitarian leadership— a tool used to achieve social con­
formity and obedience to political authority. In these chapters, 
it becomes clear that the individual retains certain capabil­
ities to resist the efforts of totalitarian leadership to 
influence and control him through use of the mass media. Even
during Stalin's day, certain "islands of separateness" such 
as the family, the university and the church may have pro­
vided some refuge from the relentless efforts of the regime 
to monopolize the political communication environment. Some 
observers have also taken note of the phenomenon of "privati­
zation," a psychological device by which people under totali­
tarian rule have been able to appear outwardly conformist and 
obedient, while actually being ambivalent or harboring 
hostility to the principles and methods of the regime.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of part I deal with a number of 
systemic, institutional and group considerations which appear 
to be important in the evolution of the private zone. Among 
the systemic considerations are two having to deal with the 
consequences of modernization: industrialization and urbani­
zation. These are coupled with several group considerations 
which may have collectively produced a class cleavage of sig­
nificant proportions in post-war Soviet society. In short, 
there appears to have developed since the war a new "middle 
class" with a "technological outlook" which is too sophisticated 
and politically aware to any longer accept the principles, 
methods and objectives of the Party at face value. The emer­
gence of this class appears to constitute the dilemma which 
was described above in the quotation from Karl Ryavec: The
Party contributed to the creation of new cultural and social 
elites for its own reasons, but it appears that the Party now 
has no interest in the type of social and cultural progress 
that these elites apparently desire.
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In addition to these systemic and group considerations 
there are a number of institutional ones. The political agi­
tator, as the prime vehicle of party ideas and policy at the 
local and working levels, appears to have been largely dis­
placed in the 1960s and 1970s by electronic media. The advance 
of technology has allowed the Party to place politically 
"correct" television and radio programming in the homes of 
millions of Soviet people, some of whom might otherwise be 
out of reach. But, while the political agitator could not 
be ignored without risk, or "turned off" with the flick of a 
wrist, electronic media can be turned off or mentally "tuned 
out" in riskless ways. Similarly, foreign radio broadcasts, 
with their wholly uncontrolled and frequently "anti-Soviet" 
programming can only be stopped- from reaching Soviet ears by 
electronic jamming which is becoming more expensive each year 
in material and political terms. On top of all this, there 
seem to be a number of post-Stalin developments in the Soviet 
legal system which have apparently contributed to a reduction 
in levels of fear on the part of people who wish to engage in 
non-conformist activities such as listening to foreign radio 
stations.
The objective in chapters 1 through 5 is to lay a 
theoretical, legal, philosophical and historical groundwork 
for the emergence of the private zone since the death of Stalin. 
The purposes of the remaining chapters in part I'— chapters 
6, 7 and 8— is to provide the mechanism by which the existence
and dimensions of the private zone might be determined.
I introduce the Soviet Jewish population as a target for the 
study of these issues in chapter 6. Since 1967, over 200,000 
Soviet Jews have emigrated, many to the United States.
Chapter 7 deals with antisemitism, assimilation and accultura­
tion— factors which might either facilitate or inhibit the 
use of Jewish opinion to derive conclusions about the state 
of the contemporary Soviet political communication environment. 
Chapter 7 concludes with the determination that, as members 
of a highly-educated and urbanized minority group, Soviet Jews 
might offer opinions highly suggestive of the new Soviet tech­
nical intelligentsia, the new "middle class" with the "techno­
logical outlook."
Chapter 8 is concerned with framing the hypothesis 
in formal terms. It asserts that the literature permits the 
conclusion that there are certain distinct social, cultural 
and political differences between the Soviet Union of the 
early 1970s and that of Stalin's day. It asserts that the 
private zone exists and that it is just one manifestation of 
the difference between the two periods. Chapter 8 concludes 
with the presentation of a device for the testing of the 
hypothesis— that of surveying recent Soviet Jewish emigrants 
to the United States on their attitudes toward Soviet mass 
media and on their personal behavior within the Soviet 
political communication environment.
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Fart II is entitled "Procedures, Respondent 
Testimony and Statistics." It consists of chapters 9, 10,
11 and 12, each of which is intended to explain how data 
gathered from the 104 Soviet Jews interviewed relates to the 
matter of the private zone. Chapter 9 deals with the research 
methods I employed with the Soviet Jewish emigres whom I inter­
viewed in Dallas, Houston and Kansas City during the summer of 
1980. It also lists the demographic characteristics of the 
sample and advances the judgment that these 1980 respondents 
conform demographically to both the parent Soviet Jewish popu­
lation, and to a sample developed by Professor Zvi Gitelman 
of the University of Michigan who performed a similar project 
with Soviet Jewish emigres in 1976. For these reasons I believe 
that my respondents are qualified, on one hand, to offer views 
representative of the parent population on matters of politi­
cal communication, and on the other, views useful as a guide 
to assessing the opinions and behavior of Russian members of 
the new Soviet technical intelligentsia in the same issue area.
Chapter 10 involves reporting of the news gathering 
habits of the respondents during the period of the 1973 Middle 
Wast War (the Yom Kippur War). The reaction of the respondents 
to this event is intended to be the test which shows their 
attitude toward Soviet mass media and toward the Soviet politi­
cal communication environment. It also establishes the dimen­
sions of the private zone. The period of the Yom Kippur War 
was chosen for two reasons. First, as Jews, it was anticipated
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that the respondents would have payed close attention to 
dramatic news concerning the survival of Israel, and that 
they would still have clear memories of their news gathering 
habits, even after seven years and the trauma of having engaged 
in the emigration and resettlement processes. Second, by 
1974, some of my respondents had already left the Soviet 
Union and would not be able in 1980 to comment first-hand on 
events in the Soviet Union which took place after 1373. In 
chapter 10, it becomes clear that the Soviet press was gen­
erally mistrusted as a source of reliable and complete news 
about the Yom Kippur War. Foreign radio stations appeared to 
be the principal source of war news during the war because 
the foreign stations were perceived to be much more truthful 
and objective than the Soviet press when the reporting of both 
sources was compared side by side.
Chapter 11 deals mainly with statistics derived from 
the tabulation of responses to questions about how confidently 
the respondents shared the news of the war from foreign radio 
stations with other people. The issue was posed in terms of 
"discussion partners": respondents were asked to remember
how confidently they talked about the war with members of 
their own family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances and 
strangers. The tables containing the statistics show that 
all the respondents talked confidently with their own families 
but showed high degrees of caution when talking with acquain­
tances or strangers. In mid-range interpersonal situations.
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most respondents were comfortable discussing the news about 
the war from foreign radio with friends, but the greatest 
variation in response occurs in relation to co-workers. 
Respondents were offered five choices of response: "always,"
"mostly," "sometimes," "seldom" and "never." In regard to 
co-workers, no choice is totally disregarded. Because the 
"discussion dimension" of co-workers seems to be the one where 
confidence about discussing news from an unofficial source 
such as foreign radio appears to yield to caution and discre­
tion, it seems that the private zone encompasses the individual, 
his family and friends; but not necessarily co-workers, and 
certainly not acquaintances or strangers.
Chapter 12 is the final chapter in part II and the 
final chapter in the body of this work. It is built around 
statistical tables which are produced by crosstabulâting the 
demographic characteristics of the respondents with their 
responses to questions about how confidently they talked about 
foreign radio with five types of discussion partner— family, 
friends, co-workers, acquaintances and strangers.
Age proves to be an important factor since older 
respondents seem to show more caution and discretion than 
younger people in all dimensions of discussion. Women seem 
to be slightly more cautious than men, particularly in the 
discussion dimension of co-workers. Jews from "western" areas 
of the Soviet Union (western Ukraine, western Byelorussia and 
other regions which came under Soviet rule as late as 1939-1944)
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seem to be slightly more confident about communicating 
information from an unofficial source in the workplace than 
"heartland" Jews (those from "core" or "central" areas of the 
Soviet Union which have been under nominal Soviet control 
since 1917). Respondents with advanced technical educations 
in the Soviet Union and occupations which would mark them as 
likely members of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia 
seem to be somewhat more comfortable about discussing informa­
tion from foreign radio about the Yom Kippur War than the 
respondents with no more than high school educations and non­
intelligentsia occupational positions in the Soviet Union.
In all cases, willingness to communicate information from 
foreign radio, particularly in the workplace, is believed to 
be positively correlated with the presence of the private zone.
The purpose of the Conclusion is to resolve a 
question about the origin of the private zone. As discussed 
earlier, the private zone may have developed because of basic 
change in the Soviet political system— change away from the 
totalitarian model— toward the kind of industrial pluralism 
often associated with the western social democracies. The 
communications behavior of the new Soviet technical intelli­
gentsia, of which many of my respondents were members at one 
time, may be indicative of such systemic political change.
On the other hand, the private zone may be a more 
transient phenomenon, an interesting but historically
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impermanent development caused by certain changes in the 
post-Stalin political atmosphere. Such a change might be 
caused, easily enough it seems, by a regime decision to get 
away from the kind of large-scale, coercive and politically 
costly techniques of social control which were commonplace 
under Stalin. In this view, the regime accepts the private 
zone on sufferance, but retains the privilege and power to 
reassert at any time the kind of Stalinist techniques of 
social control which could obliterate it.
Thus, the private zone may have evolved because of 
change in the nature of the Soviet system, because of a reac­
tion to a change in political atmosphere, or perhaps for some 
other set of reasons. But in any event, it seems that many 
Soviet citizens in recent years have been left well enough 
alone in the handling of their personal communication matters, 
that those who so choose seem to possess a private zone.
And this alone seems no small thing, given that it appers 
to have occurred in a country with the history of the Soviet 
Union.
PART I




Perhaps the best known expression of the totalitarian 
model was contained in Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy.^ The authors contended that all 
totalitarian dictatorships possess common features :
1. an unofficial ideology consisting of an official 
body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of 
man's existence to which everyone is supposed to 
adhere, at least passively . .
2. a single mass party led typically by one man, 
the "dictator," and consisting of a relatively 
small percentage of the population (up to ten 
percent) of men and women, a hard core of them 
passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to 
the ideology . . .  ;
3. a system of terroristic police control . . .;
4. a technologically near-complete monopoly of con­
trol, in the hands of the party and its subservient 
cadres, of all means of effective mass communica­
tion such as press, radio, motion pictures;
5. a similarly technologically near-complete monopoly 
of control (in the same hands) of all means of 
effective armed combat;
6. a central control and direction of the entire 
economy . . .;^
For Friedrich and Brzezinski, the objective seems to have been 
to specify the organizational requirements for the achievement
16
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of total control of society.^ The objective of total control 
can be expressed in any number of ways but Professor Pool 
seems to have done it elegantly enough: the dream of every
totalitarian movement has been to make the whole nation into 
a loyal devoted family dedicated to the ideals of the leader
gor party. One of the main features which seems to separate 
a totalitarian dictatorship most clearly from the authori­
tarian state is the tools it chooses to use to get and keep 
power. Professor Fainsod assigned terror the preeminent role, 
describing it as the lynchpin of modern totalitarianism.^
However, Hannah Arendt wrote that there is a complex 
and invidious relationship between terror, propaganda and
pindoctrination to the totalitarian state. She allowed that
in totalitarian countries, terror and propaganda present two
sides of the same coin, quoting among others, E. Kohn-Bramstedt.
Kohn-Bramstedt's explanation of the relationship is that "terror
without propaganda would lose most of its psychological effect,
whereas propaganda without terror does not contain its full 
gpunch." And Arendt advances the point by stating that wher­
ever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces 
propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much 
to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages 
when political opposition still exists) as to "realize con­
stantly its ideological doctrines and practical lies."^^
In the years just before the death of Stalin, a technologically 
conditioned, near-complete monopoly of effective mass
18
communication (described by Friedrich and Brzezinski as 
common feature number four above) was hard at work in the 
Soviet Union trying to make reality out of just this kind of 
ideological doctrine and just these kinds of practical lies.
Violence, of course, was indispensable to the process.
The operational code of mass communication in Stalinist 
Russia, a product of a totalitarian doctrine, was clearly 
described by Professor Inkeles.""
1. The entire system of communication is oriented 
toward a single goal. Both it and its control 
apparatus serve as instruments through which the 
Party and government mobilize the mind and will 
of the population; they must see to it that what 
ought to be done ^  done, what ought to be thought 
and felt felt, (author's emphasis)
2. The ends to which mass communication must be put
are justified in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory. 
The practical effect of this is that the media is 
to be used primarily to strengthen the Party's 
leadership in its self-assigned role as leader, 
teacher and guide to the Soviet people.
3. Soviet control of communications is not designed 
to facilitate or improve the free exchange of 
ideas among men. Indeed the Soviet leaders 
clearly regard such a free flow of ideas as dan­
gerous and as likely to impede the attainment of 
the Party's goals.
4. The state establishes for the media, specific, 
concrete and practical goals, which are treated 
much like production norms set for Soviet industry. 
The media are conceived of as tools or instruments 
for effecting the purposes of the Party.
5. Soviet control of the mass media is absolute.
There can be no competition for the message of 
the central authorities, not even for small meet­
ings, or for that matter, from private conversa­
tions between individuals. All must be harnessed 
for attainment of the greater goal of partyleadership.12
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It seems right to suggest that Inkeles was correct in 
principle but was referring to a state of affairs which had 
evolved considerably after the passing of Stalin and Beria, 
Stalin's secret police chief. This is not to say that the 
operational code of the mass media was changed, but that the 
goals implicit in the code were no longer attainable if they 
ever were. The code implies that the media operate in a non­
competitive environment, without losing any eyes, ears or 
hearts to secondary sources of information. But insofar as 
Professor Fainsod correctly described terror as the lynchpin 
of modern totalitarianism, only the memory of mass terror 
remained as the lynchpin after Stalin was gone. For many 
years this memory served to support the realization of doctrine 
by the mass media. But the effectiveness of the memory declined 
with each passing year.
Within the literature of totalitarianism itself are 
occasionally found qualifications to the generalizations made 
about the features of totalitarian dictatorships. Friedrich 
and Brzezinski, still writing in Totalitarian Dictatorships
and Autocracy, held out hope for certain "islands of separate-
13ness" in totalitarian society.
. . . even within the grip of a total demand for 
total identification with such a regime, some people 
manage to maintain themselves aloof, to live in 
accordance with their personal convictions, . . .
Among these islands of separateness, we propose four 
which have proved to be of particular tenacity; the 
family, the churches, the universities and the 
military establishment. . . . "
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Friedrich and Brzezinski seem to be saying that there always 
have been certain areas where the Party competes for personal 
loyalty with other institutions and does so with very mixed 
results. Brzezinski and Huntington suggested that the inter­
ests of parents in socializing their children seldom, if ever, 
coincide with those of the Party— that the family can never 
be a "transmission belt" for the Party because it will always 
be partially a r i v a l . P a r e n t s  need and demand the affection 
and loyalty of their children and the totalitarian state de­
mands the same. The child wants to know whom he can really 
trust and it would seem that the state normally takes second 
place in this kind of contest. Even during the height of the 
Terror, according to Friedrich and Brzezinski:
The family has proved a haven for the persecuted, and 
has served to counteract the tendency of our time to 
isolate and to collectivize the individual. . . . 
Members of families have been encouraged to testify 
against other members and such betrayal of the most 
intimate relationships has been praised as "patrio­
tism" and loyalty to the totalitarian leadership*
. . . [yet] the family became the sole refuge where 
anticommunist sentiments were freely voiced and 
where religious rites were maintained. Many Soviet 
emigres recall that their parents attempted to counter 
the official propaganda to which the children were 
exposed in the schools and the communist youthorganizations.
*The Pioneers is the mass communist organization of 
school children in the Soviet Union. It was founded in 1922 
as a result of the Party's concern over child-rearing practices 
and its desire to limit familial influence in the interests of 
indoctrination (Reshetar, 1978: 155). The classic Pioneer
hero and martyr is Pavlik Morozov, a fourteen-year old who, 
in 1932 reported on his own father for hiding grain from the 
state during the harsh period of collectivization. The father 
was shot and villagers then killed the son in vengeance 
(Smith, 1974: 162; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956: 244;
Reshetar, 1978: 156n).
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All of this tends to suggest that even in a 
totalitarian state, total control of society has not yet 
been achieved. Perhaps it is because all human beings are 
not capable of perfect obedience to authority. A major force
in the prevention of such obedience is the phenomenon of
16"privatization," or escape into the self. Privatization
seems to take on at least two forms in the Soviet case; on
one hand it permits a person to develop ritualized ways of
appearing politicized, and on the other, it equips a person
to strain out political messages he does not want to hear.
Often privatization involves extreme methods. Many Russians
"do not drink for fun or merely as an outlet; they drink to
get drunk— to blot themselves o u t . " B u t  perhaps Hedrick
Smith best described privatization in terms of what he viewed
as a dichotomy in Russian behavior:
. . .  In their authoritarian environment, from child­
hood onward Russians acquire an acute sense of place 
and propriety, of what is accepted and what is not, 
of what they can get away with and what they had 
better not attempt. And they conform to their sur­
roundings, playing the roles that are expected of 
them. With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they 
divide their existence into their public lives and 
their private lives and distinguish between "official" 
relationships and personal relationships. This hap­
pens anywhere to some degree, of course, but Russians 
make this division more sharply than others because 
of political pressures for conformity. So they adopt 
two very different codes of behavior for their own 
lives. . . .  In one, thoughts and feelings are held 
in check. . . .  In the other, emotions flow warmly,
w ith o u t m oderation .18
The implication of privatization for the Soviet mass 
media seems clear. It makes the achievement of what Professor
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Inkeles cited as the single goal of the official communication 
system appear quite impossible. That goal, to include the 
dictum that what ought to be thought and felt ^  felt, can 
never be achieved as long as great masses of Russians present 
only their "official" faces to the state. When the state sees 
only "official" faces it knows not, and may no longer care, 
which ones hide minds and hearts which are fully privatized.
Smith believes that the entire system of propaganda has left 
the population completely indifferent to the form and content 
of the political message. He takes note of the ever-present 
signs and banners in the Soviet Union which proclaim "Communism 
Will Win!," "Lift High the Banner of Proletarian Internationalism!," 
"Glory to the Soviet People, Builders of Communism!," and on ad 
infinitum.
Once during a trip arranged by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, several of us [sic] Western newsmen were 
grimacing at the array of slogans in the city we 
were visiting. Later a Russian translator for 
another correspondent approached me discreetly and 
advised me in a low voice: "I heard you talking
about these slogans. They are like the trees. They 
are part of the scenery. We don't pay any attention 
to them."19
Perhaps at this point it is helpful to reiterate the 
point made by Kohn-Bramstedt and Arendt about the relationship 
of terror and propaganda: "Terror without propaganda loses
most of its psychological effect; propaganda without terror 
does not contain its full punch." But now it also seems clear 
that indoctrination without the presence of violence may very 
well leave the state incapable of implementing its ideological
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doctrine and with the population indifferent to its lies.
At the time Smith was writing (circa 1974) , it appears that 
the Soviet political communications environment had arrived 
at precisely this point. "Communism Will Win!" was the slogan. 
But apparently Soviet political communications no longer had 
any meaningful ability to compel belief in such a statement 
because mass terror and the memory of political violence had 
become so remote in the lives of so many people. As early as 
1967, John A. Armstrong concluded that "the Soviet Union can 
no longer be called a police state in the usual sense of the 
term."
High police officials do not exert major influence 
on policy decisions arid the police as an institution 
is not a major factor in political struggles. Terror, 
in the sense of wholesale punishment for political 
offenses is ended, at least for the time b e in g .20
According to Armstrong, a police state has at least
three characteristics and the Soviet Union no longer had any
of them:
1. Pervasive clandestine surveillance. Under Stalin, 
the aim was to "enfold all of Soviet society in
a web of surveillance. . . . Soviet indoctrination 
stresses the need for universal vigilance against 
foreign and domestic enemies of the regime. . . . 
Occasionally volunteers step forward to be informers, 
motivated by patriotic fervor, ideological zeal.
. . . The average Soviet citizen, and especially 
party members, are obliged to report suspicious 
circumstances to the police but there is consider­
able evidence that many Soviet citizens hate the 
role of informer. . . . [As a result, the police 
rarely lack an informer where they need to have 
one but they must either pay him money, give him 
privileges or coerce him into doing the job.]
2. Secret arbitrary arrest and condemnation. The 
departure of Stalin and Beria brought sweeping 
changes. Very soon after Stalin died, the Soviet
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regime began to emphasise use of the open judicial 
system as opposed to secret police boards. [This 
is not to say that the system became "fair," just 
that it began to emphasize procedural as opposed 
to summary justice.]
3. Confinement to concentration camps. These have
largely been eliminated. At the height of the
Terror, as many as 20 million people may have been
incarcerated. But as many as 80 percent of all
inmates were probably released by 1956. Political 
prisoners— members of nationalist undergrounds, 
religious leaders, dissident intellectuals— still 
exist but these categories contain far fewer 
prisoners than existed in 1953.21
To the extent that Armstrong was correct in 1967 in saying
that the Soviet Union was no longer a police state, it seems
clear why Soviet media and indoctrination services by 1974 
had probably failed to achieve the single goal which Professor 
Inkeles had cited as the primary one. The communication system 
had failed to mobilize the mind and will of the population 
principally because it could not persuade masses of people 
through its own voice and it no longer had mass terror as an
ally with which to coerce belief.
But it may be true that by 1967, the Party was no 
longer placing quite the same emphasis on persuasion, indoc­
trination and coercion to produce belief, tools that Arendt 
and Kohn-Bramstedt had in an earlier day said were indis­
pensable to produce belief. Paul Hollander has written of
what he calls the shift to less coercive policies which he
22says occurred after Stalin's death. He focuses on what he 
feels is an official desire to foster conformity through 
value-oriented as opposed to coercive measures. This desire
25
he finds codified in the "new Program of the CPSU,"
promulgated as the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism at
the 1961 22nd Party Congress. The Moral Code, according to 
Hollander, is described by its author as a series of 
"scientifically formulated precepts which govern the conduct 
of man who builds the new society." The Moral Code consists 
of these principles:
1. Devotion to the Communist cause; love of social­
ist motherland and of other socialist countries.
2. Conscientious labor for the good of society— he
who does not work, neither shall he eat.
3. A high sense of public duty; intolerance of 
action harmful to the public interest.
4. Concern on the part of everyone for the preserva­
tion and growth of public wealth.
5. Collectivism and comradely mutual assistance; one 
for all and all for one.
6. Human relations and mutual respect between 
individuals— man is to man a friend, comrade 
and brother.
7. Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty 
and unpretentiousness in social and private life.
8. Mutual respect in the family and concern for the 
upbringing of children.
9. An uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, 
dishonesty, careerism and money-grubbing.
10. Friendship and brotherhood among all people of the 
USSR; intolerance of national and racial hatred.
11. An uncompromising attitude to the enemies of 
Communism, peace, and the freedom of nation.
12. Fraternal solidarity with the working people of 
all countries, and with all p e o p le s .23
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According to Hollander the historic significance of the Moral
Code may not be readily apparent since little or nothing in
its content differs sharply from the moral prescriptions of
the past. But he suggests that Soviet leaders may have found
significance in the document, and made it public policy,
because it places the longstanding political values within
the context of The Moral Life. Hollander believes that this
represents more than just wishful thinking on the part of
Soviet leaders and he quotes from the preamble to the Moral
Code to make his point about the official view of the state of
development of Soviet society:
In the course of transition to communism, the moral 
principles of society become increasingly important; 
the sphere of action of the moral factor expands and 
the importance of administrative control of human 
relations diminishes a c c o rd in g ly .24
Here then is one explanation the state has used to justify its 
monopoly of control over such institutions as the mass média, 
while at the same time explaining away the need in modern 
times for massive use of police state methods. It is a bril­
liant lie because it both asserts the fiction that communism 
has produced a more moral man in only four decades than had 
been produced in all of proceeding human history, while at 
the same time it confirms the need for the immoral use of 
terror which produced him in the first place. But more than 
this, the Party seems to be saying to the people, "We need 
total control over mass communications (as well as economic 
planning, the police and armed forces, etc.) because this
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arrangement jointly supports our political requirements and 
your moral precepts. The Moral Code seems to show how hard 
the Party has tried to produce a controlled society without 
using the old, discredited. Stalinist methods of control.
In addition to claiming that morality is on the side 
of Communism, the Party has made active use of peer pressure 
to induce conformity. Alfred G. Meyer has written of the 
extensive experimentation made by the Party to transfer cer­
tain police and/or judicial functions from the formal admin­
istrative agencies of government to informal groups at the
25grass-roots or community levels. The first such experiment 
involved "Comrades' courts" which were formed by residential 
neighborhood assemblies or by the employees at a place of 
work. The second involved the "squads" (druzhiny) of Young 
Communist (Komsomol) activitists who acted as auxiliary police 
and arbiters of taste, propriety and behavior. The "Comrades' 
courts " set up formally in 1961, were entitled to hand out 
minor punishment or refer a case deserving serious punishment 
to higher authorities. Meyer reports that they were concerned 
mostly with such matters as petty theft, unsatisfactory work 
discipline, wife-beating, drunkenness, malicious gossip and 
the like. Apparently, the main function of this court was to 
produce a more positive attitude toward the type of values 
promulgated by the Moral Code.
But of greater concern to Meyer appears to be the 
Komsomol "squads," whose members were supposed to use
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persuasion, warnings or adverse publicity against petty
offenders and non-conformists or to turn them over to the
formal authorities for legal action. As soon as they were
created, it became clear that the "squads" would frequently
overstep the limits of their authority, taking the law into
their own hands. Mostly because they included "roughnecks"
with "narrow, prying minds," Meyer reports that they often
27induced "violent resistance” to their activities.
In both the case of the Comrades' courts and the 
Komsomol "squads," the Party apparently wished to exercise a* 
form of coercion and intimidation without resort to use of the 
official police apparatus. According to Meyer, Soviet commen­
tators regarded the introduction of these devices as evidence
of "the withering away of the state and the blossoming of true 
28democracy." It remains, however, as evidence of the effort
to produce a controlled society by making terror a "popular 
29institution." And to the extent that they were experiments 
which occasionally embarrassed the state, they are one result 
of its failure to persuade commensurate with its unwillingness 
to exercise terroristic methods on an official and mass basis.
CHAPTER 2 
INDIVIDUALISM AND INFORMATION
Professor Pool has addressed the subject of public 
opinion and communication in totalitarian societies and 
offered a number of generalizations:
1. Totalitarian regimes are highly conscious of 
public opinion and make major efforts to 
effect it.
2. The controlled communications put out by 
totalitarian regimes— designed more for effects 
than for truthfulness— tend to become highly 
formalized and stilted.
3. Eventually the public becomes sated with such 
propaganda material and grows inattentive, 
apathetic and apolitical.
4. Despite that, the public has a hunger for trust­
worthy and credible information.
5. In seeking the facts, the public learns to read 
between the lines. It becomes accustomed to 
interpreting clues to the truth that are buried 
in the unreliable information available to them.
6. The kind of unity and cohesion created by 
totalitarian methods is fragile. When the 
structure of controls breaks down, the apparent 
unanimity collapses quickly. . . .30
Perhaps the most important of these generalizations to a study
of contemporary public opinion in the Soviet Union is number
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four: the failure of the official communications to generate 
interest or belief in what it says does not prevent the public 
from having an intense interest in news from sources it can 
trust. This point was driven home by Inkeles and Bauer in
31The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society.
Published in 1959, the work encompasses a series of several 
thousand interviews with former Soviet citizens who were dis­
placed by World War II and found themselves in the West. All 
of the interviewing was completed by 1952. The authors in­
cluded a fair number of questions dealing with the reaction 
of the respondents to Soviet mass media specifically and the 
information environment in the Soviet Union in general.
Inkeles and Bauer were able to show that the Soviet public 
not only had a hunger for trustworthy and credible information, 
it had some ways of getting it.
Inkeles and Bauer framed several conclusions about 
the process of getting credible news information in a totali­
tarian society. Their conclusions say as much about the people 
who were seeking it as they do about the information environ­
ment itself. And Inkeles and Bauer were able to document that 
there was a secondary network of communications at work in 
Soviet life and that this secondary net was vital to these 
people as a source of credible information.
1. The communications policy of the regime . . . 
was to make even its supporters dissatisfied 
with the coverage of news, and the reliability of 
news they got through covert means. As a result 
there grew up parallel to the official system of 
communications an unofficial one including word- 
of-mouth communication, personal observation and
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a pattern of interpretive inferences as applied 
to official media.
Inkeles and Bauer were able to determine that many 
respondents used inferential methods to squeeze credible 
information out of the Soviet media. This process is sometimes 
known as "reading between the lines." The techniques for read­
ing between the lines were based on a combination of a degree 
of mistrust for the official media and a series of implied 
assumptions about the Soviet system and its communications 
policy. For example, it was suggested by a respondent that 
one should believe exactly the opposite of whatever it was that 
the Soviet press apparently wanted the audience member to 
believe, i.e., "The Soviet press interprets events in Korea 
as American aggression, when in actual fact the contrary is 
true and it is Soviet aggression," or "If they wrote that 
our enemies abroad were arming for war, I knew that the Soviet 
Union was arming." Another method of reading between the lines 
was to assume that the Soviet government would always attempt 
to prepare the populace in advance to accept unpleasant dev­
elopments; "If there was going to be a famine in the Ukraine, 
we always would hear that there was hunger in Germany and 
Austria, and that children were picking food out of garbage 
cans. When I saw such examples, I knew that soon we would 
a famine." Respondents were also able to glean facts from 
Soviet press reports that the state had no intention they 
learn. For example, one respondent recalled a Soviet press
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report about a workers' strike in an American factory. He
correctly assumed that the American workers were striking
because they had the right to strike, a right not enjoyed by 
32Soviet workers.
2. The special characteristics of Soviet communi­
cations policy, including a monopoly over the 
media and a militant one-sided presentation of 
the official point of view, particularly fosters 
this unofficial system and it has reached dis­
tinctive proportions.33
It seems that this second finding by Inkeles and Bauer is 
most significant for it establishes something which contrasts 
with the earlier work of Professor Inkeles himself. Inkeles, 
in Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, concluded that "Soviet 
control over the mass media is absolute. There can be no 
competition for the message of the central authorities, not 
even from small meetings, or for that matter from private con­
versations between individuals." This is not to say that 
Inkeles was overstating the case in his presentation of the 
operational code of the Soviet media. But it does seem clear 
that his later work shows the benefit direct contact with 
former Soviet citizens provides in helping to see the Soviet 
communications environment in more than one dimension. Inkeles 
and Bauer also reached some important conclusions about demo­
graphics and media;
3. Distrust of the official media is a function of 
attitude toward the regime, however, some degree 
of mistrust of the official media does not, per 
se, necessarily mean that one is disaffected from 
the system. All media, both official and unoffi­
cial, are most extensively used by those higher 
in education and/or occupational status. Such a
33
person needs all kinds of information, both from 
overt and covert sources to survive and advance, 
and the higher his position in society, the 
higher his ability to obtain information from 
both systems.34
It should be emphasized that the interviews conducted by
Inkeles and Bauer were completed before the death of Stalin
and reflect the communications behavior of people who had faced
the full force of the Terror. Yet the hunger for credible
news information, even under such circumstances, seems
irresistible. Table 1 illustrates the degree, according to
Inkeles and Bauer, to which members of several levels of Soviet
society, as of the late 1940s, depended on both covert and
overt sources of news.
Table 1
Social Class Patterns of Exposure 
to Communications Media
Type of Media Intelligentsia White-Collar Peasants
Official Mass Media 
Exposure
High 52% 38% 3%
Medium 45 47 21
Low 3 15 76
Covert Mass Media 
Exposure
High 20 11 1
Medium 26 25 12
Low 54 64 87
Total Respondents 642 679 387
SOURCE; Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 167.
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The authors defined official mass media information as 
newspapers and magazines, books and Soviet radio. Covert 
media were defined as discussion with friends, rumor and 
foreign radio. It should be emphasized that, according to 
Inkeles and Bauer, use of covert sources of news did not 
automatically identify a person disaffected from the Soviet 
system. Conversely, it appears that persons deeply loyal to 
the system might still be active users of covert media. This 
suggests the interesting possibility that neither group of 
people, both loyal and disaffected, fully trusts Soviet media 
and neither group ever has. The nature of Soviet life seems 
to make it possible for many people to wholeheartedly support 
the system with their words and deeds yet behave in ways which 
show an altogether different attitude. Perhaps it is a func­
tion of the dichotomy in Russian behavior described above by 
Hedrick Smith. Inkeles and Bauer obtained data about use of 
communications in Soviet life which also illustrated this 
point. (See table 2, p. 35) Inkeles and Bauer used such 
terms as "anti-Soviet sentiment" in a general sense and they 
felt that the meaning of their use should be clear in the con­
text of the immediate issue. In this context, an anti-Soviet 
sentiment "score" was derived from the expression of varying 
degrees of hostility toward such Soviet institutions and 
policies as state ownership of heavy industry, collectiviza­
tion and so on.)
Even though Inkeles and Bauer assumed that theit
35sample is more anti-Soviet than the parent population.
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Table 2
Percent Frequently Using Various Communications 
Media by Social Group and Anti-Soviet 
Sentiment Score
Social Group and Anti- 
Soviet Sentiment






Media Low High Low High Low High
Soviet Radio 68 57 59 48 15 6
Soviet News­
papers/Mag. 87 77 77 64 27 13
Foreign Radio 14 13 12 8 1 1
Rumors 30 30 21 19 7 10
Friends 33 22 24 19 5 7
Median
Respondents 422 177 370 263 93 215
SOURCE : Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen 9
p. 169.
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they still felt that the members of their sample were far 
from totally disaffected from Soviet life as a group. It 
can be seen from the data in table 2 that within the intelli­
gentsia and white-collar groups there is not a significant 
difference between persons with low and high anti-Soviet 
sentiment scores in their use of various communications media. 
For example, among the intelligentsia, 14 percent of the low 
anti-Soviet respondents and 13 percent of the high anti-Soviet 
respondents used the covert news provided by foreign radio. 
Among the white-collar respondents, 59 percent of the low 
anti-Soviet respondents and 48 percent of the high anti-Soviet 
respondents used the news provided by Soviet state radio.
These are not especially meaningful differences in terms of 
percentage, and they tend to suggest that sentiment toward the 
regime is not a major factor in determining the penetration of 
either overt or covert communications into the information 
environment of different social groups. What does seem to be 
meaningful is the extent to which covert sources of informa­
tion had penetrated among the intelligentsia and white-collar 
respondents. For example, approximately one-third of the 
intelligentsia and one-fifth of the white-collar respondents 
reported relying on rumors and friends for information. More 
than one-tenth of the members of both groups reported rely­
ing on foreign radio. This is noteworthy in a society which 
had earlier been described as one in which there can be no com­
petition for the message of the central authorities.
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Dual networks of communication exist in the Soviet 
Union and it seems clear that both have been there for some 
time. Gayle Hollander eventually produced a functional com­
parison of the two^® and her conclusions are worth presenting 
in detail because they are comprehensive.
1. The official system is monopolistic and highly 
controlled; the alternative system is pluralistic.
In contrast to the official system, the extra- 
official system involves many different strains 
of dissent (national, ethnic and various politi­
cal interpretations) and is accessible to anyone 
who dares to obtain the necessary means and be­
come involved in it. There is no one ultimate 
interpreter of the truth.
2. The official system is extremely hierarchical, 
paralleling the party apparatus and monitored by 
it at all levels; the alternative network is non- 
hierarchical. Since there is no one political 
organization among dissenters, no one ideology or 
set of goals, no one form of communication, there 
can be no way of setting up a hierarchy that 
encompasses the entire movement.
3. Official communications are portrayed with a massive 
top-to-bottom flow of content; the extra-official 
network operates on a horizontal plane. In the 
legitimate network, there is very little bottom- 
to-top communication (letters to newspapers, 
readers' conferences, secret police informers, 
etc.). Horizontal communication among groups below 
the elite level is severely restricted and purpose­
fully curtailed, inhibiting the development of any 
competing world-view or any serious modification
of the elite version of reality except within the 
elite itself. Among participants in the extra- 
official network, by and large, the flow of informa­
tion among various groups or individuals is on a 
more or less equal basis. There is no organized 
hierarchy to create and maintain control of the 
information flow.
4. Soviet mass media and the agitation-propaganda 
apparatus carry content that is primarily 
prescriptive; the unofficial system is concerned 
more with description and interpretation. The 
official system presents all material in a
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didactic manner with clearly defined implications 
for citizen reaction and behavior. Information 
in the unofficial system is notable for its 
straight-forward factual information and the 
meticulous care with which the information is 
presented. Its interpretations of reality are 
clearly at variance with the official versions.
5. The official version is dualistic and highly 
co-ordinated; the alternative one is multiform 
and relatively uncoordinated. The official system 
makes use of the two-step flow process by which 
information reaches the masses through certain 
influential persons (agitators, news commentators, 
etc.) acting as agents of the state. The unof­
ficial system makes use of both interpersonal 
contacts and printed materials as well as broad­
casts (mainly foreign and some illegal domestic 
ham stations). However these are not well 
coordinated. There is much duplication and waste 
of energy and effort.3?
To build her comparative statement of the two networks 
of communication, Gayle Hollander had the benefit of knowledge 
of some thirty-five years which had elapsed since Inkeles and 
Bauer began work on The Soviet Citizen. In these thirty-five 
years, the Soviet Union had proceeded through de-Stalinization 
and turmoil in leadership, and it had entered into detente 
with the West. These are important considerations for a 
study of the contemporary Soviet communications environment. 
But there is at least one more individualistic consideration 
which should be covered. Hollander wrote with specific knowl­
edge of the modern dissenter's movement in the Soviet Union. 
Inkeles and Bauer wrote that "distrust of the official media 
is a function of attitude toward the regime; however, some 
degree of mistrust does not necessarily mean that one is dis­
affected from the system." Though dissenters may be the most
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active users of the covert communications network, it does
not seem to follow that one becomes a dissenter by using it.
There may be at least one analyst who does not share
this point of view. A. Y. Shtromas has identified a category
of "potential dissent" to include "dissent" which is rarely
expressed politically but which is manifested in psychological
38and behavioral terms. Shtromas believes that:
Everyone in Soviet society today finds political 
change desirable and yet, at the same time, feels 
himself an impotent prisoner of the inertia imposed 
by the existing political system. One way or another, 
every Soviet citizen feels like a dissident and to a 
certain extent is a dissident in real te rm s .39
Shtromas prefaces his remarks to say that dissent should be
considered to include anything constituting refusal to assent
40to an established or imposed set of values, goals or ideas. 
Thereforef it seems possible to suggest that using the covert 
communications network, because one finds the official one to 
be inadequate, might make a person a dissenter in "potential" 
terms (potential in the terms used by Shtromas). In the 
sense that one turns to covert sources of information because 
he finds the official sources unreliable or untrustworthy, it 
seems fair to say that he is refusing to assent to an imposed 
set of values, goals and ideas. To the extent that he spreads 
news from covert sources among his family, friends and co­
workers, the scope of his "potential" dissent expands. It 
would be difficult to say at what point potential dissent 
becomes "actual" dissent, but perhaps highly active use of
40
covert communications makes an individual feel like a 
dissenter of sorts, and as Shtromas suggests, makes even a 
loyal Soviet citizen feel like a dissenter "in real terms."
CHAPTER 3
SYSTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of systemic considerations which
also should be considered under the rubric of totalitarianism.
The first one involves the role industrialization may have
had in producing a "liberalizing" effect on Soviet political
life. Specifically, industrialization is identified as the
principal force behind the putative convergence of the Soviet
and Western systems. Convergence theorists have not always
41explicitly formulated the concept, but it seems that indus­
trialization and urbanization, as consequences of moderniza­
tion, have contributed to making Soviet life appear more 
liberal, hence Western, than it appeared in Stalin's day. 
Brzezinski and Huntington cited three perceived consequences 
of industrialization which have been suggested as leading to 
convergence ;
1. . . .  Industrialization and urbanization, it is 
said, give rise to a common culture found in all 
modern societies. The industrial process imposes 
uniformities in equipment, skill, technique and 
organization. Managers in separate societies 
develop similar outlooks and similar ways of 
life. Eventually this culture will produce 
similar political institutions. This is to say, 
anti-Soviet Marxism: The forces of production
41
42
will shape the social context of production, 
which in turn will shape the political super­
structure.
2. Industrialization produces increasing diversity 
and complexity in society. An industrial society 
is necessarily pluralistic because physical 
scientists, medical experts, pedagogues, mili­
tary strategists, engineers, even economic 
planners must be free to use their skills and 
expertise. The laws of economics, physics, 
military strategy . = = are universally true
and must be respected by all modern societies, 
hence ideological and political claims must be 
limited. The function of the Party will no 
longer be to impose new demands on the system 
itself but to play a mediating, brokerage 
role. . . .
3. Industrialization creates affluence. Affluence 
undermines the discipline and ideological 
orthodoxy. The historical function of the 
Communist Party was to industrialize the Soviet 
Union. It could justify its monopoly of power 
only so long as sacrifice was required to achieve 
this end. Now sacrifice is no longer necessary 
economically and hence, the Communist Party is no
longer necessary.42
The convergence thesis suggests an explanation for 
increased use of covert communications in contemporary Soviet 
life. Industrialization produces complexity, complexity pro­
duces problems requiring solutions, and solutions require 
information. Convergence would seem to suggest that tech­
nicians, administrators and specialists all over the world are 
seeking ever greater freedom to find that information. In the 
Soviet Union, seekers of all kinds of information may be find­
ing the official communications network to be increasingly 
inadequate because the political control exercised over the 
official system appears anachronistically restrictive. In 
terms taken from Gayle Hollander, perhaps today's Soviet
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problem solvers at all levels of society feel they need 
information which is less prescriptive, less didactic—  
information which is more descriptive and interpretative. 
Therefore, the consequences of modernization and convergence 
theory, which are derived from them, do seem helpful in iden­
tifying several characteristics of the modern Soviet audience; 
the audience possesses a higher degree of sophistication, 
awareness and curiosity than ever before. And it seems clear 
that the Party and mass media are having difficulty coming to 
grips with this reality.
Convergence theory is also deeply rooted and it has 
implications for civil liberty questions in both the USA autid 
USSR. Pitirim Sorokin was one analyst who felt that totali­
tarianism was a political reaction caused by some great 
"emergency" such as war, famine or depression and that totali­
tarian tendencies in political life tend to recede as the
43emergency passes. The breadth and depth of his views, the 
comprehensiveness with which he applied them, and the assur­
ance with which he expressed them, induces a degree of skepti­
cism in this writer. Yet, they seem to be suggestive and 
worthy of mention;
Each time in a given society there appears an 
important emergency in the form of war or threat of 
war, or great famine, or great economic depression, 
or devastating epidemic, or earthquate, or flood, 
or anarchy, or unrest and revolution, or some other 
major emergency, the amount and severity of govern­
ment regimentation invariably increases and society's 
economy, political regime, way of life and ideologies 
experience a totalitarian conversion; and the greater 
the emergency the greater the totalitarian transfor­
mation. Conversely, each time a society's major
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emergency decreases, the amount and severity of its 
political, ideological and cultural systems undergo 
a de-totalitarian reconversion toward less regimented 
and more free ways of life; and the greater the 
decrease of the emergency, the greater the recon­
version to freedom. 44
Sorokin was more than happy to allow people to think 
that the West was moving in the direction of greater authori­
tarianism at the same rate the Soviet Union was receding from 
totalitarianism. Putting it in a blunt, if not grandiose 
fashion, Sorokin wrote, "In Soviet Russia, especially after 
Stalin, these liberties [civil] have been slowly expanding
while in this country [USA] they have tended to contract in
45various— overt and covert— ways."
Sorokin has not been alone in entertaining these kinds 
of views. In The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith 
presents a contemporary view of the state of civil liberties 
in political systems undergoing convergence. Unlike Sorokin 
who had spent roughly half his life in Russia and half in the 
United States, Galbraith's perspective on convergence is more 
certainly Western. He is quite open to the question of whether 
convergence increases the chances for freedom of expression 
in the Soviet Union while decreasing the chances for such 
freedom in the United States. But, Galbraith addresses the 
issue by dividing it:^^ Whose freedom are we talking 
about?— the working man's or that of the business leader who 
does the most talking about freedom? Galbraith then focuses 
on what he sees as the failure of the business leader and
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manager in the West to use the freedom he has for fear of
losing his position in a system which has made him
affluent:
The president of Republic Aviation is not much 
more likely to speak critically, or even candidly 
of the Air Force than is the head of a Soviet
combinat of the ministry to which he reports. No
modern head of the Ford Motor Company will ever 
react with the same pristine vigor to the presumed 
foolishness of Washington as did its founder. . . .
The high executive who speaks fulsomely of personal 
freedom carefully submits his speeches on the sub­
ject for review and elimination of controversial 
words, phrases and ideas as befits a good organi­
zation man. . . . The danger to liberty lies in 
the subordination of belief to the needs of the 
industrial system. . . .^^
Galbraith seems to be saying that in both Soviet and American 
systems, as "mature" industrial states, the question of indi­
vidual liberty is the same. The man who wishes to speak out, 
to be different, to oppose the status quo faces the same kind 
of risk. The man who steps out from the crowd faces the same 
kind of life in both countries— a life deprived of the material 
rewards and satisfactions which the system is prepared to 
deliver to him in abundance if he conforms. By implication 
Galbraith seems to suggest that in the modern Soviet Union, 
now that it has "left behind" its totalitarian past, the sanc­
tions today for being out of step and speaking out are some­
how more benign.
Both Sorokin and Galbraith have been taken to task 
48by Bertram D. Wolfe. Mr. Wolfe feels that Sorokin's own 
career as an academic militates against many of the more 
extravagant aspects of his formulation of convergence.
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According to woife, Sorokin held influential positions first
in Saint Petersburg as a professor of sociology before the
Revolution, and then at Harvard. Before he came to the
United States, Sorokin, through his own writing, had fully
branded himself as a "political reactionary," and only the
personal intervention of Lenin saved him from execution.
Lenin instead, writes Wolfe, ordered his stripped of his
Soviet citizenship and exiled.
. . . and that is how Sorokin found his way alive 
to America and to Harvard. By the time he wrote 
America and Russia [sic] (his very popular 1944 
book which widely disseminated his views on con­
vergence) , Professor Sorokin had not only forgiven 
the fact that Lenin stopped him from writing, teach­
ing, engaging in political activity, and living in 
the land of his birth, but he seemed to forget that 
Stalin, less "polite," would have taken his life 
along with his honor.^^
Wolfe, though he can be accused of engaging in hyperbole, 
nevertheless poses a problem for Sorokin and his thesis. Pre­
sumably Sorokin would agree that his ejection from Russia 
occurred during a period of extreme emergency conditions there. 
Presumably this should have produced a totalitarian transforma­
tion sufficient to have produced the elimination of Sorokin 
himself. But he escaped and so did many others. Sorokin 
handles this kind of detail through tortured elaborations of 
his thesis which lack the breezy tone of his basic 
formulation.
Wolfe also goes after Galbraith with the same kind 
evidence. He finds Galbraith to have directly addressed the 
issue of civil liberties in converging societies in an
47
interview with New York Times correspondent Anthony Lewis.
The interview was published in the magazine section of the 
Sunday, December 18, 1966 edition of the paper. The conclud­
ing question and answer of the interview got to the heart of 
the matter :
Lewis: Are you suggesting that as the two
societies converge, the Communist society 
will necessarily introduce greater polit­
ical and cultural freedom?
Galbraith: I'm saying precisely that. The require­
ments of deep, scientific perception and 
deep technical specialization cannot be 
reconciled with intellectual regimenta­
tion. They inevitably lead to intellec­
tual curiosity and to a measure of 
intellectual liberalism.51
Wolfe's response to this exchange is important and worth quot­
ing at length because it seems to sum up the problem faced by 
those who suggest that systemic developments have produced 
wholesale change in the information environment of the Soviet 
Union today:
All of the technological similarities imaginable and 
all of the Bills of Rights that paper will put up 
with will not alter the intellectual barbed wire 
represented by the absolute monopoly of the means of 
communication and of all the devices, paper, presses, 
meeting halls, publishing houses, reviews, reviewers, 
formulations, even vocabularies by which men communi­
cate and know each other and themselves. The rulers 
own and control the journals and organizations that 
might criticize their mistakes, their stupidities and 
cruelties. Harvard Professor Galbraith could not be 
a professor in a Soviet university. A.D.A. leader 
Galbraith could not be a political leader, author 
Galbraith could not get a book published if it main­
tained that the two systems are getting to be indis­
tinguishable. If he could steal a bit of paper and 
use an off-hour mimeograph machine to set down his 
views, he would be hauled into court for anti-Soviet 
propaganda, tried by a judge who knew in advance what
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the verdict was to be and how to make the crime fit 
the punishment. The courtroom would be packed with 
secret police masquerading as intellectuals and work­
ing men who would testify that his views were intol­
erable to them, corrupted their children, endangered 
public safety. He could not get friends, relatives 
or admirers of his wit into the courtroom. The 
"audience" would drown the words of the accused 
and his witnesses with jeers and clamor for punish­
ment. If he persisted he would run the danger of 
going to a sanitarium for the mentally deranged as 
has been the case with Yessinin-Volpin, Bukovsky,
Tarsis, Batashev, Vishnevskaya, and General 
Grigorenko. . . .  To sum up: the convergence theory
will not stand up. . .  . The likelihood is that they 
[the two countries that are supposed to be converging] 
will continue to move [each] toward its own future 
under the influence of its own heritage, traditions 
and institutions, a heritage that will both be con­
served and altered more by the actions of men than 
by the weight of things. . . .^2
Mr. Wolfe would seem to have the last word on whether 
or not the Soviet and American systems were converging as of 
the late 1960s. Clearly, each retained certain features to 
distinguish it. In regard to the Soviet case, several of 
these institutional and group features will be taken up in 
the next two chapters. However, it does seem for the moment 
that within the varied, sometimes exotic literature dealing 
with systemic considerations are to be found views which can 
contribute to the notion that the Soviet political system and 
its post-war political communication environment have not 
developed in a vacuum. The forces of industrialization and 
urbanization have worked their will on both Soviet and Western 
societies. The results have not necessarily been the same, 
but it does seem fair to suggest that these systemic forces 
have contributed to a certain change in the political atmos­
phere on the Soviet side. Whether one describes the
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atmosphere as more "liberal," more "Western," or less 
"Soviet" than in Stalin's day, it does seem changed at 
least in small part because of forces at work in the world 
which ignore political boundaries.
CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Mark W. Hopkins and Gayle Hollander, writing 
separately and at separate times nevertheless share a per­
spective on the problems Soviet mass media have had in get­
ting and keeping hold on its a u d i e n c e . B o t h  see the Soviet 
media as an inflexible institution for the most part, one 
which is trying hard to come to grips with technical and 
conceptual problems caused by forces of modernization. For 
example, Hopkins suggests that the political press of the 
Soviet Union has only recently (since the middle 1960s) shown 
real concern for the interests and tastes of the Soviet 
audience.
As a generalization, what happened was that the 
Soviet press, being managed by a centralized politi­
cal group, tended toward satisfying the political 
management rather than the mass audience. Because 
during Stalin's years very little attention was paid 
to public opinion, a sort of intellectual incest 
took place. Editors structured content according 
to what the political leadership considered the 
most effective form in propagandizing national 
goals and thoughts. The political leadership con­
curred in what was disseminated; but no one bothered 
to discover whether the message was reaching the 
audience. As a consequence, the managed press en­
gendered indifference, disbelief and cynicism among
the audience.54
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Hopkins may have a point. He hints at a distance
which he feels has opened up between the political management
and the mass audience. The distance seems to have grown
wider, as the ability of the political management to reach
the mass audience has grown greater over the years. The
modern technology of mass media, just as industrialization
in general, has proved to be a double-edged sword for the
Party. The more the Party is capable of reaching the mass
audience through television, radio, newspapers and a host of
other media, the more the audience seems to have availed
itself of unofficial and covert sources of information.
Gayle Hollander has addressed this matter directly:
As accessibility to the media has increased, exposure 
has become more and more privatized. The artificially 
supportive context of earlier days, collective listen­
ing and the agitator who guided discussion after 
programs or newspaper readings has gradually begun 
to disappear. As people have less and less contact 
with officials who try to guide their exposure pat­
terns and reactions, they become somewhat freer in 
their choices regarding official media. To some 
extent liberated from official scrutiny, people can 
now more easily choose not to expose themselves to 
media, and they can react to political messages in 
private or in the company of trusted friends. Such 
inter-personal support is an important condition for -c 
resisting and supplementing official interpretations.
A study of contemporary Soviet public opinion should
include reference to the work done by the Soviets to find out
what Soviet people think about public issues and the mass
media which supplies them the bulk of their news information.
Unfortunately, information of this type if quite scarce.
There is evidence that the state is quite concerned with what
people think? however, for reasons that are not entirely
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clear, it has chosen to let very little evidence of the 
research it has done into the question get out of its hands.
During the 1950s, however, several studies came to 
light which suggest that there were a few attempts to deter­
mine public opinion through survey research methods. A major 
effort was made by the editors of Komsomol * skaya pravda, the 
official organ of the Komsomol. R e s e a r c h e r s  went out to 
ask a single question, "will mankind succeed in averting 
war?" On May 19, 1960, the publication presented the opinions 
of 1,000 respondents noting that only 21 answered "no" and 
only 11 answered " i n d e f i n i t e . Komsomol'skaya pravda even­
tually opened a "Public Opinion Institute" which was shortlived
and there is evidence that a few additional "institutes" oper-
58ated openly until 1971. However, it appears that both the
results of the work of these institutes and the need for their
existence were questioned by powerful forces in the political 
59bureaucracy. It is easy to see by the nature of the ques­
tions the institutes investigated and the information acquired 
that their presence was not always innocuous.
For example, Walter D. Connor suggests that the work 
of the institutes during the 1960s can be divided into three 
research areas; public attitudes toward politics and politi­
cal participation, attitudes toward law and social control, 
and attitudes toward labor and productivity.^^ It is not to 
suggest that the institutes discovered anything revolutionary 
in their inquiries into these matters. Rather, the reasons 
for their demise seem diffuse. Perhaps the main reason
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open research into matters of public opinion is today 
circumscribed in the Soviet Union is because researchers 
during the 1960s found out things about the Party that the 
Party leadership would just as well not see publicized— as 
in April 1965, when disconcerting information turned up con­
cerning the political awareness of large numbers of Communist 
Party members. Party members are charged to develop a long- 
range perspective, it is not sufficient just to be knowledge­
able about current Party and state decrees. Yet,
a poll was taken of 13,000 Communists in order to 
ascertain what they had studied in the system of 
political education since 1956 and what questions 
of Marxist-Leninist theory they would like to study 
further. It turned out in the course of ten years 
29 percent of those questioned had not studied the 
history of the CPSU, 73 percent— political economy,
87 percent— philosophy. In the system of political 
education, there were basically studied [only] 
current Party and state documents.
As a result, large numbers of Communist Party members in the 
1960s may have been capable of only the most shallow discus­
sion o:f important ideological matters. Perhaps this is the 
kind of reason public opinion research today in the Soviet 
Union is all but invisible. Apart from occasional, innocuous
poll reports, the kind of information which appeared in the
621960s is no longer published.
In addition to public opinion studies, Soviet researchers 
in the 1960s also accomplished and published a number of studies 
related to the listening and viewing habits of Soviet radio 
and television audiences. Mark Hopkins and Gayle Hollander, 
again in separate work, both refer to an important study
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conducted by Boris Firsov probably in 1 9 6 6 - 6 7 . Firsov and 
his colleagues produced a sample of 1,916 television viewers 
in Leningrad, a city home to many of the most sophisticated 
citizens of the Soviet Union. With high concern for the 
demographic characteristics of his sample, Firsov was able 
to identify the major television viewing habits and preferences 
of the Leningrad audience. For example, Firsov identified the 
most popular and unpopular categories of television programming. 
Ranking highest in popularity were films, variety shows and a 
program involving quiz questions directed at a panel. Rank­
ing lowest were shows on the history of the government, shows 
on economic themes and shows regarding what was being taught 
in the s c h o o l s . O n c e  again, as with the work of the public 
opinion institutes, it probably brought little comfort to the 
political bureaucracy to know that the audience had such low 
regard for the programs which conveyed the highest political 
content and had such high regard for what probably seemed the 
most trivial.
Mark Hopkins has provided additional evidence which 
shows a more fundamental dissatisfaction than that which 
afflicts television programs with political or economic 
themes. In 1967, Soviet researchers investigated the reaction 
of Soviet audiences to information about foreign news develop­
ments which reached Soviet radio and television audiences 
through the official mass me d ia . De v e l op i ng  a sample of 
5,232 respondents from both rural and urban regions of the
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Soviet Union according to a statistical model of the Soviet 
population, the researchers first inquired into the sources 
of daily information on foreign news developments. Results 
indicated that the printed press was the prime source, fol­
lowed by radio, then television and finally lectures by 
political agitators. Then the researchers turned to the atti­
tudes of the audience toward the news coverage of foreign 
events as covered by Soviet radio and television. They chose 
three categories of information on which to question respon­
dents: timely, immediate information; factual news dispatches
(not necessarily timely); and commentary and interpretation. 
Then they rated the popularity of the radio and TV programs 
which corresponded to these categories. Apparently the idea 
was to see whether it was most important to people to have their 
foreign news information correct, or fast, or appropriately 
interpreted, and then what they thought of the official ser­
vices in "satisfying" these requirements. The results of 
Hopkins survey are shown in table 3.
Hopkins believes that the most significant conclusion 
to be drawn from these data is that there was an apparent 
dislike for interpretation and commentary and a dissatisfac­
tion with the coverage of foreign news in g e n e r a l . E x c e p t  
for collective farmers, all groups seemed less than pleased.
The Party relies on interpretation and commentary as the 
principal means of getting across its point of view in foreign 
news matters; yet, it appears that no group favors
Table 3
















Workers 49.0 29.0 28.9 28.1 56.6 25.2
Engineers-
Technicians 62.9 18.0 40.2 18.0 72.4 23.4
Collective
Farmers 40.0 60.2 27.5 46.6 49.3 52.7
Students 53.8 21.6 38.7 22.1 74.9 27.8
CPSU and
Govt.
Officials 61.3 28.7 55.0 36.2 81.2 40.0
SOURCE: Zhurnalist 8 (August 1968), p. 62, as quoted in Hopkins, Mass
Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 328.
♦Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because respondents checked more 
than one category.
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interpretations and commentary over factual dispatches and 
timely information, and no group decidedly felt that the 
official news network covers international news well in any 
category of consideration. Once again, the information con­
tained in this survey appears to be the type of information 
that the political bureaucracy would prefer not to see pub­
lished in an open publication such as Zhurnalist. Perhaps 
this is again the reason why the audience research data such 
as the type developed by Firsov and others have virtually dis­
appeared from public view since 1971.
A major source of information with which Soviet audi­
ences have been able to supplement the official news and news 
information has been Western radio broadcasts. Analysis of 
recent data obtained from emigrants of the Soviet Union shows 
that 95 percent of them listened to Western radio broadcasts 
before departing for a b r o a d . T o  be sure, many of these 
emigrants are urban, educated and white-collar people, but 
their exposure to Western radio shows that outside-originating, 
unofficial news information is readily available in the Soviet 
Union. Of course the degree to which these people actually 
understand and believe what they hear on Western radio sta­
tions is something yet to be determined. For many years the 
broadcasts of the Voice of America (VGA) and the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC) have been available to any Soviet 
listener equipped with a suitable short-wave radio and the 
requisite motivation to listen. Analysis of recent data
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obtained from Soviet emigrants (table 4) shows that listening
to foreign stations has been widespread. For five years,
from June 1963 to August 1968, the Soviets stopped jamming
68almost all foreign broadcasts. Jamming commenced again 
with the invasion of Czechoslovakia but it stopped again 
almost entirely in September 1973. From September 1973 until 
August 1980, and the onset of the Polish workers' strikes, 
jamming of almost all the foreign stations was quite rare.
In addition to jamming, the Soviet authorities have 
used other methods from time to time to curtail listening to 
foreign stations. Gayle Hollander has identified two— imitat­
ing the broadcast sound and style of the foreign stations on 
a Soviet station, and launching propaganda campaigns in the 
Soviet press against foreign stations in g e n e r a l . I n  1964, 
the Soviets put on the air a station known as Mayak or 
Beacon. It broadcast news, commentary and popular music in 
the fashion of several foreign stations and it operated on the 
same frequencies as some of them. It was a most innovative 
form of jamming. Before 1963 and after 1968 when jamming was 
resumed, Soviet newspapers also actively combatted the influ­
ence of foreign radio with words. Pravda on July 31, 1968, 
several weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, published 
the following article:
In this collective the working day began with an 
account by Engineer B, of the "latest news" he had 
heard the previous evening over foreign radio 
broadcasts. It is noteworthy that even before the 
Party committee intervened, his own colleagues ex­
plained to him that he had become a sort of extended
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Table 4
Overall Listening to Foreign Radio (Emigrants)
1976-77 1978 1979
n=l,605 n=960 n=890
Station % % %
VGA 89 91 94
BBC 74 57 63
Deutsche Welle (DW) 53 44 52
Radio Liberty (RL) 39 24 24
Radio Free Europe (RFE)* 17 21 22
Radio Peking 8 21 16
Radio Canada 21 18 14
Radio Sweden 17 19 14
Radio Vatican 7 11 10
Radio Monte Carlo 5 8 7
Radio Luxembourg 3 2 2
Radio France 4 2 1
Radio Japan 1 1 1
Radio Italy 3 - -
Radio Finland 2 1
Radio Iran 2 1
All India 1 1
Other 3 - 1
Totals exceed 100% due to multiple stations of listening.
SOURCE; "Listening to Western Radio by Emigrants 
from the USSR in 1979," Analysis Report #3-80, in Soviet 
Area Audience and Opinion Research, RFE-RL, Inc., June 
1980.
*Listeners to RFE in the 1979 survey group were pri­
marily resident in the Ukraine (40%) , the Baltic Republics 
(18%), Moldavia (14%) and Byelorussia (11%). Languages of 
listening were mainly Polish and Romanian.
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communications line for a foreign radio station, 
which with his help was disseminating false re­
ports about events taking place in the world.70
But the authorities have also tried to discredit the foreign 
radio stations by connecting them to alleged espionage activ­
ities by the foreign governments which sponsor them. Even 
though the state may or may not intend to make good on the 
threat, it has tried to make Soviet listeners feel they are 
at risk by listening openly to the foreign station and that 
the risk increases by publicly acknowledging the station as 
the source of news information. For example, two articles in 
Izvestiya in December 1968 linked the BBC with the British 
Secret Intelligence Service;
To put it bluntly, in its forty-six years on the banks 
of the Thames, it [BBC] has accumulated considerable 
experience in ideological sabotage, which has always 
been directed against the Soviet Union and the other 
Socialist countries. . . . The BBC, the mouthpiece 
of rabid anti-Communism in the British Isles, has 
been taking a very active part in several extremely 
ugly S.I.S. operations. This is confirmed by a num­
ber of documents in our possession. . . . London's 
radio spies cooperate with the S.I.S. in other fields 
as well. For instance, British intelligence has long 
been interested in the extensive mail the BBC receives 
from its listeners, primarily from the European 
socialist countries and the Soviet Union. . . .  In 
connection with all this another document has come 
to light; it states that "an agreement exists with the 
BBC to turn over to the S.I.S. all letters sent to the 
BBC from listeners in the socialist countries. The 
addresses of the letterwriters are also to be handed 
over.71
It seems clear that the Soviet Union is no longer a 
completely closed society, though the authorities may attempt 
to close it from time to time. Outside information can and 
does get through on a regular basis. Even the jamming of a
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foreign radio station does not eliminate the possibility that 
a persistent listener will hear bits and pieces of the for­
bidden broadcast and spread the news to his friends. The 
Soviet Union may no longer be an effectively closed society 
to foreign broadcasts, but the on-again, off-again history of 
jamming suggests that it is a troubled society as both the 
Party and mass audience try to fix the boundary line which 
separates what the audience is permitted to know from what it 
is forbidden to know and talk about. Earlier in this chapter, 
reference was made to the conclusion in 1967 by John A. 
Armstrong that the Soviet Union was also no longer a police 
state in the usual sense of the term. Perhaps there have 
been some additional later institutional developments which 
have reduced the tendency of the police apparatus to draw 
the line between what one is permitted to talk about and what 
one is not. In 1971, Professor Barghoorn speculated on this 
matter.
The party apparatus and its police allies still 
dominate Soviet Russia, but their dominance is not 
as overwhelming as it once was. They are forced to 
take into account, sometimes yield at least partially 
to the demands of other groups in society, such as 
scientists and writers, for a measure of autonomy 
and independence far greater than Stalin would have 
permitted. . . .  It is significant and encouraging 
to those who regard individual and professional free­
dom as precious values, that liberal Soviet jurists 
have, in the post Stalin era, added their voices to 
the curtailment of arbitrary and extra-legal adminis­
trative behavior. There has developed an alliance, 
or at least a parallelism of professional interests 
which may yet curb the excesses of police power.
. . . The police agencies can almost certainly be 
counted on to resist. . . ,^2
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In Western, perhaps American terms, the ability of 
an individual to acquire and disseminate all kinds of informa­
tion is normally considered a civil right. Professor Feld- 
brugge writes that Soviet legal science usually distinguishes 
between four groups of civil rights: social-economic rights,
such as the right to work; equality, as in the rights and 
duties of citizens in the economic, social-political and 
cultural spheres of life; personal rights, as in the inviola­
bility of the person and the home; and finally political rights,
73such as freedom of speech, press, assembly and conscience.
All of these [political] liberties are severely 
limited by what is called "the interests of the 
working class." Every political activity which 
would encroach upon the objectives of the political 
leadership, which alone knows what the interests of 
working people are, is inadmissable.74
Nevertheless, the remarks of Professor Barghoorn would 
suggest that some Soviet jurists in recent years may have 
contributed to a climate in which some Soviet citizens may 
have felt more free than in earlier years to acquire and dis­
tribute information outside of regime control and approval. 
Soviet jurists have long had at their disposal Article 70 of 
the RSFSR Criminal Code to limit the speech activities of per­
sons who would speak in a fashion harmful to "the interests of 
the working class." Article 70 defines "Anti-Soviet Agitation 
and Propaganda" as one of ten "Especially Dangerous Crimes 
against the S t a t e . I t  ranks with treason and espionage, 
both of which are punishable by death. A person found guilty 
of violating Article 70 may be punished by "deprivation of
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freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or 
without additional exile for a term of two to five years.
Article 70 seeks to prohibit "agitation and propaganda carried 
on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet 
regime (vlast') . . .  or the circulation, for the same pur­
pose, of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet 
state and social system. In 1966, after a trial of
four days, Soviet philosopher Andrei Siniavsky and poet lulii 
Daniel' were convicted of "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propa­
ganda" under Article 70.. Siniavsky received a sentence of 
"seven years imprisonment in a corrective labor colony of the
most severe kind." Daniel' received five years imprisonment
78under the same conditions. These cases received wide press
coverage in the West.
In 1966, Article 70 was supplemented by Article 190-1;
"Circulation of Fabrications Known to Be False VThich Defame
Soviet State and Social System. " Article 190-1 is listed in
the Criminal Code of the RSFSR as one of over two dozen "Crimes
79Against the System of Administration." It ranks with such 
matters as "Desecration of State Emblem or Flag" (Article 190-2) 
and "Resisting Policeman or People's Guard (Article 191-2). 
Specifically, Article 190-1 forbids "the systematic circula­
tion in oral form of fabrications known to be false which de­
fame the Soviet state and social system, and likewise, the pre­
paration or circulation in written, printed or other forms of
80works of such content." The penalty for conviction under
64
Article 190-1 is listed as "deprivation of freedom for a 
term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 
100 rubles.
It is unclear whether Soviet lawmakers intended the 
introduction of Article 190-1 to make it harder or easier to 
deal with people who speak out against the regime. On the 
surface, it would seem to be harder because the introduction 
of 190-1 apparently made it possible for people to express 
criticism of particular institutions or policies within the 
system, though not of the system as a whole. And there is 
evidence that conviction under Article 190-1 deals with a 
lower level of offense than 70. For example, John Hazard 
et al. recount the case of one X. Teshaev who was convicted 
on August 7, 1970, by the Judicial Division for Criminal Cases 
of the Tadzhik SSR Supreme Court. Citizen Teshaev had com­
mitted a variety of offenses. Among them was violation of 
Article 203-1 (distribution in oral form of deliberately false 
fabrications harming the Soviet State). Article 203-1 was 
identical to Article 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. It 
seems that Teshaev, while working in a factory in the city of 
Dushanbe in 1968-69, had spoken in a fashion offensive to per­
sons of a certain ethnic origin in Tadzhikistan. He was con­
victed therefore of distributing "deliberately false fabrica­
tions" and "intentionally slanderous rumors." In overturn­
ing the verdict of the Tadzhik SSSR Supreme Court in 1971, 
the Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet stated that Teshaev was
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convicted "without foundation" under Article 203-1 because
he "failed to harm the Soviet State" (my emphasis) in a
82deliberate, systematic fashion.
The introduction of Article 190-1 in 1966 suggests 
that the regime found itself under-equipped to deal with 
"offenses" involving speech when it had to rely principally 
on Article 70. The regime apparently felt that it had many 
more "Teshaevs" on its hands than "Siniavskys" or "Daniels." 
The regime apparently felt that Article 70 was intended to 
deal with a much more "dangerous" person than the likes of 
Teshaev, whose most dangerous quality was his bigotry. 
Nevertheless, it still chose to find Teshaev not guilty of 
violating Article 203-1 (identical to Article 190-1) on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence. The case of Teshaev is 
hardly definitive, but it does suggest that, by the early 
1970s, the regime was ready to look closely at cases involv­
ing speech, and to reserve the harshest penalties for persons 
who had violated the letter of the strictest law.
There would seem to be at least two levels of inter­
est in these matters : practical and juridical. On the juridi­
cal level, there is interest in whether or not the regime, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, had decided to deal with acts 
of political non-conformism through procedural as opposed to 
summary justice. Cases involving internationally known 
figures such as Siniavsky or Daniel', or a virtual unknown 
such as Teshaev, might turn out more or less well for the
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accused. And, of course, we have no way to know with 
certainty how many people may have run afoul of the law dur­
ing this period for speaking out, and who were imprisoned or 
punished by police authorities in a summary fashion. However, 
the fact that the regime did choose to try some political non­
conformists in open court, against the standard of the criminal 
code, with acquittal possible, would tend to support Professor 
Barghoorn's view that some forces have been at work attempting 
to curtail the exercise of arbitrary and extra-legal police 
power. This would seem to be an important institutional dev­
elopment, one which would seem able to contribute to a certain 
reduction of fear in the heart of the person who desires to 
acquire and distribute information from sources outside of 
regime control.
On the practical level, a Soviet person might ask him­
self a direct question about speech: What can I get away with,
and what had I better not try? Professor Jerry Hough has 
recently written of a Soviet future in which "liberaliza­
tion" and "democratization" occur at the expense of
83"authoritarianism." While his conclusions seem premature 
at best, he does offer some interesting opinions on the prac­
tical aspects of speech. He has developed a short list of 
speech activities which may be free from any sanction:
Criticism in a personal diary is not covered by the 
law for there is no intent to spread the "falsehood," 
and a critical remark provoked by personal diffi­
culties or by delays in the supply system is also 
exempt, for there is no deliberate attempt to sub­
vert the system. [The same reasoning applies to a
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political joke repeated for reasons of humor.] 
Moreover, if persons are to be prosecuted, they 
must know that their "slander is slanderous. Even 
repetition of "Voice of America" accusations is not 
punishable unless the state proves knowledge and intent.84
It appears, then, that the regime in the 1970s was
prepared to see expressed a good deal of alienation, in a
variety of spoken forms. But alienation is not the same thing
as resistance to authority. It would seem, therefore, that
the regime was prepared to discriminate between the two, to
acquiesce in one case and punish in the other. But still, it
may be that the regime was ready to employ a host of informal
sanctions against a political non-conformist, even one who was
resistant to authority, before it arrested and prosecuted him.
According to Professor Hough:
In practice, the post-Stalin regimes generally have 
instituted legal proceedings only as a last resort, 
preferring to use a number of lesser penalties as 
warnings. The line between acceptable and unaccept­
able speech is a fuzzy one, but anyone in the vicinity 
will be given full notice of the precariousness of his 
or her position. If the warnings are not heeded, the 
sanctions can be progressively tightened; first, 
denial of permission to go abroad, reduced size in 
the edition of a book or postponement of its publica­
tion; loss of an administrative post or the possi­
bility of one; then total rejection of manuscripts, 
secret police searches of apartments. If the dissi­
dent abandons his political activity, he generally is 
permitted to resume a normal life.85
Hough appears to have had in mind leading artists, scientists 
and writers when he wrote the remarks directly above. Unless 
he was being overly optimistic, it would seem that the regime 
in recent years was prepared to see some of its leading citi­
zens distribute a relatively high amount of unofficial
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information before it took them strictly to task. And the 
flexibility with which the regime apparently was prepared to 
handle serious cases of political non-conformism on the part 
of high-ranking persons would seem to suggest that the infor­
mation activities of persons of lower social standing was of 
even more modest concern. The answer to the question, "What 
can I get away with?" for most Soviet people could be the 
following; "In comparison to Stalin's time, quite a lot."
CHAPTER 5
GROUP CONSIDERATIONS
As Professor Hough has noted, the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable speech is a "fuzzy" one. In 
November 1970, not long after the publication of his Will 
the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, Soviet historian Andrei 
Amalrik was brought to trial and convicted.^ Amalrik indir­
ectly addressed the matter of.the "fuzzy" line in this book. 
Amalrik took a position related to that of the convergence 
theorists in that he saw, in the post-Stalin era, the devel­
opment of a new "middle class," a class of "specialists."
The commitment of the state to the development of specialists 
for the achievement of state goals, and the growth in numbers 
of specialists, were seen by Amalrik as producing a new group 
of people which was taking on mass character. This new middle 
class was seen as enjoying a high standard of living by Soviet 
standards, as having achieved a certain level of respect in 
Soviet society, and as having the ability to assess more or
less accurately its own position in society and that of
2society as a whole,
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Âmalrik appears to be a proponent of the technocracy
thesis in his 1970 book; however, the technocracy thesis did
not originate with him. It has its roots in James Burnham's
The Managerial Revolution (1941) in which rule by a new elite
of managers was foreseen.^
The bureaucrats of today and tomorrow may think, in 
their own minds, that they pursue an independent 
course; but their projects, their wars and displays 
and manipulation of mass sentiment, all require enor­
mous resources. In practice, these can be assured 
only through their collaborating with, and in the end 
subordinating themselves to those who are actually 
directing the processes of production, to the manager. 
The sources of wealth and power are the basic instru­
ments of production; these are to be directed by the 
managers; and the managers are then, to be the ruling 
class.4
According to A. Y. Shtromas, a recent Soviet emigrant,
Amalrik was also proceeded in advancing a technocracy thesis
by Soviet samizdat author F. Znakov (pseudonym) who argued as
early as 1966 that the main force for political change in Russia
was the struggle between the "partocratic upper class" and the
"technocratic middle c l a s s , Z n a k o v  reportedly developed the
concept out of his reading of George Orwell's 1984. Orwell's
fictional and futuristic society involved a party split between
"Inner" and "Outer" factions— the Inner members administrators
and the Outer members specialists. Orwell fantasized about a
world in which the machine had produced wealth and abundance,
but also about a world in which shortages of material goods
had to be artificially created to preserve certain "natural"
distinctions between people;
By the standards of the early twentieth century, 
even a member of the Inner Party lives an austere,
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laborous kind of life. Nevertheless, the few 
luxuries that he does enjoy— his large well- 
appointed flat, the better texture of his clothes, 
the better quality of his food and drink— his 
private motorcar or helicopter— set him in a dif­
ferent world from a member of the Outer party, and 
members of the Outer party have a similar advantage 
in comparison with the submerged masses whom we 
call "the proles."6
W. W. Rostow in Dynamics of Soviet Society (1954), 
added his voice to those which had spoken of Soviet society 
as factionalized by technological influences. Rostow high­
lighted what he called "the technological outlook" and he 
speculated about its political significance;
The bulk of the bureaucracy is now professionally 
trained in one or another field of specialization 
where criteria for efficient performance are ration­
ally evolved. . . . The outlook of the good techni­
cian with his built-in standards of order and effi­
ciency is bound to conflict with the workings of a 
system where the arbitrary and apparently irrational 
exercise of power intrudes on the normal business of 
life. Whether openly articulated or not the concep­
tion of a more orderly and rational organization of 
society is altogether likely to develop; and it might 
become politically meaningful should the instruments 
of high power split or operate less strongly on the 
bureaucratic chain of command.7
However, there are good reasons to downplay the role 
group conflict may be playing in the creation of political 
change in the Soviet Union. First, even though the technical 
intelligentsia has essential skills, and it may also possess 
the outlook described by Rostow, it still faces a bureaucratic- 
political elite with a monopoly of control on the forces of
Ocoercion in Soviet society. Secondly, even though the party 
apparatus may appear to be just one of several competing 
interest groups in Soviet politics, it is the party apparatus
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which acts as a supreme, unifying, ”superbureaucracy," which
9"holds the whole totalitarian structure together." These 
considerations are mentioned for reasons of comprehensiveness 
and are not intended to take anything away from Amalrik whose 
views are suggestive and worth pursuing a little further.
Amalrik had noted that his "middle class" had taken 
on "mass character" and he felt that this new class was in 
opposition to the bureaucratic e l i t e . B o t h  sides "show 
marked passivity" in pursuit of their interests. This situa­
tion is reported as confusing for both sides, and the party 
seems to be particularly confused because it no longer seems 
to understand why it needs to hold on to power. It no longer 
appears confident in its service of doctrine, leadership or 
tradition. The principal aim of the regime seems just to pre­
serve itself in power.
The regime is thus no longer on the attack but on the 
defensive. It's motto is "Don't touch us and we 
won't touch you." Its aim: "Let everything be as
it was." . . .  It is now evident that in Soviet 
Law there exists, if I [Amalrik] may use the term, 
a broad "gray belt"— activities that the law does 
not formally forbid but which are, in fact, forbid­
den in practice. For instance: contacts between
Soviet citizens and foreigners; a concern over non- 
Marxist philosophies or [taking a position] inconsis­
tent with notions of socialist realism; attempts to 
put out typewritten literary collections; spoken or 
written criticism not of the system as a whole, which 
is forbidden under Articles 70 and 190-1 of the 
Criminal Code, but of particular institutions within 
the system.12
Professor Hough, writing with knowledge of Soviet life 
in the 1970s, reported that criticism, not of the system as a 
whole, is possible in practical terms because of the nature of
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Article 190-1. Amalrik, in his 1970 book, reported that it 
was not possible in practical terms because such criticism 
was part of a "gray belt." Perhaps any difference of opinion 
is related, in part, to a ten-year difference in historical 
perspective. On the other hand, it would seem more likely 
that the location of the "fuzzy line" between what is accept­
able and unacceptable speech to the regime has not moved with 
the passage of ten years' time, that it lies where it has 
always done so since the introduction of 190-1 in 1966. What 
separates acceptable from unacceptable speech to the regime 
are probably qualitative criteria. Such criteria include the 
intent of the speaker in making speech of a politically non­
conformist nature, and the forum in which he chooses to make 
it.
Any confusion about what constitutes acceptable and 
unacceptable speech to the regime is probably due to the 
regime itself. The degree to which one enjoys the "protection" 
of Article 190-1 (protection in the sense that under it one 
may express alienation against certain state agencies or 
policies, but not of the system as a whole) seems to depend 
on whether or not a person shows himself to be without "sub­
versive" intent. The degree to which a person shows himself 
to be without subversive intent seems to be a measure of how 
few of the non-judicial sanctions (warnings, travel restric­
tions, lost job promotions, etc.) must be applied against him 
before he desists from making precisely the kind of criticisms
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that he apparently can make under Article 190-1. This would 
mean that his right to make such criticisms exists, but it 
is not absolute. It is an encumbered right, if that is not 
a contradiction in terms, the weight of the encumbrance de­
pending on such factors as the persistence of the speaker in 
making known his unconventional views, and the level of inter­
est that the authorities take in making him stop. It would 
appear to be a dynamic, even ideosyncratic sort of thing. In 
this view, there is no dichotomy between Amalrik and Hough 
about the nature of the "protection" provided by Article 190-1.
In addition to the question of intent would seem to 
be the question of the audience. Professor Hough offers 
another opinion which seems to be helpful in this context;
The Soviet leadership behaves as if controlling the audience 
which is exposed to the idea is more important than control­
ling the idea i t s e l f . T h e  key to the question becomes the 
setting in which the idea or information is expressed. The 
family and the universities were identified earlier by Fried­
rich and Brzezinski as two "islands of separateness" even in 
Stalin's day. Others may have developed since his death.
For example. Hough reports that the greatest freedom of expres­
sion seems to be permitted in more or less private gatherings—  
at a party, with a group of colleagues at work, in a bar.
Among professional and scholarly groups, discussions may be 
quite "free-swinging," and "the regime does not usually seem 
to impose severe punishment on the transmission of quite
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radical views directly to the authorities.""^ The regime has 
also been "semi-tolerant" of highly "illegitimate" communica­
tions that are confined to the samizdat network with its
individual reproduction of documents by either hand or by 
15typewriter.
William Taubman has written of his days in 1965-66 
as an exchange student in the Department of Administrative Law 
at Moscow State U n i v e r s i t y . A s  an American he reports with 
seeming wonderment the type of frank exchanges about political 
matters which seemed commonplace among students and their pro­
fessors. Even when a guest lecturer appeared, a member of the 
Communist Party Central Committee, the students barraged him
17with sharp questions and cynical rejoinders to his responses. 
The students seemed to have a passion for getting behind party 
rhetoric and straightening out slanted facts. This is not to 
say that the students were behaving disloyally, just with 
intense objectivity and skepticism. Perhaps Taubman was wit­
ness to no more than a manifestation of de-Stalinization which 
was still in flower in 1965; perhaps something more.
Taubman was thoroughly impressed by the degree to 
which the professors and the party leaders went toward meet­
ing the students on their own terms. They seemed to believe 
that "youth will be served" insofar as they gave direct ans­
wers to direct questions most of the time, even when the topic 
was sensitive to the Party. Often their answers did not 
satisfy many of the students, but in the case personally
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observed by Taubman, the member of the Central committee
continued to patiently explain things until most of the
18students ceased their objections. Taubman felt that the 
Party was trying to convince the students that despite what 
appeared to be conflicting points of view on important mat­
ters, the young people and the Party had no difference which
X 3could not be openly addressed and resolved:
The simple truth is that Soviet indoctrination has 
backfired. It has ended in doubt and dissent. And 
Soviet education, perhaps in spite of itself, has 
produced a generation that questions all kinds of 
philosophical and political assumptions. We delude 
ourselves when we persist in the notion that this is 
a nation of sheep. We must recognize that the Party 
today does not equate all ideological non-conformity 
with criminal delinquency, that far from penalizing 
outspoken students, it encourages them to be frank.20
The reason the Party wanted the students to be frank, accord­
ing to Taubman, was because their frankness served as a kind 
of feedback mechanism— the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party regularly sent officials to debate current issues with
the students to determine the actual levels of their cynicism 
21and disbelief. Insofar as the students suffered no damage 
to their careers or reputations by speaking out freely, it does 
appear that the regime had induced a kind of "freedom of ex­
pression" among members of this specialized group. The progeni­
tor of this "freedom" was not without its ulterior motive, but 
thirty years ago when Stalin was in command what Taubman 
observed at Moscow State University in 1965 would have been 
unthinkable.
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Of course, it is possible to make too much out of 
Taubman's report. It would be very interesting to retrace 
his steps in 1981 to see if students are still speaking out 
with the same impunity. But I suspect that Taubman was wit­
ness to an important but transient phenomenon. The litera­
ture does not contain consistent, continuing evidence of the 
type developed by Taubman that the level of free expression he 
witnessed in 1955 carried on into the 1970s. Perhaps because 
de-Stalinization had given way to detente by the mid-1970s, 
some more determined measure of social control was reasserted 
by the regime.
A noteworthy exception to this point of view would be 
the recent writings of Professor Hough. Hough would seem to 
be saying, among other things, that the type of political com­
munication observed by Taubman in 1965 is not to be considered
22all that rare in the 1970s. He refers to "private gatherings"
— a party, colleagues talking at work, working men in a bar. 
These, in addition to the "free swinging" debates which Taubman 
observed in an academic setting, have some important things 
in common. In all of these cases, the number of people present 
is relatively small; the people present generally know each 
other by name, and the efforts to communicate "illegitimately" 
are either informal (as in Hough's "private gatherings") or 
they serve a larger party purpose (as in Taubman's example).
The people in all of these settings may well be under surveil­
lance by the regime as they use information from unofficial
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sources (such as foreign radio stations), but these people are 
normally not punished for doing so.
To the extent that Hough is correct about private 
gatherings in the 1970s, people were probably more comfortable 
about communicating information from an unofficial source, and 
expressing unconventional views, because general levels of 
fear had fallen among Soviet people since the passing of Stalin. 
It seems that people were less worried in the 1970s about what 
might happen to them for failing to conform to party-determined 
patterns of behavior than they were when Stalin was alive. 
Perhaps Taubman, in 1965, was witness to a period since Stalin 
when levels of fear were at a particularly low level. I sus­
pect that they grew again somewhat into the 1970s because 
observers of the Soviet Union over the last five to seven 
years, except mainly Professor Hough, appear to have had dif­
ficulty finding anything approximating what Taubman found 
easily in 1965. But viewed against the backdrop of the last 
thirty years, the Soviet political atmosphere has certainly 
changed, if the political communications behavior of Soviet 
people in the 1970s can be used as a measure. It seems to 
have changed dramatically, though the rate of change has not 
been consistent and the state of the change is not necessarily 
permanent.
The development of the private zone would seem to be 
evidence of a changed political atmosphere since Stalin. In 
chapters 6 through 8, I outline a way that the presence and
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dimensions of the private zone can be determined empirically. 
In short, I propose to establish a test case. I propose to 
use data obtained from an examination of recent Soviet Jewish 
emigrants from the Soviet Union to establish the presence and 
dimensions of the private zone in the political communications 
environment of a certain Soviet nationality group during the 
early 1970s. Using members of such a group for this kind of 
purpose poses certain opportunities and problems. These are 
dealt with in chapter 7. Finally, in chapter 8, we see how 
the private zone has evolved and how it may actually be one 
manifestation of the difference between the general political 
atmosphere of Stalin's day and that of the early 1970s.
CHAPTER 6
THE CURRENT EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS
Though the Soviet Union may no longer be a completely 
closed society, it has certainly not become open to the 
degree that an American researcher might freely go around 
inside the Soviet Union making inquiries about political 
attitudes. Since it appears that the Sô /̂ iet authorities are 
reluctant to permit serious and open research into political 
attitudes by even Soviet analysts, there seems to be little 
point in imagining it being done by non-Soviet parties.
Since it also appears that current Soviet citizens gener­
ally exhibit what Hedrich Smith viewed as a dichotomy of 
behavior (separating the world into "official" and "personal" 
spheres), the responses to direct questions on sensitive 
subjects by Soviet citizens in the Soviet Union might depend 
on what the respondent thinks the interviewer wants to hear 
as much as on what he actually thinks. This is not to say 
that survey research methods are inappropriate with all 
Soviet subjects, only that the setting in which such methods 
are used may be at least as important as the nature of the 
people who are being asked the questions.
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For example, Inkeles and Bauer produced credible 
results by administering questionnaires to former Soviet 
citizens who were displaced by war. In this way, people 
who had permanently left the Soviet Union and who were on 
their way to new lives in other countries were able to pro­
vide responses suggestive of general Soviet attitudes, with­
out exhibiting the complete dichotomy of thought and behavior 
which they might have exhibited were they still living in 
the Soviet Union. Since World War II, there has been no dis­
placement of people in central Europe to match the massive 
one which produced the pool of subjects studied by Inkeles 
and Bauer. However, constant movement of people through the 
"Iron Curtain," and more to the point, legal emigration from 
the Soviet Union, have continued to place in the West limited 
numbers of people who possess pertinent information about the 
Soviet Union and who can reflect attitudes identical with 
those generally held there.
During the 1970s, most legal emigrants of the Soviet 
Union were Jews or close relatives of Jews. Many of these 
people now live in the United States. The number of recent 
Jewish emigrants is not large when measured against the num­
ber of people in all of Europe who were displaced by World 
War II, but enough Soviet Jews have now emigrated so that 
making them the object of survey research methods is think­
able in statistical terms. Large-scale emigration began in
the second half of 1971 and by the end of 1978 more than
23170,000 Jewish emigrants had left the Soviet Union.
Table 5
Jewish Emigration from the USSR, 
1976-78, by Republic









Total 14,261 16,745 28,858 59,864 100.00 100.00
RSFSR* 3,323 3,116 4,742 11,181 18.7 37.6
Ukraine 6,446 7,598 13,891 27,935 48.7 36.1
Moldavia 1,481 2,467 3,827 7,775 13.0 4.6
Uzbekistan 333 781 1,657 2,771 4.6 4.8
Azerbaydzhan 957 683 1,023 2,663 4.4 1.9
Georgia 643 572 1,055 2,270 3.8 2.6
Byelorussia 308 413 1,118 1,839 3.1 6.9
Latvia 358 514 747 1,619 2.7 1.7
Lithuania 266 349 371 986 1.6 1.1
Tadzhikistan 94 154 335 583 1.0 0.7
Kazakhstan 30 57 33 120 0.2 1.3
Estonia 16 24 40 80 0.1 0.2
Kirgiziya 2 14 19 35 0.1 0.4
Armenia 4 3 0 7 0.0 0.0
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0.2
00to
SOURCE: Yoel Florsheim, "The Demographic Significance of Jewish
Emigration," Soviet Jewish Affairs 10 (February 1980): 7. Florsheim obtained
above data and data in table 6 from the Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency. 
The Jewish Agency is the semi-official Israeli agency responsible for the emigra­
tion of Jews to Israel.
*RSFSR stands for Russian Socialist Federated Republic, also known as the 
Russian republic.
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The data in table 5 indicate that.almost half of all the 
1976-78 emigrants came from the Ukraine, even though, accord­
ing to the 1970 Soviet census, the Ukrainian republic had 
only 36.1 percent of all Soviet Jews. The Moldavian republic 
supplied 13.0 percent of all the emigrants during the per­
iod, even though it was home to less then 5 percent of all 
Soviet Jews in 1970. Conversely, the Russian republic, which 
was home to 37.6 percent of the Jews in 1970, supplied only 
one-fifth of the emigrants during the years 1976-78. Perhaps 
there are historical reasons for the relatively heavy emigra­
tion from the Ukraine and lighter emigration from the Russian 
republic. Perhaps the urge to emigrate is retarded by forces 
which tend to assimilate Jews into Russian society on the one 
hand and spurred by the forces of antisemitism on the other. 
Perhaps the authorities at the local level are more or less 
receptive to emigration applications at different times. It 
seems that all of the factors have been important in deter­
mining the demographic characteristics of the emigrant com­
munity, and each will be considered more deeply. But for the 
moment, it seems clear that the majority of the Jewish emi­
grants in recent years have come from the two most populous 
republics of the Soviet Union (Russian and Ukrainian), but 
the numbers of emigrants from all republics does not conform
to the geographical distribution of Soviet Jewry as it was
24recorded in the 1970 census.
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The mechanics of emigration are complex. Ostensibly 
the Soviet authorities have been open to the subject of Jew­
ish emigration for some time. Premier Kosygin observed at 
a press conference in Paris on December 3, 1966, that "As 
regards the reunion of families, if any families wish to
come together or wish to leave the Soviet Union, for them the
25road is open and no problem exists here." However in prac­
tice, the Soviet Union regards emigration for any reason to 
be a very serious matter. A person wishing to emigrate must 
first request a vyzov, an affidavit inviting him and specified
family members to join a relative abroad, usually in Israel.
As many as 469,188 "original vyzovy" (excluding repeats and 
renewals) may have been sent to Soviet Jews between 1967 and
2 g1978. Igor Birman, a emigre, has detailed some of the steps
required to get out of the Soviet Union:
The invitations (vyzovy) almost never come without a 
request by the individual concerned; they are obtained
by sending the necessary information (names, relation­
ships, etc.) to Israel, most commonly with persons 
departing. . . . Even under normal circumstances, 
the time lag between requesting the invitation and 
its receipt is a couple of months (I waited three).
. . . Having received an invitation, people will 
frequently decide not to apply (for an exit visa).
For instance, a husband requests an invitation and 
then the wife strenuously opposes the move. . . .
An invitation is officially valid for only one year.
It then becomes necessary to extend the term of the 
invitation at the Dutch Embassy in Moscow (which 
represents the diplomatic interests of Israel) or 
request another invitation. . . .
Most potential emigrants think long and hard before requesting
an invitation. And that is not the decisive step. The deci-
27sive and "totally irrevocable" decision is made when a person
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makes an application to emigrate with the Visa and Registration 
Department (OVIR) of the Soviet government Ministry of the 
Interior. The prospective emigrant must then submit a number 
of additional items in addition to the vyzov;
1. An appliction and questionnaire, executed in 
duplicate, for each person departing, sixteen 
years of age and older. The questionnaire forms 
are issued by OVIR upon presentation of the vyzov 
and they must be returned with the responses typed 
in.
2. An autobiography, at the end of which must be 
indicated the identification of the foreign rela­
tive the applicant intends to join.
3. A "reference" from the place of residence (the 
Housing Office, the Apartment House Office, the 
Housing Management Office, etc.) indicating the 
number and relationship of members of the family, 
at the end of which it must be stated that it was 
issued for presentation to OVIR.
4. A statement to OVIR from each of the applicant's 
remaining parents, consenting to the applicant's 
departure for permanent residence in Israel. The 
signatures of the parents must be certified by the 
Housing Office at their place of residence. If 
the parents are deceased, their death certificates 
must be submitted to OVIR.
5. A statement to OVIR from the other parent of a 
minor child, if that parent remains in the USSR, 
consenting to the applicant's departure. That 
parent's signature must be certified by the Hous­
ing Office at his or her place or residence.
6. Eight photographs, 4 by 8 centimeters, of the 
applicant are to be provided to OVIR for docu- 
mentational purposes.
7. A receipt from the USSR State Bank certifying the 
payment of a fee of forty rubles for "exit visa 
processing."
8. A postcard with the applicant's current address 
for subsequent notification purposes.28
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From time to time various other information sheets, character 
references and miscellaneous certifications have also been 
required. There has also been the matter of the so-called 
"education tax."
On April 3, 1972, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet decreed "An Edict on Repayment by USSR Citizens, Emi­
grating Permanently, of State Expenditures for Education (1972,
29Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 52, item 519). The 
objective of the Edict was to require "Citizens of the USSR, 
emigrating permanently abroad (except those emigrating to 
socialist countries)" to "repay state expenditures for study 
in higher educational institutions, in graduate schools, in 
computer programming schools, in adjunct teaching positions 
(etc.). . . . "  Persons effected were instructed to repay the 
state according to a schedule calculated to reflect the "value" 
of their degree, or the cost of their higher education in terms 
of the number of years of education provided by the state.
The price of this "education tax" to a potential emigrant 
could run from 900 rubles for one year of study in economics, 
law or pedagogical science to as much as 12,800 rubles for a 
person who had received the academic degree of doctor of 
s c i e n c e . T h i s  decree ultimately became a general issue in 
Soviet-American diplomatic relations and relations between 
the American Congress and President.*
*In January 1975, President Ford signed the Trade Reform 
Act which extended Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the 
Soviet Union as well as extensive trade credits. Attached to 
this Act was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which, since 1972, had
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Once the prospective emigrant has completed the 
lengthy application procedure, elements of the Committee for 
State Security (KGB) became actively involved in his case, 
even though the KGB may also register the names of persons 
who request invitations from I s r a e l . ( A  vyzov must be vali­
dated by the Finnish embassy in Tel Aviv, which represents 
Soviet interests in Israel, before it can be used to apply 
for an exit visa from the Soviet Union.) The KGB routinely 
reviews the applications to emigrate, and local units make 
contact with the applicant's employer, review his personal 
history statement, call in selected applicants for "inter­
views " and make recommendations regarding approval or disap-
32proval of individual applications. Naturally, this process
takes time and is psychologically difficult for an applicant.
Birman continues;
The process is difficult firstly because quite fre­
quently (though not always) submitting an application 
means automatic loss of employment and therefore one's 
livelihood. Everything depends on just what kind of
attempted to link American trading policy with the Soviet Union 
to Soviet human rights policy particularly in regard to the 
emigration of Soviet Jews. Despite the strong reservations 
of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, Senator 
Henry Jackson ultimately succeeded in linking the two. 
Specifically, Jackson proposed denying MFN or trade credits 
to any country which "(1). denies its citizens the right or 
opportunity to emigrate; (2.) imposes more than a nominal 
tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required 
for emigration (Congressional Record, April 10, 1973, p. 11550). 
The decision of the Soviet authorities not to insist on payment 
of the "education tax" in April 1973 was commensurate with the 
introduction in the Senate of the Jackson amendment, and may 
have been in response to it (Orbach, 1979: 138). Similarly, 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment has been in effect while over
100,000 Soviet Jews have received exit visas and it has been 
at least a minor factor in their emigration.
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employment it is and on the attitudes of the local 
authorities. . . . Secondly, and most importantly, 
the individual takes a great risk in submitting the 
application. It cannot be known in advance whether 
permission will be granted or denied. . . . The 
official position of the authorities is that they 
grant the opportunity to leave to all who wish to be 
reunited with relatives in Israel— if such permission 
does not conflict with the interests of the state. 
However, just what these "state interests" are has 
never been defined. . . . From what is said when per­
mission is denied (this is never done in writing), one 
can assume that in the vast majority of cases the 
excuse is that the individuals concerned were engaged 
in sensitive work and after leaving might divulge a 
state secret. . . . There are no formal rules for this 
terrible "game." . . .  It is quite possible that the 
authorities purposefully act to keep the regulations 
from becoming public knowledge thereby denying people 
the opportunity to act accordingly.
It should be clear by this point that the average prospective 
emigrant is not average in terms of motivation and perseverance. 
He raises a flag and identifies himself to the authorities as 
a malcontent, at least. He subjects himself to personal scru­
tiny and ridicule which might not otherwise occur. Until he 
actually departs the Soviet Union, he is in deep limbo. But 
if he applies, he has some reason to hope that his application 
will be approved because, according to Birman:
. . . [I]t is quite uncommon for application to be 
rejected for no reason at all. Years of experience 
have demonstrated that for a family which has neither 
a well known personality (such as a major dissident, 
or an internationally known artist, writer, performer, 
etc.) nor a member who had contact with classified 
information (while a member of the Soviet military or 
defense research establishment, for example) the proba­
bility of refusal, and the actual number of refusals 
is quite low. . . . How much time passes before a per­
son learns his fate? I am aware of record cases of 
only two-three weeks and others took eight-nine 
months. On average, however, the period was generally 
about three months (usually longer if the application 
is rejected). About a year ago (1978), this sitution 
changed significantly; the waiting time now averages 
six months or longer. . . .33
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Once a person receives his exit vist, he is free to
go more or less whenever he chooses. But before he actually
departs, he is supposed to turn over to the authorities the
following items;
his internal passport, birth certificate, diplomas 
from educational installations, labor record book, 
military service records, retirement certificate, 
diplomas and certificates for learned degrees and 
titles, membership certificates of creative artists' 
unions, and a statement from the "Housing Operations
Office" that the applicant's living space has been
vacated and that no claims were registered against the 
applicant in that regard. (The applicant can, however, 
have these documents authenticated for the purpose of 
giving them legal validity abroad.)34
Jews normally depart by train from Vienna, Austria through 
Budapest, Hungary, but some fly Aeroflot (the Soviet state 
airline) direct from M o s c o w . B e t w e e n  1971 and the 1973 
Middle East War, emigrating Soviet Jews were processed through 
an Israeli-run facility at Schoenau Castle, near Vienna, but 
after a Palestinian terrorist attack on an emigre train bound
for Vienna a few days before the war broke out, the Austrian
government closed the Schoenau facility. Schoenau was con­
trolled by the "Jewish Agency," the semi-official group 
responsible for the emigration of Jews to Israel, but the
36new processing facility is controlled by Austrian parties.
It was at Vienna, particularly during the years 1976-78, 
that the phenomenon of neshira ("dropping-out") began to grow 
sharply.
There is no way to know if an applicant for an exit 
visa, or even a person who takes the initial step of requesting
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a vyzov from Israel, actually intends to live in Israel, to
live in a second country, or if he is not at all certain
where he intends his final destination to be. At Vienna, he
can halt the chain of events which will normally deposit him
in Israel by requesting to go somewhere else. Jews seeking
resettlement in a Western country other then Israel are placed
under the care of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)
which sends them on to a HIAS center in Rome, Italy. The
average stay in Vienna is only several days at most, butin
Rome the stay can last as long as three weeks to six months,
depending on the bureaucratie machinations of the country in
37which the emigrant wishes to live. At this point the average 
emigrant is again the object of forces he cannot control, and 
with only life experience in the Soviet Union and little or no 
skill in a western language, he is again in limbo. As a 
noshrim (derivative of neshira) he has "dropped out" and 
must take his chances. There is evidence that noshrim are 
more likely to come from certain Soviet cities than olim 
(emigrants who choose to continue to Israel). That is to say, 
that during the years 1976-78 emigrants from the major cities 
of the Ukrainian and Russian republics were more likely to 
emigrate to a country other than Israel (see table 6).
Naturally, the phenomenon of neshira is of concern 
to the Soviet, Israeli and American governments. The Soviet 
government seems to treat the matter as an open secret. It 
issues exit visas to go to Israel knowing full well that many
Table 6
Emigration in 1976-1978 by Principal 
Place of Origin
City Republic
Emigrants Olim Noshrim 
(in absolute numbers)
Emigrants Olim Noshrim 
(in percentages)
Neshira*
Total 59,864 27,509 32,355 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.0
Group A 31,031 3,946 27,085 51.8 14.3 83.7 87.3
Odessa Ukraine 10,695 497 10,216 17.9 1.7 31.6 95.5
Kiev Ukraine 6,757 637 6,120 11.3 2.3 18.9 90.6
Leningrad RSFSR 4,787 1,154 3,630 8.0 4.2 11.2 75.9
Moscow RSFSR 4,286 955 3,331 7.2 3.5 10.3 77.7
Krarkov Ukraine 2,319 256 2,063 3.9 0.9 6.4 89.0
Lvov Ukraine 2,190 465 1,725 3.7 1.7 5.3 78.8
Group B 2,639 1,045 1,594 4.4 3.8 4.9 60.4
Riga Latvia 1,576 721 855 2.6 2.6 2.6 54.3
Minsk Byelorussia 1,063 324 739 1.8 1.2 2.3 69.5
Group C 11,758 10,388 1,370 19.6 37.8 4.2 11.7
Kishinev Moldavia 4,644 3,857 787 7.8 14.0 2.4 16.9
Chernovtsy Ukraine 3,204 2,836 386 5.4 10.3 1.1 11.5
Baku Azerbaydzhan 1,612 1,435 177 2.7 5.2 0.5 11.0
Derbent RSFSR 1,260 1,257 3 2.1 4.6 0.0 0.2
Beltsy Moldavia 1,038 1,003 35 1.7 3.6 0.1 3.4
SOURCE: Plorsheim, "Demographic Significance," p. 13.
*Noshrim as percentage of emigrants.
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of them will never set foot in the country. The government 
of Israel is concerned because neshira not only affects the 
prestige of Israel, but it also deprives the country of human 
energy and skill it can ill afford to lose. The American gov­
ernment is concerned because the United States is the over­
whelming choice of the noshrim. Of the 4,110 Soviet Jews 
assisted by HIAS in 1974, the following choices were made: 
the United States, 84.9 percent; Canada, 9.6 percent; 
Australia/New Zealand, 2.9 percent; Western Europe, 2.2 percent; 
Latin America, 0„3 percent. Of the 3,490 Soviet Jews landing 
in the United States in 1974, 45 percent settled in the New 
York metropolitan area and the remainder in some thirty-three 
states and the District of Columbia. Of the 5,502 Soviet Jews 
assisted by HIAS in the first nine months of 1975, 4,681, or 
85 percent of the total, went to the United States. During 
the first nine months of 1977, HIAS assisted 6,358 Soviet Jews
and 5,615 reached the United States, or 88 percent of the 
38total. There would seem to be at least three general rea­
sons for neshira:
1. The nature of the Jews emigrating in the early 
years (1967-1972) was not the same at that of the 
Jews emigrating in the later years (1976-1978).
2. Israel was a diminished attraction for the Jews 
who tended to emigrate in the later years.
3. The United States was an enhanced attraction in 
the later years for these same people.
University of Michigan Professor Zvi Gitelman has
analyzed the backgrounds of various Soviet Jewish groups and
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shown how background factors may have influenced members of
39these groups in their choice of destination. Gitelman 
divided the Soviet Jewish emigrants into three groups:
1. Zapadniki ("Westerners")— those Jews emigrating 
from the Baltic states, the western Ukraine, wes­
tern Byelorussia and Moldavia— people from areas 
which came under Soviet control as late as 1939- 
1944.
2. "Heartlanders"— including Jews emigrating from 
areas of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian 
republics which have been under nominal Soviet 
control since 1917.
3. Asians— including Jews emigrating from Georgia 
and all other locations in the Soviet Union.
Of the three groups, Gitelman found that the majority of
recent emigrants to the United States were "heartlanders."
He contended that, in the "heartland," Jewish culture and
consciousness (hence, Zionist conviction) were much weaker
than in the "western" areas which had supplied the bulk of
the emigrants who, in the early years, had generally gone
40directly to Israel.
In the summer of 1976, Gitelman and his colleagues 
interviewed 132 recent Soviet Jewish emigrants who had settled 
in the area of Detroit, Michigan. The emigrants were found 
to be a highly educated, urbanized group which was heavily 
composed of "heartlanders!' (see tables 7 and 8). Gitelman 
also found that the Detroit "heartlanders" enjoyed higher 
incomes in the Soviet Union than zapadniki and they also 
enjoyed jobs with higher status. For example, among the 
zapadniki there were more skilled workers and among the 
"heartlanders" more engineer=economists (table 9).
94
Detroit (1976) Immigrants : Last Place
of Residence in USSR
Origin Cities
Zapadniki 24 (18.2%) Odessa 29
"Heartlanders" 79 (59.8%) Moscow 7
Georgia 6 ( 4.5%) Lvov 13
Central Asia 1 ( 0.8%) Leningrad 7
Undetermined 22 (16.7%) Kiev 5
Table 8
Detroit (1976) Immigrants; 
Levels of Education
Jews in the USSR 
Labor Force, 1970 Detroit (1976) sample*
Education RSFSR Moldavia "Heartlanders" Zapadniki Total*
Elementary & 
incomplete
secondary 16.3% 34.0% 24.1% 33.3% 23.5%
Secondary 13.9 23.3 26.6 29.2 27.3
Tekhnikum 17.3 16.1 12.7 16.7 13.6
Incomplete
higher 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.2 5.3
Higher 46.8 18.4 32.9 16.7 30.3
*Fourteen (10.6 percent) were not in the labor force in t 
the year before their emigration.
**Includes twenty-two people whose place of origin in 
the USSR is not certain.
Table 9












Worker 3.0 4.2 3.8 2.9 3.2
Skilled Worker, Technician 26.5 33.3 26.6 35.7 16.1
Clerk, Hairdresser, Employee 23.5 25.0 24.1 7.1 41.9
Engineer-Economist 31.1 8.3 36.7 32.9 29.0
Foreman, Assistant Director 2.3 0.0 2.5 4.3 0.0
Professional 5.3 4.2 3.8 7.1 3.2
Student, Pensioner, Housewife 3.0 8.3 0.0 4.3 1.6
No Answer 5.3 16.7 2.5 5.7 4.8
U1
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Gitelman found that levels of Jewish identification 
among the Detroit immigrants also varied according to whether 
one was a "heartlander" or not. For example, the 1970 census 
showed that 17.7 percent of the Jews of the Soviet Union con­
sidered a Jewish language (mainly Yiddish, says Gitelman) to 
be their native tongue. While 41.7 percent of the zapadniki 
identified Yiddish as their native tongue, only 12.7 percent 
of the "heartlanders" in the Detroit sample did the same.
Fully 87.3 percent of the "heartlanders" and only 37.5 percent 
of the zapadniki identified Russian as their native tongue. 
According to Gitelman, this should not be surprising when it 
is considered that as late as 1939, Jewish culture and schools 
thrived in many parts of Moldavia (then part of Rumania), the 
western Ukraine and western Byelorussia (then parts of Poland), 
as well as in the Baltic states, while the Russian language 
became prevalent among Jews of the "heartland" at an earlier 
time— the 1920s and 30s when industrialization and urbaniza­
tion were sweeping through many areas of the Soviet Union.
To amplify this point, Gitelman asked the Detroit respondents 
to characterize the atmosphere in their childhood homes, to 
characterize it as "more or less Jewish." Again, for reasons 
which tended to emphasize the use of Yiddish among zapadniki 
and de-èmphasize its use among "heartlanders," the "more 
Jewish" homes were found among the zapadniki and "less Jewish" 
homes among the "heartlanders" (see table 10). Presumably, 
the respondents characterized their childhood homes on the
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Table 10











Zapadniki 0.0% 25.0% 29.0% 45.8%
"Heartlanders" 12.7 34.2 30.4 20.3 2.4
Georgians and 
Central Asians 28.6* 14.3** 14.3 42.9***
Indeterminate 13.5 18.2 27.3 40.9
*n = 2; **n = 1 ;  ***n = 3.
basis of whether the family observed Jewish holidays, holiday 
and Sabbath ritual, and whether synagogue attendance was fre­
quent. But it seems that a respondent could use any other 
standard as he wished. It could be argued that social and 
political pressure artificially reduced synagogue attendance 
and observance of Jewish ritual, particularly in the childhood 
homes of "heartlanders." But Gitelman observes that there was 
no sharp rise in such practices among the Detroit emigrants 
once they had established homes in the United States.
Gitelman's work seems to provide some insight into the 
phenomenon of neshira, and coincidentally into the character­
istics of the people who make up the bulk of Soviet Jewish 
emigration reaching the United States. Dr. Thomas Sawyer, formerly 
a Russian language officer with the U.S. Foreign Service, 
has also investigated these matters. He offers the following 
generalizations about the apparent tendency of neshira among 
Jews from the Soviet "heartland."
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. . . These "core" ("heartlander") Jews apparently 
have little if any cultural affinity with the State 
of Israel, having been cut off from Jewish traditions 
for most of their lives . . . their motivation for 
leaving the Soviet Union appears to be that of want­
ing to get away from the Soviet system . . . rather 
than a desire to go to [author's emphasis] the Jewish 
"national homeland." Also, since many of the new 
Jewish emigrants are professional persons, there is 
a greater ambition and need to pursue individual 
careers in the most advantageous environment— for 
many that means going to the United States, the "center 
of world capitalism." In addition, a sizable number of 
emigrants are accustomed to the cold Russian climate 
and consequently are apparently hesitant to resettle 
in the temperate Israeli zone. Also, there are those 
who are opposed to the "socialist" system of govern­
ment in Israel. . . . Others are worried about the 
volatile Middle East situation, Israel's inflation, 
reported serious housing shortage, alleged unemploy­
ment situation (particularly for skilled and profes­
sional labor), necessity to learn Hebrew, currency 
devaluation, and general economic difficulties. . . . 
Israeli realities (or perceived realities) are trans­
mitted regularly to would-be emigrants from relatives 
and friends who have already resettled in Israel.41
The picture of today's noshrim contrasts sharply with popular
images of the modern Jewish emigrant. Many Americans remember
the characters shaped by Leon Uris in his 1958 novel Exodus.
Exodus depicted the dramatic struggle of Jews to reach Israel
from war-devastated Central Europe in the aftermath of the
Holocaust. Uris wrote about people with an intense spiritual
and emotional commitment to the Jewish state. The noshrim do
not appear to have this commitment.
In his 1976 Detroit interviews, Gitelman compared the
attitudes and opinions of his respondents toward the United
States and Israel and the impression of both countries was
generally favorable. Part of what the Detroit respondents
knew about the two countries came from exposure to unofficial
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sources of information while they still lived in the Soviet
Union; foreign radio broadcasts, occasional encounters with
foreigners, letters from abroad, and conversations with other
Soviet citizens who appeared to have knowledge of the United
States and Israel. But the intense anti-Israel propaganda
campaign conducted by the Soviet mass media may have produced
42some negative impressions, and overall, the opinion of Israel 
as a place to live was lower than that of the United States. 
Gitelman found that 70 percent of his respondents considered 
Israel a "religious" rather than a secular state and that this 
was seen as an "undesirable" characteristic. Though they did 
not accept the position of Soviet propagandists that Israel 
was a warlike and aggressive state, they apparently accepted 
the notion that Israel was "a theocracy guided by religious, 
and hence anti-modern, anti-scientific values.
Even though the Detroit immigrants did have a generally 
favorable impression of both countries, the United States 
seemed to have a special "pull" on the basis of ideological 
and practical considerations. In spite of Soviet propaganda, 
many had been able to develop favorable impressions of Ameri­
can culture, technology and economy. Many expressed admira­
tion for the size and power of the United States, suggesting 
that as former Soviet citziens, they did not want to "trade 
down" to a much smaller country like Israel— a regional power, 
at best. Others expressed admiration for the democratic values 
present in America. Gitelman felt that these attitudes cannot
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be allocated by group among his respondents, that they are 
generalized among them all— zapadniki, "heartlander," those 
of high education and low. In thise sense, even though 
"heartlanders" in recent years are more likely to go else­
where than Israel, noshrim emigrating to the United States 
seem to go there simply because they believe life in the 
United States is the most attractive, and life in the Soviet 
Union is the least attractive of all the opportunities avail­
able to them.
CHAPTER 7
SOVIET JEWS; CONSIDERATIONS OF 
ANTISEMITISM, ASSIMILATION 
AND ACCULTURATION
It seems clear that both the parent Soviet Jewish 
population and the emigrant Jewish population, contain 
people from different groups which in turn have marginally 
different social characteristics and experience. Neverthe­
less, according to Theodore Friedgut;
. . . [T]he overwhelming majority of today's Soviet 
Jews have a common recent past and a common social 
profile. Over three quarters of Soviet Jews are 
true "heartlanders," living in areas which for two 
generations have been under Soviet rule. They are 
overwhelmingly urban (though dispersed among many 
cities in the Soviet Union) and, in most cases, are 
already second generation urbanites living in the 
larger urban centers. . . . They are far better 
educated than the non-Jews around them, and are 
therefore concentrated in the intelligentsia occupa­
tions, many of which have large and disproportionate 
percentages of Jews. This puts the Jews largely into 
the upper socio-economic levels of Soviet society.44
Friedgut concludes that the Soviet Jewish community is an 
urbanized, educated and dispersed minority with more in com­
mon than not. This seems to be a reasonable appraisal. The 
differences between Soviet Jews, those which divide zapadniki
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from "heartlanders" in terms of geography and experience, are 
important in shedding light on matters such as neshira. It 
also seems important to know that the majority of emigrants 
in the United States are "heartlanders" who, among all Soviet 
Jews, have been subjected to the most persistent and longstand­
ing pressures to assimilate into Soviet society. But no Soviet 
Jewish emigrant, whether he chooses to live in Israel, the 
United States or a third country, has wholly escaped assimila­
tion pressures. It is these pressures which have probably left 
today's Soviet Jews with more in common than not. And because 
of the intense nature of these pressures, there are good rea­
sons to believe that most members of this urbanized, educated 
and dispersed minority have acquired many Russian attitudes 
and behavior patterns.
Professor Vernon Aspaturian wrote of three processes 
which have worked to shape the multinational state which is 
the modern Soviet Union: Sovietization, Russianization and
Russification.^^ Sovietization is defined as the process of 
modernization and industrialization within the Marxist-Leninist 
norms of social, economic and political behavior. Russianiza­
tion is defined as the process of internationalizing Russian 
language and culture within the Soviet Union. Russification, 
on the other hand, is a more limited process; it is defined 
as "the process whereby non-Russians are transformed objectively 
and psychologically into Russians and is more an individual 
process than a collective me." Aspaturian concluded that
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Russianization is a prerequisite to Russification and 
Russianization has been an important instrument of Sovieti­
zation. Gitelman found among the Detroit immigrants that 
only 45.8 percent of the zapadniki and 20.3 percent of the 
"heartlanders" felt their childhood homes had been "wholly 
Jewish" in atmosphere. Similarly, he found that 87.3 percent 
of the "heartlanders" who made up almost 60 percent of his 
sample considered Russian to be their native tongue. This 
kind of evidence would tend to suggest that Gitelman's respon­
dents were heavily Russianized in Aspaturian's terms. Some 
of the Detroit immigrants may have been at least partially 
Sovietized as well insofar as their reasons for leaving the 
Soviet Union did not reflect complete disfavor on the country 
of their birth.
Gitelman determined that family reasons, antisemitism 
and political alienation were the most important reasons why 
his respondents decided to take advantage of the opportunity 
to emigrate. Family reasons included those cited by persons 
wishing to join relatives in other countries, who had children 
whom they felt could have better lives in other countries, or 
who found that they would be left behind by close relatives 
who had made up their minds to leave if they did not also 
decide to go. Antisemitism, as a reason to emigrate, includes 
the host of official and unofficial acts of discrimination 
which have plagued Soviet and European Jews for generations. 
Political alienation involves dissatisfaction with the Soviet
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system and perhaps also one’s personal involvement within it. 
Gitelman compared these reasons for leaving with how satisfied, 
in general, his respondents were with life in the Soviet 
Union (see table 11). It appears that 63 percent of the people 
citing family reasons for emigration were at least partially 
satisfied with their lives in the Soviet Union. Of those cit­
ing antisemitism, 30.3 percent were still at least partially 
satisfied, as were 33.3 percent of those citing political 
alienation. Gitelman reports that zapadniki and less-educated 
respondents were more likely to cite family reasons and 
"heartlanders" were more often motivated to emigrate by anti­
semitism and political alienation. But significant portions 
of both groups, despite their decision to emigrate, still 
found their lives as Soviet citizens to be at least more or 
less satisfactory. If one accepts that a person would have 
to be at least somewhat sovietized to find life in the Soviet 
Union satisfying to any degree, then Gitelman's respondents 
may have been not only heavily Russianized, but partially 
sovietized as well.
The policy of the Soviet government toward the Jews 
has varied widely and the objective of the policy has never 
been particularly clear except in the most general of terms.
At times since the Revolution, it appears that the party and 
the state have intended the Jews to become completely 
assimilated— Russified— and at other times they have taken 
steps which would appear to make this impossible. Technically,
Table 11
Detroit(1976) Immigrants: Satisfaction in 










Family 2.5% 30.0% 47.5% 15.0% 5.0%
Antisemitism 33.3 36.4 18.2 12.1 --
Political alienation 33.3 29.2 25.0 8.3 4.2
Other 17.6 50.0 26.5 5.9 --
o
U1
SOURCE: Data in tables 6, 1, 8, 9 and 10 from Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet
Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?," Soviet Jewish Affairs 7 
(1977): 33-42.
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Jews represent one of the four major nationality groups 
inside the Soviet Union of which states of the same nation­
ality are located outside the territory of the Soviet Union.
Of the other three— Germans, Poles and Moldavians— Poland 
and Moldavia (as part of Rumania) are today incorporated into 
the Soviet sphere. As for the Germans, they were largely 
rounded up during World War II, deported to regions of Siberia 
and Central Asia and there is no evidence that they have been 
permitted to regroup in any numbers in any area of European 
Russia. Therefore, of the twenty-two major nationalities of
the Soviet Union, only the Jews today:
1. live almost exclusively in European, metropolitan 
areas of the Soviet Union;
2. share a cultural and religious heritage with 
millions of persons living in countries outside 
of direct Soviet control;
3. represent a small minority of persons in each of 
the significant political subdivisions of the 
Soviet Union in which they live.
The status of the Soviet Jewish community is thus highly
irregular in Soviet terms, showing the countervailing effects
of the attempts to assimilate and segregate the Jews over the
years.
The British scholar Jacob Miller attempted to generalize
46Soviet theory on the Jews. He wrote :
These are logical and simple in principle but the more 
they are pursued in detail the more complex and self­
contradictory they become. . . .  So far as the theory 
of national minorities is concerned, this problem has 
been solved by the construction of socialism, which 
ends the exploitation of minor nationalities by abolish­
ing the exploiting classes of all Soviet nationalities.
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which now consist of state industrial workers, 
kolkhoz [collective farm] peasants, and intellectuals, 
working harmoniously, irrespective of nationality, 
in the common aim of constructing communist society. 
Socialism encourages, for strictly socialist purposes, 
the flowering of national cultures, but in mature 
communist society the national cultures will be 
absorbed in a common culture to which all will have 
contributed. In the meantime, each nation has its 
own state [a Union or autonomous republic within 
the USSR]. . . .  As for religion, this is a set of 
irrational beliefs and practices deriving from the 
need to make life tolerable in the conditions of 
alienation and exploitation of class society. . . .
The Jews satisfy the theory of religion, but not that 
of nationality, since they live scattered throughout 
Soviet territory and thus cannot have their own state. 
In any case, for that same reason, they are undergoing 
rapid assimilation and therefore do not need a national 
state within the USSR. It has been, and is open to 
Soviet Jews to dwell in a compact territory of their 
own within the USSR, namely the autonomous region of 
Biro-Bidzhan,* but they have not so far chosen to do 
so. (The existence of the State of Israel is irrele­
vant, except that, as an arm of American and British 
imperialism, it seeks to subvert Soviet Jews.)**
In reality, Jews have never been a favored group
either under the Tsar or his Communist successors. But
immediately after the Revolution, the ,new Soviet government
took steps which were progressive. The government
. . . took steps to stamp out antisemitism, accorded 
the Jews recognition as a separate nationality with 
rights of cultural autonomy, legalized the use of
*In 1934, the Soviet government declared the establish­
ment of a "Jewish Autonomous Region" located in a remote area 
of the Soviet Far East along the marshes of the Amur River 
which separates the Soviet Union from China. In 1941, this 
region, also known as Biro-Bidzhan, had a population of 114,000 
of whom 30,000 were Jews. In 1958, Khrushchev "admit(ed) 
failure of the Region's aim of 300,000 Jews, blam(ing) the fail­
ure on "Jewish individualism." By 1975, only 12,000 Jews re­
mained in the Region, forming only one-fifteenth of the total 
population (Gilbert, 1976: 37).
**Miller's remarks were published in 1970, before the 
most recent wave of Jewish emigration had reached its crest.
But even so, the existence of the State of Israel would
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Yiddish as the language of instruction in schools 
located in centers of Jewish population, and 
encouraged and supported a Yiddish press and 
theater. . . . Despite a cultivation of a Jewish 
nationality centered around the Jewish language, 
most Soviet Jews were on the road to voluntary 
assimilation before the war.47
Professor John Armstrong has contended that Jews 
represented a "mobilized diaspora" which possessed special 
talents. During the 1920s and 30s, when modernization trends 
took sharp hold in the Soviet Union, Jewish talents in "nego­
tiation, commerce and administration" were rare and in 
48demand. During this period, Jews in good number were able
to get Into higher education, into the skilled professions,
and a few even rose to prominent positions in the Party and 
49state. But World War II produced the first of two develop­
ments which were to dramatically change the status of Soviet 
Jews. The Nazi occupation "succeeded in rekindling the
ancient and latent antisemitism of the Ukrainians and Russians
50which had been submerged by Soviet policies." World War II 
may also have brought a rekindling of antisemitism in Stalin 
himself. Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, wrote that 
Stalin may have believed that the death of his son Yakov in 
a German prisoner-of-war camp was due to the fact that he was 
betrayed to the Germans by his Jewish wife Y u l i a . S t a l i n  
may also have believed that encounters between Jewish troops 
in the Red Army and Jews of other Allied nations enhanced
probably still be considered irrelevant in this kind of a 
Soviet analysis because emigration is permitted solely "for 
the reunification of families," not for religious or politi­
cal reasons.
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52the pro-Western sentiments of the Soviet Jewish soldiers.
In any event, the general position of Soviet Jews began to
rapidly deteriorate. In contrast to the marked upward
mobility of Jews in the 1920s and 30s, by the beginning of
World War II, quotas setting upward limits on the numbers of
Jews in Party and government posts, in the art and professions
and in higher education were secretly promulgated.̂ ^ Official
antisemitism reached a fever pitch in January 1953 when nine
prominent doctors, six of them Jews, were accused of comspir-
acy to murder Soviet l e a d e r s . E v e n  though the death of
Stalin averted a trial and caused the "Doctors Plot" to be
exposed as a fabrication, at least two of the doctors died
55while being tortured to produce confessions.
The second of the two developments which radically 
changed the status of Soviet Jews was the creation of the 
modern state of Israel. Initially, Stalin favored the Jewish 
state with moral and material support— the Soviet Union was 
the first country to extend official recognition to Israel 
and Stalin arranged for certain arms shipments to be made to 
Israel by Czechoslovakia.^^ However, his ardor soon cooled, 
probably because the establishment of Israel had an electrify­
ing effect on Soviet Jews and this indicated to a suspicious 
Stalin the possibility of a psychological attachment incom-
57patible with Soviet ideological and foreign policy objectives. 
The death of Stalin and the consolidation of power under 
Khrushchev produced only a temporary improvement and by 1958,
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a virulent campaign against Jewish cultural and religious 
institutions was underway. Despite a constitutional guar­
antee of freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, many syna­
gogues were closed or set on fire, and many worshipers were
58beaten up or arrested. Anti-religious campaigns against 
most denominations were intense under Khrushchev, but the 
antisemitic campaigns of 1958-1959 and 1961-1963 were par­
ticularly harsh. Martin Gilbert reports that the local 
press of the Western Ukraine contained many foul accusations 
and slander during these years. For example:
14 December 1958 . . . Lvov . . . The local edition 
of Pravda describes Judaism as a religion of hatred 
towards other religions and of enmity towards all 
nations.
18 March 1959 . . . Drogobych . . . The local paper 
attacks Jewish "crooks" for having "stripped clothing 
off the dead" during the war to sell to the Gestapo.
28 September 1958 . . . Stanislav . . . The local 
Pravda compares Jews to ticks, describing them as 
"loathsome and filthy creatures."59
During the early 1960s, Khrushchev launched a campaign against 
so-called economic crimes which included cases of alleged 
pilferage, bribery and currency speculation.^^ During the 
period July 1961 to March 1963, at least 110 death sentences 
were imposed for economic crimes, and of these 110, at least 
68 were J e w s . I n  the Ukraine, where 2 percent of the popula­
tion were Jews, Jews accounted for 83 percent of the condemned 
and shot.^^ The charges involved "embezzlement of food­
stuffs," "counterfeiting of coins," "speculation in fruit," 
and the like.^^
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since the dark days of 1958-1963, and beginning with 
the lightning victory of Israel in the June 1967 Middle East 
War, Soviet policy under Brezhnev and Kosygin apparently has 
been to downplay official antisemitism and to strike hard at 
the "threat" posed by Zionism and the state of Israel. Accord­
ing to Kosygin, "antisemitism" is something "absolutely alien 
to and incompatible with our i d e o l o g y . I n  the early 1970s, 
the Soviet press, particularly that directed at foreign audi­
ences, actively attempted to paint a picture of the Soviet 
Union as a multinational society in which all groups, especially 
the Jews, were treated f a i r l y . B u t  the anti-Zionist posi­
tions were often difficult to distinguish from antisemitic 
ones. For example, Zionist ideology was described by a Soviet 
reporter as "a mixture of Judaistic mysticism, nationalistic 
hysteria, shameless social demogogy and racialist concepts 
of the superiority of 'God's' chosen people over all other 
p e o p l e s . A g a i n s t  this kind of post-1967 background grew 
much of the pressure, both inside and outside of the Soviet 
Union, to permit significant numbers of Soviet Jews to 
emigrate.
The point of all these campaigns and attacks seems not 
to have been to do battle with Judaism as a religion, or with 
Zionism as a political manifestation of a religion, but to 
oppose both as forces which might unite Jews as a distinct 
cultural group within Soviet society. In this sense, Jews 
have been subject to the same kind of pressures to assimilate.
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to Russify, as have many of the twenty-two other major
nationality groups; it seems only that the pressures
were particularly severe and consistent in the Jewish case.
The severity of the pressures seemed due to the fact that the
general status of Soviet Jews was so irregular in Soviet terms
— Jews were particularly dispersed and vulnerable because of
their small numbers. And these measures to forcibly assimilate
Jews may have produced some success in that countless Soviet
Jews today are Jewish only insofar as they happen to have two
Jewish parents and therefore must carry an internal passport
which identifies them as Jews. For them, there is no spiritual
or cultural distinction, no heritage to pass on to children.
Many Jews belong to the Party, though they probably
are aware that they need not aspire to the highest leadership
positions. There may be many Jews in the middle and lower
echelons of the Red Army, but there are probably few in the
conventional combat units and probably more in the highly
6 7specialized units where technical expertise is required. 
Certainly Jews fought effectively as Soviet soldiers and parti-
gosans during World War II and were still making major mili­
tary contributions into the 1960s. For example, in 1967, a 
Soviet military publication, Voyenno-Istoricheski-Zhurnal 
revealed the names of two radar operators who had spotted the 
American U-2 aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union in May 
1960. The men— Lieutenant E. E. Feldblum and Sergeant E. 
Shuster— were both Jews and they were commended for doing a
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"masterful piece of work.'*"' Perhaps in reaction to foreign
criticism, the Soviet press has occasionally published articles
identifying prominent Jews in Soviet life. Lists of Soviet
officials can be culled, revealing names which probably
identify people as Jewish. In both cases, a surprising
number of Jews has been known to turn up.^^ The number of
such people is probably not large in the aggregate, but it
does seem to suggest that there are more than a few Soviet
Jews who are completely committed to the system and enjoying
its rewards. Though Jews (with rare exceptions) are excluded
from key decision-making positions, they nevertheless have
been well represented in technical specialties and have en-
71joyed many material perquisites. According to Igor
Birman :
. . .[T]he main thing is that the Jewish intelligentsia 
still occupies a very important position in many 
vital areas and to force them out too quickly could 
well cause the most serious consequences for the 
regime. . . . There is no way we can know how the 
"Jewish problem" has been discussed at the very top 
levels or what decisions have been taken. But we can 
guess at those decisions from what has actually 
happened;
1. Jews have already been displaced in a number of 
areas of employment including the Party and state 
apparatus, the KGB and militia, foreign service, 
foreign commerce and the armed forces command.
2. Restrictions are placed not only on admission to 
higher educational institutions, but also on employ­
ment and career advancement in practically all fields. 
Something akin to percentage quotas is applied to 
accomplish this.
3. In a limited number of cases, the recruitment of 
staff and professional advancement are facilitated 
if the Jewish applicant is either very good or an 
irreplaceable specialist.
4. It is much easier for a Jew to be named assistant 
chief than chief.
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5. Those already employed are very seldom dismissed 
simply because they are Jews.
6. While the authorities have, in principle, per­
mitted emigration, they are also clearly impeding the 
emigration of the scientific and technicalintelligentsia.72
As a group, the status of Soviet Jews is low and 
probably growing lower. Soviet reality prohibits Jews from 
practicing Judaism, from expressing interest in their cultural 
heritage, all unless they are willing to forego the best mater­
ial and professional advantages the system has to offer.
Even the many Jews who choose to live in the Soviet mainstream 
find that their personal possibilities are limited. The nature 
of the predicament has been described by Zvi Gitelman;
The contradictory trends of national assertion and 
attempts to assimilate [among Soviet Jews] can be 
seen as equally "natural" or "logical" outcomes of a 
situation wherein the individual finds himself in a 
peculiar kind of unstable equilibrium, and is driven 
to reduce dissonance and stabilize his own personal 
situation by propelling himself to one of the two 
polar modes of behavior: assimilation or nationalism,
the latter, at present almost always leading to 
attempts to emigrate. The Soviet Jew finds himself 
in this position because the policies of the USSR have 
created an environment around him which can be under­
stood as an unstable equilibrium, producing psycholog­
ical dissonance, and, of course, attempts to resolve 
it. This unstable equilibrium is created by the 
government-determined inability of Soviet Jews to 
creatively [sic] express themselves culturally as 
Jews, and hence the necessity to become acculturated 
into non-Jewish, almost always Russian culture, and 
at the same time, the refusal of Soviet society and 
the Soviet government to allow the Jew to assimilate 
completely into the Russian culture and assume Russian 
identity. Thus Soviet Jews are acculturated— they 
have adopted the culture of another social group— but 
they are not assimilated— they have not adopted that 
group's culture to such an extent that they no longer 
have any characteristics identifying them with their 
former culture and no longer have any loyalties to 
their former culture. Most Soviet Jews consider them­
selves to be culturally Russian. However, since their
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internal passports designate them officially as Jews, 
and since the surrounding society tends to regard 
them as Jews rather than Russians, they are in the 
curious position of being culturally Russian, but 
legally and socially Jews?^ (underlining added)
It seems fair to suggest that almost all Soviet Jews 
who emigrate, whether to Israel, the United States or some­
where else, are culturally Russian in the sense described 
above by Gitelman. The Jews who have chosen to remain in the 
Soviet Union and pursue the benefits of assimilation are pro­
bably no more culturally Russian than those who have chosen 
to emigrate. By the same token, emigration would not seem to 
take away the acculturated emigre's Russian attitudes on many 
issues. This is not to say that all Soviet Jews have the same 
political and social attitudes, or exhibit the same political 
and social behavior as all ethnic Russians. But it does seem 
possible that the behavior of Soviet Jews, particularly in 
regard to communications matters, may be quite similar to that 
of Soviet Russians. This would seem to be particularly true 
of Jews from the "heartland" where Soviet rule has been in 
place for so many years. During much of Soviet history, 
certainly through World War II and during the entire reign of 
Stalin, the fate of Jews and Russians was intertwined. Both 
suffered in commensurate terms from the turmoil of the Civil 
War and the Terror, and while inordinate losses were probably 
suffered by Jews during the Naxi occupation, the remainder of 
Soviet society was far from untouched. Both have advanced, 
though mostly in material terms, as a result of the
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industrialization and modernization of the Soviet Union.
So it would seem that the relatively recent arrival of the 
state of Israel as an issue in Soviet domestic and foreign 
affairs has been the major factor in unraveling this loose 
Russian-Jewish axis. As Gitelman has pointed out, the Soviet 
Jew now has a choice, to stay or to emigrate— a choice not 
open to Russians. It is a difficult choice, but a choice 
nonetheless. The existence of this choice is perhaps now one 
of the most important psychological differences between the 
acculturated Soviet Jew who can leave and the Soviet Russian 
who has to stay behind whether he wants to stay or not. The 
fact that some Soviet Jews chose to exercise the choice and 
now live in the United States.would not seem to make much of 
a difference in how they sought and acquired information while 
they still lived in the Soviet Union. There is no particular 
reason to suspect that they haindled their information matters, 
both official and unofficial, in any way radically different 
from the way the Russians handled theirs.
CHAPTER 8
THE PRIVATE ZONE AS A "WHITE 
BELT" PHENOMENON
Lev Navrozov is a journalist and an emigre who left 
the Soviet Union in October 1971. He describes the typical 
emigrants simply as "people who have exhausted the possi­
bilities of Soviet life."^^ It also seems worth suggesting 
that members of the current wave of emigration may be repre­
sentative of the broad, new "middle class," identified by 
Andrei Amalrik as the class of "specialists" which is in 
opposition to the bureaucratic elite. Surely their high 
level of education and technical expertise make most of the 
emigrants specialists. Their desire to emigrate would tend 
to suggest they did not share all the goals of the bureau­
cratic elite. Amalrik wrote of the "gray belt"— the area 
encompassing activities which the law does not formally for­
bid, but which are, in fact, forbidden because they are too 
risky to be practiced. For years the act of emigration was 
probably a "gray belt" activity, but now for many Soviet 
Jews it appears to be a "white belt" activity— one both 
formally and practically permissible.
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Navrozov has described the same situation in terms 
of what he feels are the "socio-civic" differences between 
pre-1953 and post-1953 Russia. Before 1953, any desire to 
leave the Soviet Union, he wrote, would have been regarded as 
"political trespass" punishable by whatever arbitrary sanctions 
the "organs of state security" cared to impose. After 1953 
and before 1967 when the current wave of emigration began, 
expressing a desire to emigrate would have still constituted 
a "political trespass," but the conviction of such a "trespass" 
would have required "the furnishing of proof that would hold 
up under official inspection" (procedural as opposed to sum­
mary justice). After 1967, and certainly after 1973 (a year 
in which almost 35,000 Jews emigrated), the desire to emigrate
for Jews was no longer "political trespass" but now part of
75"what you can do."
In this sense, Soviet Jews as representative of the 
new "middle class" in Soviet life have benefitted from the 
expansion of the area around themselves which has been referred 
to in the previous chapters as the "private zone." In the 
years since 1953, Soviet Jews have seen emigration turn from 
a "gray belt" activity into a "white belt" one. Not all per­
sons desiring to leave have been permitted to leave, but for 
the over 200,000 Soviet Jews who have successfully emigrated, 
the Soviet authorities apparently have treated their personal 
desire to leave as a matter of personal conscience, so to 
speak— a matter for the private zone. Of course, these
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personal desires have profound implications for the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But it does seem 
possible to say that the Soviet authorities have been follow­
ing a line of policy on the emigration issue which, despite 
its consequences, has permitted a large number of Soviet citi­
zens to freely exercise their personal convictions and per­
manently depart the Soviet Union.
Of course, the matter might be very much in doubt for 
a prospective emigrant until he actually receives his exit 
visa. The state reserves the privilege to deny exit visas 
to whomever it chooses, sharply reducing the dimensions of the 
private zone for such persons. Until he actually departs, 
the prospective emigrant is subject to intimidation and 
harrassment, thereby also limiting the dimensions of the pri- 
zate zone but probably to a lesser degree. But no potential 
emigrant can make an intelligent choice as to whether or not 
to apply for an exit visa without reliable information about 
the world outside the Soviet Union. It appears that this 
kind of information circulates freely enough eimong Soviet 
Jews, those who eventually emigrate and those who do not.
There are apparently two reasons for this phenomenon. The 
first involves the growing importance of unofficial communi­
cations media in the Soviet Union in recent years. The second 
involves the strength and persistence of the private zone in 
relation to communications matters during the same period. 
Information regarding the state of Israel— its possibilities
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for living, and, most importantly, its military and political 
security— would seem to be especially important for Soviet 
Jews considering emigration. Even the noshrim who may intend 
to live in the United States know that they must at least 
apply for emigration to live in Israel. Without Israel, 
there is no emigration to anywhere, at least for now. There­
fore, it seems particularly pertinent to make a test of the 
existence and dimensions of the private zone in regard to 
communications matters by asking former Soviet citizens, who 
happen to be Jewish, what information they were able to get 
about Israel from all communications channels and how freely 
they were able to make use of it inside the Soviet Union.
In this way, some of the characteristics of the private 
zone may become apparent. For example, we might expect the 
zone to be of a certain circumference, one which traces a 
territory of circular shape. Inside this territory we might 
expect to find the individual and the family members, co­
workers, and other associates with whom he feels he can safely 
share information from unofficial sources. We might expect 
the circumference of the zone to vary, always including the 
individual, almost always including family members, but exclud­
ing other categories of people, and particular members of 
categories according to psychological, demographic and his­
torical criteria. For example, we could expect the zone to 
be larger for persons who feel no desire to acquire and spread 
large amounts of unofficial information— a person who spreads
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only official information needs to take less care with whom 
he speaks and any unofficial information which ^  conveyed 
has less chance of falling into the hands of an untrust­
worthy party if it is conveyed by a person who deals infre­
quently with unofficial information. By the same token, we 
could expect the zone to be smaller for persons who choose 
to be active communicators of unofficial information, because 
such persons know from personal experience that they can trust 
some but not all of the people they know. Demographically, 
since the activities of persons who have high education and 
status may be more evident to the political authorities than 
those of lower status persons, the zone may be larger for per­
sons who are lower in education and status and smaller for 
persons of higher education and status. For historical rea­
sons related to those which are responsible for the phenomenon 
of neshira, persons living in the Soviet "heartland" may gen­
erally have a smaller zone than do persons living in western 
or Asian cities of the Soviet Union. This might be similar 
to saying that communications freedom is greater in a city 
such as Riga in Latvia than it is in an eastern Ukrainian 
city such as Kiev or in Moscow itself.
This test of the private zone involves asking Soviet 
Jews now living in the United States questions of how they 
acquired certain information about Israel from both official 
and unofficial sources while they still lived in the Soviet 
Union. In October 1973, before many of them had considered
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applying for an exit visa, there occurred the fourth and 
most recent of the Arab-Israeli wars. The outcome of this 
war (also known as the Yom Kippur War because the Arab attack 
commenced on the highest of Jewish holy days) was in doubt for 
several weeks. The initial, successful Arab attack was thor­
oughly reported in the Soviet press leaving many Soviet Jews 
to question the survival of Israel. After several weeks,
Israel recovered the military initiative and drove the Arabs 
back, but this information was slowly and inaccurately reported 
by the Soviet press.
To get news they felt they could trust about an event 
of exceptional interest, Soviet Jews turned to unofficial 
sources, particularly foreign radio stations. Rumor, word- 
of-mouth, contact with foreigners, mail from abroad and many 
other sources of unofficial information eventually supplemented 
the news supplied by foreign radio. In time, the whole unof­
ficial information network was activated and continuously 
tapped by people hungry for reliable news. This unofficial 
information was widely shared and compared with that from 
official sources. "Reading between the lines" was rampant.
In short, the Yom Kippur War was an unprecedented communica­
tions event. It can show the dimensions of the private zone 
both in terms of the individual and the nationality group to 
which he belongs.
PART II
PROCEDURE, RESPONDENT TESTIMONY, STATISTICS
CHAPTER 9
RESEARCH METHODS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS
The 104 Soviet Jews interviewed in the course of this 
investigation were initially contacted by mail and asked if 
they would like to participate in a study concerning mass 
communications in the Soviet Union. A letter of introduc­
tion in Russian (appendix A) was accompanied by a response 
form (appendix B) by which a potential respondent could indi­
cate his interest in the study to the researcher. A total of 
405 letters of introduction were placed in the hands of Soviet 
Jewish families now living in Dallas, Kansas City and Houston. 
The intermediation of the local Jewish Family Service agency 
was most helpful in this regard. Approximately 150 positive 
responses were received, a response rate of 37 percent. It 
appears that the nature of the study, and the carefully phrased 
and competent Russian used in the letter of introduction, are 
at least partially responsible for the good rate of response. 
The response form contained the address and phone number of 
the respondent and instructions as to the best time to call. 
When I arrived in the city, I proceeded to call all of the
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respondents who had indicated an interest in the study and 
to schedule interview appointments.
The interviews almost always took place in the home 
of the respondent. In most cases other family members were 
present and the family head, usually a man, spoke for the 
group. The interviews took place mostly in English and partly 
in Russian. Many of the respondents had been in the United 
States for more than two years and were quite skillful in 
English. Many of the more recently arrived respondents were 
also sufficiently skilled in English to answer questions in 
that language. Most of the remainder wished to use English 
as much as possible and resorted to Russian for the purpose 
of elaborating an answer, or when using English became 
fatiguing. In all cases, the respondents were cordial and 
in many cases, hospitable as well.
I expected that many respondents would be curious 
about my work but might not respond by mail because of shyness, 
suspicion or other reasons. As it turned out, some people who 
had received my letter but not responded eventually agreed to 
be interviewed— after I had conducted an interview with a 
neighbor or friend. In each of the three cities I found that 
the longer I remained, the easier it became to interview 
people on a referral basis. Some of my respondents told me 
that they knew other Soviet Jews who had received my letter 
but were reluctant to talk to me. When it became clear after 
several days that my questions and methods were innocuous
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enough, I received additional informal invitations to come 
over and talk. As a result, my total response rate is some­
what higher than 37 percent.
The interviews averaged forty minutes in length.
The questionnaire (appendix C) contained forty-two questions. 
Interviewing time did not include the period before the inter­
view began in which I attempted to get acquainted with the 
respondent. Nor did it include the time after the question- 
ning which normally was social in nature. The shortest inter­
view was conducted in ten minutes, with a respondent who was 
on her lunch break from a factory job. The longest inter­
view, four hours, occurred with an elderly respondent who had 
been a teacher and philosopher in the Soviet Union and who 
was interested in discussing the purpose and theoretical sig­
nificance of each of my questions. Many of the respondents, 
as intelligent, highly-educated professional persons were also 
interested in Soviet communications matters and expressed an 
interest in seeing the results of my work when it was finished. 
Overall, my respondents seemed especially cooperative, pleasant 
and sincere.
Of the 104 respondents, 68 (65.4 percent) were male 
and 36 (34.6 percent) were female. The fact that the sample 
is overabundant with males does not reflect an imbalance of 
the sexes in either the Soviet Jewish population in the 
Soviet Union, or in the Soviet Jewish emigre population in 
the United States. Rather it seems to reflect the fact that
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Soviet Jews have tended to resettle in the United States in 
family units and a male seems to speak most often for the 
family. Additionally, it seems that unmarried males more 
often responded to my letter of introduction than did unmar­
ried women. As a result I found myself talking more often to 
men than women in this category. In families in which the 
husband and wife were not married in October 1973 (the month 
the Yom Kippur War started), or were living in separate house­
holds, I interviewed both husband and wife. Most often, 
however, and particularly with older couples, there was only 
one interview per family.
Table 12 
Age of Respondents in 1980
Age Count Percentage






Over 70 __1 1.0
Total 104 100.0
The data in table 12 show that the bulk of the sample 
is composed of persons under 50 years of age. Only one per­
son under 20 years was interviewed because he had an exceptional
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memory regarding his personal experience with the Soviet 
communications environment in 1973, a year in which he passed 
his thirteenth birthday. No other person under 20 was capable 
of responding to the interview questions with specificity.
Only four persons over the age of 60 were interviewed. Many 
of the available persons in this age bracket had virtually no 
capability in English or were infirm. As a result, most of 
my respondents are between 21 and 50 years of age. Differen­
tiation according to age is considered to be a very important 
factor in this research. For the purpose of crosstabulating 
age with the responses to specific interview questions, the 
respondents were grouped into three categories according to 
the amount of their lives spent in the Soviet Union prior to 
the death of Stalin in 1953. In this way it is felt that 
experience or lack of experience with life in a model totali­
tarian state might reflect itself (see table 13).
Table 13
Age at the Time of Stalin's Death
Age in Years 
in 1953 Count Percentage





Professor Gitelman's 1976 Detroit sample of 132 
Soviet Jewish emigres^ was composed of 18.2 percent zapadniki 
or "westerners," 59.8 percent "heartlanders," and the remainder 
"Asian" Jews or Jews of indeterminate geographical origin.*
I followed Gitelman's lead, using his essentially geographic 
guidelines to identify a respondent as a heartlander. Westerner 
or Asian (including Georgian) Jew. My 1980 sample suggests 
that the flow of noshrim, heartlander Jews has not slackened 
in the interim and may actually have increased. My respondents, 
in keeping with the overwhelmingly urban disposition of Soviet 
Jewry, represented eighteen cities in the Soviet Union 
(table 14). Based on the location of the respondent in 
October 1973, which was normally inside the region of the 
Soviet Union where he or she grew up, the classification 
results are shown in table 15.
The respondents were asked to consider the number of 
years of education they had experienced in the Soviet Union.
The data in table 16 indicate that as a group, these people 
were quite educated in terms of exposure to Soviet schools 
and universities. Further, the data in table 17 shows the 
relative level of education for all of the Soviet nationality 
groups according to the 1959 and 1970 census figures. The 
table indicates that Jews have a history as the most highly 
educated of all the nationality groups in the Soviet Union.
*"Westerners" are Jews emigrating from areas of the 
western Ukraine, western Byelorussia, the Baltic republics 
and other regions which came under Soviet control in 1939- 
1944. "Heartlanders" are Jews emigrating from areas under 
nominal Soviet control since 1917. "Asian" Jews include 
those emigrating from Soviet Georgia.
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Table 14






























Years of Education in the Soviet Union
Years Count Percentage




More than 19 16 15.4




Percent of Population Aged Ten and Over Having 
Higher and Secondary Education (Complete and 





Jews (RSFSR) 76.4 82.4














Tatars (RSFSR) 32.9 44.2
Tatars (Uzbek SSR) 43.6 53.5
SOURCE: 1970 Census, as quoted in Robert A. Lewis
et al., Nationality and Population Change in Russia and 
the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970 (New
York: Praeger, 1976), p. 340.
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The Soviet pattern of education is quite standard.
High School is completed after the tenth year and many 
students then terminate their formal education with an addi­
tional two years of trade or technical school. The degree 
"candidate of science," roughly equivalent to the American 
Ph.D., is normally not awarded until after the eighteenth 
or nineteenth year of education. When all formal school is 
taken into account, including continuing education, night and 
correspondence courses, an individual may have more than 
nineteen years of education to his credit. A comparison of 
the data in tables 16 and 17 indicates that the respondents, 
as a group, were considerably better educated than any other 
Soviet nationality group and were somewhat better educated 
than Soviet Jews at large. Whereas 82.4 percent of Soviet 
Jews in the Russian republic had been exposed to at least 
secondary education according to the 1970 census, approximately 
97 percent of the respondents had received at least secondary 
education prior to their departure from the Soviet Union in 
the years 1973-1980. Differentiation according to education 
is considered to be an important factor in this research.
For the purpose of tabulating educational level with responses 
to specific interview questions, the respondents were grouped 
into three classes: those of low, medium and high education,
(table 18).
Since many of the respondents had received university 





Low (up to 12 yrs) 24 23.1
Medium (13-18 hrs) 62 59.6
High (above 19 yrs) 16 15.4
No Response __2 1.9
Total 104 100.0
to identify their major field of study. The data in 
table 19 show that a broad range of fields are represented 
though there is a distinct preponderance of scientific and 
technical disciplines, such as engineering. This tendency 
toward the technical is probably related to the general 
Soviet emphasis on academic training which can contribute 
directly to the campaign for modernization through indus­
trialization. Differentiation according to field of study 
is also considered to be an important factor in this research. 
Therefore, the fields listed above have been grouped according 
to whether or not training in a particular field helps to 
identify a respondent as a former member of the Soviet intel­
ligentsia and, more to the point, whether the respondent has 
an education indicative of a member of the technical intelli­
gentsia. Hence, the fields in table 20 have been grouped 
into three classes; technical intelligentsia (coded in 
table 17 as 1), non-technical intelligentsia (coded as 2),
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Table 19 
Major Field of Study
Field Count Code Percentage
Mechanical Engineering 20 1 19.2
Electrical Engineering 9 1 8.7
Math/Computers 7 1 6.7
Music 6 2 6.8
Other* 6 5.8
Physics/Biology 5 1 4.8
Engineering (all other) 5 1 4.8
Economics 4 1 3.8
"General"** 4 3.8
Medical Doctor 3 1 2.9
Chemistry 3 1 2.9
Elementary Education 3 2 2.9
English Language 3 2 2.9
Journalism/Editing 2 2 1.9
Accounting/Bookkeeping 1 2 1.0
Law 1 2 1.0
Nursing 1 3 1.0
Geology 1 1 1.0
Psychology 1 1 1.0
Architecture 1 1 1.0
Library Science 1 2 1.0
Fashion Design 1 3 1.0
Physiology 1 1 1.0
Humanities 1 2 1.0
Philosophy 1 2 1.0
No Response*** 13 — 12.5
Total 104 100.0
*Other includes primarily non-technical, non- 
professional specialties such as hairdressing, waiting on 
tables, cosmetology, truck driving, etc.
**"General" primarily includes respondents with 
limited or no university training but who claimed exposure 
to general topics such as math, history, physical culture, 
etc.
***No response primarily includes respondents with 
some or incomplete university training who did not claim 
knowledge of any technical or academic subject.
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Table 20
Major Fields of Study 
(Classified)
Class Count Code Percentage
Technical Intelligentsia (TI) 60 1 57.7
Non-Tech. Intelligentsia (NTI) 24 2 23.1
Non-Intelligentsia (NI) 14 3 13.5
No Response* 6 — 5.8
*After additional analysis, seven of the thirteen 
"No Response" indications were re-allocated to NTI and NI 
fields of study.
and non-intelligentsia (coded as 3). Table 20, above, dis­
plays the grouping of the fields into the three classes.
These groupings will be used later in this chapter for the 
purpose of crosstabulating major field of study with the 
responses to specific interview questions.
Each respondent was asked to identify his or her occu­
pation in October 1973. In most cases, and almost in every 
case involving a member of the technical intelligentsia, a 
technical education in a particular field led to a career or 
job in that field. The data in table 21 shows that the 
respondents held a wide range of jobs, but once again, 
there is an abundance of specialists in the technical fields. 
When these occupations are grouped and classified according 
to the criteria used to develop table 20, a similar product 




Occupation in October 1973
Occupation Count Code Percentage
Mechanical Engineer 20 1 19.2
Factory Worker 11 3 10.6
Elementary/Secondary 
Education Teacher 10 2 9.6
Electrical Engineer 9 1 8.7
Mathematician/Programmer 8 1 7.7
Research Scientist 7 1 6.7
Musician 6 2 5.8
Engineering (all other) 5 1 4.8
Other* 5 3 4.8
University Student 4 2 3.8
Medical Doctor 3 1 2.9
Accountant/Bookkeeper 3 3 2.9
Language Translator 2 2 1.9
Journalist/Editor 2 2 1.9
Lawyer 1 2 1.0
Economist 1 1 1.0
Fashion Designer 1 3 1.0
Geologist 1 1 1.0
Architect 1 1 1.0
Soldier 1 3 1.0
Total 104 100.0
*Other includes primarily non-technical, non­




Occupations in October 1973 
(Classified)
Occupation • Count Code Percentage
Technical Intelligentsia (TI) 55 1 52.9
Non-Tech. Intelligentsia (NTI) 25 2 24.0
Non-Intelligentsia (NI) 24 3 23.1
Total 104 100.0
The demographic characteristics of my 1980 respondents
seem to conform quite closely to the demographic characteris-
2tics of Professor Gitelman's 1976 Detroit sample --except 
for a slighly higher proportion of heartlanders, and a slightly 
lower proportion of persons older than fifty in my group. 
Although my respondents seem to be slightly better educated 
than Soviet Jews as a group, there are no other demographic 
differences which seem in any way significant to this research. 
The 1980 sample also seems to conform to the assessment of 
Theodore Friedgut^ that Soviet Jews today are overwhelmingly 
urban, far better educated than the non-Jews around them and 
disproportionately concentrated in the intelligentsia occupa­
tions. It would seem then that these 1980 respondents are 
qualified to speak in a fashion representative of all Soviet 
Jews about issues in contemporary Soviet life such as those 
concerning information and mass communications. It would also 
seem that these respondents are able to speak in a fashion 
suggestive of the members of other groups of Soviet people==
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groups principally composed of members of the Russian 
majority in which levels of education are high, urban living 
is the norm, and technical intelligentsia occupations are 
well represented.
CHAPTER 10
LISTENING HABITS AND "READING 
BETWEEN THE LINES"
The data contained in tables 23 and 24 show the 
main sources of news used by the respondents in 1973, first 
during "normal" news conditions and second during conditions 
of international crisis. Respondents were first asked "There 
was a war in the Middle East in October 1973 between Israel 
and the Arab countries. It started very quickly and without 
warning. How did you first find out that this war had 
started?" The idea was to determine which news sources, both 
official and unofficial, had the attention of Soviet Jews at 
a time when they had no particular reason to expect news of 
a special event. It should be remembered that the jamming 
of foreign radio stations, which was introduced with the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was lifted in 
September 1973. Even though the reception of foreign stations 
had been quite difficult for five years due to the jamming, 
within a month or less after subsiding, it appears that the 
foreign stations were perhaps the third most popular source 




First Source of News about the War
Source Count Percentage
Soviet Radio 26 25.0
Soviet Television 8 7.7
Soviet Newspaper 24 23.1
Someone at Work 1 1.0
Someone in Family 3 2.9
Foreign radio 21 20.2
A Friend 10 9.6
Other/Don't Remember 
Don't Know 11 10.6
Total 104 100.0
many respondents recalled that the official Soviet sources 
cut loose a barrage of propaganda, reporting that Israeli 
"aggressor" forces were being defeated by an "heroic" 
Egyptian attack. Some respondents recalled that news of the 
war through official sources (Soviet radio, television and 
newspaper) seemed delayed for hours, and even days in some 
cases, as if the authorities were trying to "formulate" the
facts. Others felt that the news came quickly through offi­
cial sources because Egypt enjoyed early success in the war 
and the authorities were only too happy to report it.
Respondents were asked, "While the war was going on,
until the time it was over, how did you get most of the news 
about the war?" The idea behind this question was to deter­
mine which sources the Soviet Jews relied upon to obtain the
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Main Source of News about the War
Source Count Percentage
Soviet Radio 12 11.5
Soviet Television 4 3.8
Soviet Newspaper 13 12.5
Someone at Work 1 1,9
Someone in the Family 2 1.9
Foreign radio 55 52.9
A Friend 6 5.8
Other/Don't Remember/ 
Don't Know 11 10.6
Total 104 100.4*
♦Percentage exceeds 100 percent because of 
rounding.
most trustworthy and complete information about an event of 
exceptional importance. In table 24 above, the popularity 
of the foreign stations seems almost striking. When the war 
started, it appears that listening to foreign stations in­
creased almost 200 percent, this at the expense of Soviet 
radio, newspapers and television whose audiences declined 
approximately SO percent each. During the first week of the 
war, the period of the Arabs' greatest battlefield success, 
many respondents recalled that the official sources tended 
to provide a high degree of detail in their reporting. Much 
was made of numbers of Israeli planes shot down, Israeli tanks
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destroyed and Israeli soldiers killed. As the war went into 
the second and third weeks, the official reporting became 
more and more general. In contrast, foreign radio stations 
appeared to have less detail at the start and more as the 
war went on. This situation probably contributed to somewhat 
increased listening to the foreign stations, though it does 
not appear that the respondents wholly abandoned the official 
sources for the foreign stations at any time during the war. 
Rather, the official media became the supplementary source of 
news information as the foreign stations became the primary. 
One respondent recalled that the official sources created 
a problem for themselves at the start of the war when they 
reported with much fanfare that the Arabs were definitely 
defeating the Israelis. In the end, it became clear, both 
in the official sources and in the foreign radio news reports, 
that much of the Egyptian army was surrounded and cut off in 
the desert by the Israeli counterattack. As a result, the 
official sources looked somewhat foolish.
The data in tables 25 and 26 below indicate which 
foreign radio stations were the most popular among the 
respondents. They were asked to name the foreign radio 
station to which they listened most often, and second most 
often, when receiving news about the war. Table 25 clearly 
shows that VOA was the dominant first choice among the 
respondents in the reporting of news about the war. BBC 
and RL were popular second choices (see table 26). Though
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Table 25
Most Popular Foreign Radio Service
Service Count Percentage
Voice of America (VOA) 74 83.1
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) 8 9.0
Radio Israel 4 4.5
Deutsche Welle (DW) 2 2.2
Radio Liberty (RL) __1 1.1
Total 89* 100.0
♦Fifteen of the 104 total respondents reported that 
in 1973 either they did not listen to any foreign radio 
station as a general rule, or they were not listening at 
the time of the war.
Table 26






Radio Israel 7 8.7
Radio Canada 1 1.2
Radio Free Europe _1 1.2
Total 89 100.0
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65 percent of the respondents reported that some jamming 
interferred with the reception of their favorite service,
67 percent of the respondents found that their favorite 
service was audible at least half the time. Very few of 
the respondents could recall the exact month (September 1973) 
when jamming subsided so it seems possible that their memory 
of jammed programming related to a period earlier than 
October 1973. If this is so, then it seems likely that 
most of the most popular foreign stations were audible to even 
more than 67 percent of the respondents.
Respondents tended to have strong feelings about the 
character of the various foreign radio services. VGA was 
generally praised for objective news reporting, although many 
respondents detected a "cautious," circumspect approach to 
its reporting of the war. Some respondents felt that VGA 
seemed to be "trying too hard" to seem objective in spot 
news reporting, as if they were attempting to be as "objec­
tive" as they perceived the Soviet official sources to be 
"biased" and "non-objective." Many more, however, felt that 
VGA was a neutral, highly credible service that provided just 
the facts in spot news reporting and left the listener to 
draw his own conclusions about the facts. BBC was almost 
universally praised for its reporting. Some respondents 
detected a relaxed, highly "professional" tone about BBC, 
a tone sometimes perceived as lacking in VGA reports. Several 
respondents criticized VGA for using announcers who seemed to
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possess less than "perfect" capabilities in spoken Russian.
In this case, announcers who did not seem to possess perfect 
pronunciation and accent were seen as slightly lowering the 
generally positive image of the station. In this regard,
BBC announcer Alexei Maximovich Goldberg was mentioned by 
name and praised by several respondents for presenting the 
most objective, "professional" reporting on any of the foreign 
radio stations. Radio Liberty, a U.S. government-operated 
service based in Germany, seemed to provoke the sharpest 
differences of opinion among the respondents. Some reported 
that they liked the "sharp" nature of the news reporting, 
particularly in regard to Soviet affairs. Some liked the way 
RL seemed to be "hard" on the Soviet regime. Others, however, 
felt that the tone of RL reporting was "angry" and likely to 
be poorly received by many Soviet listeners. Additionally, 
one respondent felt that "too many World War II Russian 
refugees work here [RL]," and he offered that some of them 
were "known" to be "co-operated with the Germans during the 
war." In any event. Radio Liberty was widely believed among 
the respondents to be among the most jammed stations in the 
Soviet Union. It seems to share this distinction with Radio 
Israel and the shortwave broadcasts coming out of the Peoples 
Republic of China. Tables 27 and 28 indicate a measure of 
how objective the foreign stations were perceived to be as a 
class in their reporting of news about the war.
Respondents were also asked to consider their opinion 
of the objectivity of Soviet official newspaper and broadcast
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Table 27
Was the Foreign Station Objective?/ 
Most Popular Service (VOA with 







No Response ^1* --
Total 89** 100,0
*Includes respondents who had no opinion on the 
issue of objectivity with their first choice foreign 
radio station.
**Fifteen of the 104 total respondents reported 
they were not listening to foreign radio in October 1973.
Table 28
Was the Foreign Station Objective?/Second Most 
Popular Service (BBC, with 30 Percent of 







No Response 26* —  —
Total 80 100.0
*Includes respondents who listened to only one
foreign radio station or had no opinion on the issue of 
the objectivity of their second choice station. In addi­
tion to these 80 respondents in table 28, 24 more were 
either listening to no foreign station in October 1973, 
or only one and had no opinion as to the objectivity of 
that station, or they failed to respond for other reasons 
such as "don't know," "don't remember," etc.
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reports about the war. Some respondents seemed surprised at 
the question, as if the answer were self-evident. Some were 
quick to respond, "they lie all the time, doesn't everyone 
know that?" and with other responses to this effect. Many, 
however, became reflective and conceded that there were times 
and circumstances under which Soviet reporting could be fully 
in accordance with the facts— those being the circumstances 
under which reporting the facts accurately and completely 
served the interest of the authorities. When considering the 
official Soviet reporting of the Yom Kippur War, several 
respondents closely echoed the sentiments of the one who said, 
"They [the Soviet press] told the truth only as long as the 
Egyptian forces were winning. Then, when Israel began to 
counterattack and win, the old pattern of reversing the facts 
and ignoring the truth began again. It is strange, but as 
long as the Soviet press was lying, we were unconcerned about 
Israel. It was only when they told the truth that we became 
worried."
Some respondents offered views reminiscent of those 
offered to Inkeles and Bauer some thirty years ago by emigres 
who thought they knew how to interpret the Soviet press: 
"Simply believe that the view 180 degrees in opposition to 
the view of the authorities is the true one," I was told.
"It's called putting the facts on their feet." One respondent 
felt that today's Soviet press is under more constraint than 
the press of Stalin's day to report the facts objectively.
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As he put it, "They [the authorities] have got to tell a 
little bit of truth nowadays, because, even though the country 
is not free, it is no longer locked up tight as if there was 
a wall around it. Besides, the best lie is the one which 
contains a little bit of truth." Another said, "They lie as 
long as possible, until the true facts cannot be denied. Then, 
they tell the truth and they don't seem to care about how 
ridiculous they look." Table 29 tabulates the variety of 
opinion on this question.
Table 29
Was the Soviet Press Reporting Objective,







No Response __4 —  —
Total 104 100.0
*This respondent seemed quite sincere.
Respondents were ready to give specific examples of 
how they "read between the lines," "put the facts on their 
feet," and used similar procedures to squeeze what they felt 
was the truth out of both the official and unofficial news 
sources available to them:
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In reading about "growing tensions" in the Middle 
East in the Soviet press, when they said that 
"Israeli provocations" were continuing, I took it 
to mean that the Arabs were getting ready to attack.
When the war began to turn in Israel's favor (after 
her counterattack had crossed the Suez canal and 
trapped the Egyptian 3rd Army in the Sinai Desert), 
the Soviet press reporting went something like this 
. . . "Israeli aggressors, we11-equipped by the 
American imperialists are attacking the heroic 
Egyptian defenders, who though not as well-equipped 
are resisting and are inflicting great losses on 
Israel. . . . "  I took all this to mean the following; 
1. Israel is advancing. 2. The Egyptians are close 
to collapse.
At times the lying in the Soviet press is very 
obvious. For example, in 1977, an Israeli bus was 
hijacked by PLO terrorists, and before it was over,
27 Israeli civilians had been killed. TASS [the 
Soviet news reporting service] said that PLO "parti­
sans" had killed 37 Israeli "soldiers." VOA also 
reported the event, but reported the truth about it.
I became sure of the truth when I caught a broadcast 
on Radio Israel. They commented on the TASS report 
about the "37 Israeli soldiers" killed by PLO 
"partisans." They said (sarcastically) that most 
of these "soldiers" were only nine to thirteen years 
old.
I remember official reports about Israeli aircraft 
losses. We were told by the Soviet press that the 
Egyptians had shot down many Israeli Phantoms and 
Mirages. At that time, I had friends who had worked 
on Soviet military aircraft sent to the Arab countries. 
Also, I had friends who had met Arab military officers 
who had come to [name of city deleted] for their 
political education at the political school for 
foreign military officers. The reports of my friends 
led me to believe that these people [the Arabs] were 
not smart enough nor dedicated enough to completely 
defeat the Israelis.
One respondent recalled an event which occurred in 1976 to
illustrate a point he wanted to make about the relationship
of simple facts to the reporting of the Soviet press. It
concerned the defection of a Soviet Air Force pilot, who flew
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his exotic, late-model fighter plane to Japan and in doing 
so, handing the West a propaganda victory of immense propor­
tions:
When Belenko [the pilot] took his Mig [the plane] to 
Japan, I was in the Caucasus at the time. Two or 
three hours after he landed, VOA had a report about 
it. Then they reported updates about it every two 
hours. Pravda took nine days to report the first
word. 1 was in the Soviet Union so I ooiaid not be
sure if VOA was telling the truth. But I did know 
that it took the authorities nine days to decide how 
to report the event. Even a one or two day delay 
for Pravda to decide how to write about it would 
have seemed understandable to me at the time. But 
to tell the truth takes no time, you just tell it.
You don't have to take time to think about how to
tell it unless you plan to say something untrue 
about it.
Most of the respondents had a particularly dim view 
of the reliability of the Soviet press and a particularly
favorable one of the news reports they received from foreign
radio. But in follow-up discussions, it became clear that 
one could readily find Soviet news information to be incredu­
lous but still act as if one believed it wholeheartedly. A 
respondent put it this way:
Listeners to Soviet radio and Soviet newspaper 
readers may not believe what they hear and read but 
they are still under the influence of it. Russians 
have a native respect for the written word. Russia 
is a reading nation. Lenin said "literature without 
propaganda does not exist," so everything they [the 
regime] write or say is propaganda. First, they 
. train people to respect what is in print, and then 
they say whatever they want. They don't care what 
people may really think, because it doesn't make 
any difference. Everyone is trained and conditioned 
to act as if they believe.
This respondent seemed to want to make a point similar to the
one made by Hedrick Smith regarding Soviet codes of behavior.
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Smith referred to the division of Soviet life into public 
and private spheres. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts 
is certainly behavior which is part of the private sphere, 
even though many people may now be listening and reporting 
what they hear in a somewhat public way. The point is that, 
as a personal activity which is part of the private zone, lis­
tening to foreign radio does not constitute entertainment in 
the sense that an American listener listening to American 
radio might be entertained. There are at least two reasons. 
First, the Soviet listener may feel a measure of guilt for 
listening, guilt associated with fear of sanction for being 
caught. But secondly, and more to the point, the Soviet lis­
tener is not going to feel "good" for having foreign radio 
prove to him on a regular basis that his own government lies 
to him.
In its own way, listening to foreign radio might be 
likened to the host of illicit activities now apparently preva­
lent in the Soviet Union, activities to which millions of 
ordinary people seem to be resorting just to get by in their 
daily lives. Countless people seem to be engaged in barter, 
exchanging favors, bribery and similar devices to short circuit 
the normal, "above ground," "socialist" system of commodity 
supply because the official system seems to be exceedingly 
inefficient. In no real way can Soviet people feel "good" 
about engaging in these "underground" activities and getting 
information from foreign radio may appear to Soviet listeners
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to be an equally illicit but necessary activity. If one can 
judge from the 1980 respondents, Soviet listeners to foreign 
radio listen wholly without self-rightous feelings. My 
respondents reported that after listening, they felt just a 
little better-informed and a little more alienated from Soviet 
life. In this sense, operating within the private zone as 
a listener to foreign radio did not make any of my respondents 
feel "free," only a little more distant from the life pre­
scribed as correct by the authorities. Listening to foreign 
radio changed nothing fundamental in their lives. They may 
have been able to get more and better information about the 
Soviet Union and the rest of the world, but it did not change 
the fact that they still had to live in the Soviet Union.
Only one respondent, a particularly intelligent and 
resourceful man, seemed to be proud about the way he obtained 
information he could rely on. For him, it had nothing to do 
with illicit listening to foreign radio.
Ninety-nine percent of Russian public news is disin­
formation. You have to be very smart and hardworking 
to find out the truth. I wanted to find out the truth 
about the United States (for example) so I went to 
the Central Library. It was 99 percent lies. I know 
because I compared the 110 books they had on America 
with each other and I got the one percent that was 
true about America in each of them. At this time I 
was out of a job because I had applied for my exit 
. visa and I eventually had seven months to spend on 
researching America. I found out what I wanted to 
know. I found out how to find a job in the United 
States, about its schools, its political system and 
political parties; about my profession in America,
U.S. income taxes, medical care and life insurance.
It was all in the Russian language in a Soviet library. 
The first time you read, you do not know what is a lie 
and what is the truth. If you read all 110 of the
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books it is hell, but after a while the true 
information repeats itself and is confirmed in 
the other books. The KGB, of course, makes a 
list of who looks at these books. A KGB man took 
the chair next to me and watched all the time I 
was reading. But it shows that it can be done.
All of the biggest cities in the Soviet Union have 
this kind of library. . . .
This respondent was perhaps the only one out of the 104 who 
seemed to feel confident and self-righteous about the way he 
had obtained information outside of regime control. As he 
told his story, it seemed that his life during his last 
months in the Soviet Union had taken place in only one sphere 
instead of the usual two; public and private. He admitted 
that the risks he took by living and behaving in this open 
way were great, but he felt that they were mitigated by the 
fact that the authorities knew he had applied for an exit 
visa. Since he had already identified himself as a non­
conformist by applying, he felt he could do himself no fur­
ther harm behaving as one. Practically no other respondent 
wished to openly appear as a non-conformist, no matter what 
applications he may have filed with the government. It seems 
that even up to the moment of emigration, almost no respondent 
felt he could listen to foreign radio and discuss what he had 
heard in the private zone, without feeling at least some small 
measure of insecurity or guilt.
Though the 1980 respondents showed a rather thorough 
skepticism about the objectivity and truthfulness of the 
Soviet press, and though listening to foreign radio probably 
failed to make most of them less depressed about themselves
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and their lives in the Soviet Union, many of them allowed 
that humor was important to them in adjusting to Soviet life. 
Within the private zone, people often tell jokes and anecdotes 
which mock the official media and power structure while at the 
same time suggesting that unofficial media have a good deal 
of respect from average people. Jokes are meant to be told, 
not read, but some of the respondents were so quick to tell 
a joke to illustrate a point, and they were so good at tell­
ing them, that it seems worth trying to repeat some of the 
best jokes here.
The Soviet press is full of reports about food 
production; how good it is this year, how much 
better it will be next year. I guess I should 
stop trying to find food in the state stores and 
just hold my bag under the radio!
At a recent politburo meeting, Kosygin found that 
he had to visit the men's room. Three times in 
three hours he asked the other members if he could 
be excused. Each time the other members voted,
"No!" Finally, there was a knock at the door.
It was the guard who came in and said, "The Voice 
of America wants to know why Kosygin can't go!"
During a recent speech on Soviet television,
Brezhnev talked endlessly about the achievements 
of Communism. I got bored and changed the channel, 
but he was on the second channel and I changed it 
again. But Brezhnev was still talking so I changed 
it again to the fourth and final channel. Brezhnev 
just looked up from his text, fixed me right in the 
eye and said, "I'd like to see you try that again!
Humor seems to be an important ingredient in helping to main­
tain a sense of perspective on the part of a person who is 
operating within his private zone. It seems to act as an 
antidote to the feelings of guilt, insecurity and alienation 
which might otherwise arise as a result of engaging in the
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practice of listening to foreign radio. Humor seems also 
to help ward off the depression which might occur as a result 
of feeling that things in Russia are hopeless compared to 
things in other parts of the world. Of course, it is foreign 
radio which provides much of the best, and most reliable 
information about other countries and world events. In this 
sense, possession of a private zone, and engaging in a pri­
vate zone activity such as listening to foreign radio, may 
make an individual feel better informed. But it does not 
necessarily make him feel happier or self-satisfied.
CHAPTER 11
DISCUSSION VARIABLES AND THE PRIVATE ZONE
I have postulated that the presence of the private 
zone is determined by the degree to which the individual seems 
willing to discuss information from unofficial sources with 
relative confidence that he will not suffer at the hands of 
the authorities for doing so. A willingness to acquire unof­
ficial information is also believed to be correlated with 
the presence of the zone. I have postulated that the dimen­
sions of the private zone might vary among people given dif­
ferences in the nature of their personal contacts, demographic 
characteristics and separate personalities. But, in general 
terms, it is believed that the zone is circular in shape and 
encompasses the individual and whose persons with whom he felt 
he can safely share information from unofficial sources. The 
respondents were asked to recall if they felt free to discuss 
news about the war, obtained from foreign radio stations, 
with different categories of people— family members, close 
friends, co-workers, casual friends or acquaintances, and 
finally, strangers. These categories of people might be
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perceived as being arranged as five concentric circles with 
the individual at the center and the fifth ring, strangers, 
outermost. The data in tables 30 through 34 show how will­
ingly or unwillingly they shared their information about the 
war from foreign radio with people in each of these 
categories.
Table 30
"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio with 








to foreign radio 15 14.9
No Response 2 —  —
Total 104 100.0
As shown in table 30, respondents indicated a high 
degree of confidence in discussing news of the war from 
foreign radio with family members. Friedrich and Brzezinski 
referred to the family as an "island of separateness" in a 
totalitarian sea, one which had "proved to be of particular 
tenacity." The data in table 30 would seem to indicate 
that this is true as of the 1973 time period. None of the
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respondents seemed to fear that one of his own children might 
turn out to be a Pavlik Morozov, someone who would turn in 
his own parent for engaging in "anti-Soviet" or "anti­
socialist" behavior. One respondent did indicate that he 
did not talk about "these things" (such as news from foreign 
radio) in front of his young son, not because he was afraid 
his son might turn him in, but because he did not want the boy 
to get into trouble for following his father's "example" of 
"talking freely." At home, news of the war from foreign radio 
seems to have been very freely shared, and it appears that the 
war was the main topic of Jewish family conversation during 
the time that it was the major news story of the day.
Table 31
"Did You Discuss News from Foreign 







Not Listening 15 14.6
No Response 1 —
At this point— table 31— the outer dimensions of the 
private zone are beginning to make themselves apparent. The
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ring composed of family members is clearly within the zone. 
Most personal friends also appear to be in a ring within the 
zone, but the confidence with which the respondents discussed 
this type of unofficial information with friends does not 
appear to be as high as it seems to be with family members. 
Whereas 78 percent of the respondents reported that they 
"always" talked with family members, only 51 percent felt 
they could "always" trust their friends with the same kind 
of information. Fifty-one percent is still a high measure of 
trust in the aggregate, but when compared to 78 percent it 
does seem to reflect a measure of diminished confidence.
Part of the reason the level of trust has remained high in 
the aggregate is because respondents felt, in answering this 
question, that "a friend" is a person known for an extended 
period of time and in whose life one felt a personal involve­
ment of significant proportions. Normally, a person would 
know the family of his friends as well as the friend. Very 
few of the respondents felt that they had more than four or 
five of such "friends" in the course of a lifetime. Most of 
the respondents, particularly the older ones, observed that 
their friends were usually Jewish as were they themselves. 
Jewish friends were normally trusted as family, but some 
reported that they had Russian and Ukrainian friends as well. 
Russian or Ukrainian friends did not always seem to be trusted 
at the level of Jewish friends. The presence of non-Jewish 
friends seems to be the primary factor in reducing the high
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level of trust accorded to family, to the still high but 
somewhat diminished level of trust accorded to friends. In 
this regard, the second ring was generally colored by the 
ethnic element.
Table 32
"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio with 








to foreign radio 15 14.9
No Response 3 -
Total 104 100.0
In table 32, it appears that we are reaching the outer 
limits of the private zone. The last possible of the concen­
tric rings around the individual, composed of people with whom 
the individual might confidently share information from unof­
ficial sources, appears to be the one containing co-workers. 
Whereas 75 percent of the respondents reported that they could 
talk "always" or "mostly" with friends, only 19 percent could 
do the same with co-workers. At the other end of the spectrum, 
only 2.9 percent of the respondents reported they would talk
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only ’’seldom" or "never" with friends, but fully 43 percent 
’’seldom" or "never" discussed news about the war with co­
workers. There seem to be several reasons for this contrast: 
the public nature of the workplace, the increased opportu­
nities for surveillance in the workplace of people by the 
authorities, and the presence in the workplace of many unsym­
pathetic Russians and Ukrainians. Whereas 71 percent of the 
respondents said that most (50 percent or higher) of their 
personal friends were Jewish, in the workplace non-Jewish 
workers made up most of the workforce 86 percent of the time, 
according to the respondents themselves.
Many of the respondents chose to talk with confidence 
to a person at work because the co-worker was also a good 
Jewish friend. But one could not always be sure of such 
things because, as one respondent put it, "a lot of Jews are 
Communists, too!" Almost all of the respondents showed a high 
degree of caution about the workplace because informers and 
provacateurs were presumed to be present. Several respondents 
offered the going assumption that one out of every ten workers 
performed such functions for the KGB. Another said that the 
ratio could be higher, perhaps one in five in high-level 
scientific or research institutions. Some respondents did 
not talk politics at all in the workplace because they felt 
an honest disinterest in the subject. Another reported, "I 
worked all day from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. each day. I had enough 
to do without making idle talk." But many said that they
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could, and would, talk "politics" (meaning news from unofficial
sources, jokes and anecdotes about government and party
leaders, etc.) on the job, depending on the type of politics
at issue, the identity of the other discussants, and whether
or not they might be overheard:
I could talk to some of the Russians at work about 
the general political situation, but I could not 
talk to them about Israel. These are two different 
things.
My Russian friends said that since I was in the Soviet 
Union I should believe what the Russian press said, 
not foreign radio. But, it was a friendly sort of 
thing. My Russian friends were well-educated. They 
knew that their press lied but they still believed 
it.
The "crap" the Soviet press puts out does alienate 
quite a few people. If someone were to repeat some­
thing from the [Soviet] press that was "crap," you 
might see a little smile from some of my friends.
Maybe there would be a wink, but no words. It is 
still real communication though, as if to say, "That 
crap is just not worth any discussion."
In our plant there was no special place where we could 
talk. Sometimes just at lunch over the table. Some­
times in back of the machines when they were running.
Russians at work would listen to VOA and ask me if I 
heard the news? I would always answer, "No." I may 
have to work, but I do not have to talk.
Above are some of the comments of respondents who tended 
to show average amounts of discretion and caution about com­
municating information from unofficial sources in the work­
place. Other respondents were either bolder themselves or 
were in a position at work to see others who were,
I worked in the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] 
organization. I had to be careful about expressing 
myself on political matters. But I worked with some 
clever Russians who also had their own point of view.
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I could talk to them about politics, even some who 
were party careerists. In 1968, when the army went 
into Czechoslovakia, one of these young men said to 
me, "you see, my friend, it is because Russian must 
have safe borders." I responded, "Where does this 
border have to be, at the Atlantic Ocean?"
Everyone drinks. You can speak out and abuse the 
government just as long as they can say you were drunk. 
If an officer in the Soviet army does not get drunk 
and abuse the government, his name is in a special 
file. He is automatically suspected of being a spy 
or part of some subversive organization.
Everyone is dissatisfied. Especially workers. It is 
expected and understood. You can talk about the fail­
ures of society, but just don't say you heard about it 
on VOA.
I was a school teacher. We were talking about the [Yom 
Kippur] war. One of my students, a thirteen-year old 
boy, stood up and said that the reporting was different 
in the Soviet press and on VOA. He must have been lis­
tening with his parents. On that day, the director of 
the school was observing me. After class he ordered me 
to tell the boy that he could no longer listen to VOA 
because it was from a capitalist country and was not 
capable of telling the truth.
I talked about the war all the time with my co-workers 
who were Jewish— eEspecially when we were at the collec­
tive farm. There was nothing else to do.
Respondents were asked to consider their attitude toward 
discussing news from unofficial sources with acquaintances or 
casual friends. Use of the term "friend" in this context re­
quired some explanation to some of the respondents. As one 
respondent put it, "In Russia, there is family, there are 
friends, and then there is everyone else." But the issue was 
clearly understood in terms of acquaintanceship— a person met 
for only the second or third time at a party, or in a school 
class, or as the new neighbor in the apartment house. The 
point was to determine to what degree the private zone might
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extend itself to interpersonal situations in which the political 
disposition of the other person is not automatically suspect, 
but neither can it be known with any degree of certainty.
The data in table 33 suggests that most of the respondents 
approached acquaintances with interest, but with a great deal 
of caution.
Table 33
"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio 








to foreign radio 15 14.7
No Response _ 2 -
104 100.0
Since over 50 percent of the respondents "seldom" 
or "never" discussed the war news from foreign radio with 
acquaintances, it would seem that the private zone would 
not normally include people in this category. Most of the 
respondents indicated that they would be naturally suspicious 
of any outgoing, overly-talkative person. If an acquaintance 
were to be introduced to the respondent by a trusted mutual
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friend, then the suspicion might be lessened. Otherwise,
though, discretion would be the order of the day:
The best thing to do under this kind of situation 
is to keep your mouth shut. Let the other person 
offer his views first. His views might be more 
or less dissident than your own. If his views were 
more dissident than yours, or at least equally 
dissident, then you might feel safe about talking 
to him. But this still could be a provocation.
Some respondents were categorical in their unwillingngess to
talk about the war, or matters relating to Israel with
acquaintances because they found it difficult or distasteful
to engage in the kind of verbal shadow boxing the previous
respondent said was necessary:
I just was never in the mood to talk politics with 
people I did not know well because until you know 
them, it is like talking to the wall.
Ninety-nine percent of the time, if someone does not 
know you, you will be told only what he thinks you 
want to hear.
Others found it less difficult to talk about political matters
with acquaintances but they would reveal only facts or points
of view which had been well disseminated in the official
Soviet press:
I never want to be on record with anyone I do not 
know well that I am a listener to foreign radio.
Today it may be no problem for people to know this 
about you. But ten years from now, a Stalin may be
in power and I will be in big trouble for something
meaningless which happened ten years earlier. You 
just never know and you can't be too careful. They 
keep such records forever.
You don't talk too loosely about VOA and such things, 
except with the closest friends— not because they 
may think you are anti-Soviet (they may be more 
anti-Soviet than you are)— but because you do not
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want to get a reputation as a careless talker.
If you do, no one will ever tall you anything 
worth knowing.
But some respondents indicated that there were cir­
cumstances under which they could be fooled. During the Yom 
Kippur War, the Moscow synagogue became a gathering point for 
Jews who wished to share the latest information about the 
war, discuss emigration, trade jokes and anecdotes or discuss 
other political matters. The authorities were aware of these 
activities and sent informers and provocateurs to mingle with 
the crowd outside the synagogue. One respondent, a young 
college student at the time, was part of the crowd and he 
found himself provoked into speaking "anti-Soviet slander."
I met a man at the synagogue. He said he was from 
Kishinev in Moscow on business. We talked sbout 
some political things, not many. Later, somebody 
called my university and asked for information about 
me. The man at the university who took the call 
happened to he a friend of my father. He told my 
father, and my father told me that I should not go 
to the synagogue for a while if I wanted to get my 
university diploma.
This respondent allowed that he had learned an important
lesson. But as an intelligent and friendly man, he felt that
the solution to his problem was not to stop meeting people
and attempting to make new friends, but learn how to "read"
people better. A number of other respondents felt the same
way and offered thoughts on how to tell if an acquaintance
or stranger was actually an informer or provocateur. Several
remarked that an acquaintance who has a good sense of humor
might be a good bet as a safe person to talk to about politics
or the news from unofficial sourcess
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Ask the person a question such as, “So, where are 
you from?" He might say, "Irkutsk." Then you 
respond, "So how is the food situation out there?"
If he says, "Great! It couldn't be better," or 
"Terrible! Those damn Communists are starving us to 
death!" then you should just talk about the weather 
with this person. But he might answer your question 
with "Great! Last month I only had to wait two hours 
for sausage and they even had two kinds!" or with 
"Great! There were no lines at all last month. Of 
course all the stores were closed because they were 
empty!" If a person shows this kind of humor, you 
might be able to talk to him about things that 
really matter.
Another respondent, a self-described "dissident" 
(referring to his own political activities before he left for 
the Soviet Union) felt that he had a "trained eye" when it 
came to spotting people who were most likely to be safe to 
talk with about matters such as the latest news from foreign 
radio. The first good sign, he.said, was if the other person 
was Jewish;
Jews in Russia are not normally conformists. , A con­
formist is the person who will turn you in, not the 
non-conformist. So, look for a person who expresses 
himself in an original way. For example, the Theory 
of Evolution is gospel in the Soviet Union. If a 
person were to say that he questioned any part of it, 
he is probably not someone who would turn you in for 
saying you heard something on foreign radio. . . .  If 
a person shows signs of material success in life, if 
he wears fashionable western clothes or a smart wes­
tern watch, be careful what you say. Such people are 
conformists and will probably turn you in. . . . The 
true "anti-Soviet" person seems to have an "insolent" 
look in the eye. This is a person who looks like he 
is feeling the pressure of having to live his life in 
the Soviet Union. This person looks ready to chal­
lenge, to question. You could probably talk to this 
person. . . .
It would seem, then, that casual friends and acquain­
tances can only be considered part of the private zone when
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the individual is satisfied that a person is reliable according 
to standards which he alone can set for himself. Some people 
seem to be quicker than others to come to a conclusion that 
a given person is reliable. A substantial portion of the 
respondents, 42 percent, indicated that they "never" discussed 
news from foreign radio about the war with any casual friend 
or acquaintance. These respondents are probably representa­
tive of the Soviet Jews who have the highest degree of caution 
and the strictest standards for judging reliability. Another 
23 percent of the respondents reported that they "seldom" 
discussed war news from foreign radio with acquaintances.
Since 65 percent of the respondents fall into these two most 
restrictive categories, restrictive in the sense of willingness 
to communicate information from unofficial sources, it would 
seem that the outer reaches of the private zone fall somewhere 
short of including the ring composed of casual friends and 
acquaintances.
The data in table 34 show the degree of continuing 
caution exercised by the respondents in the handling of their 
communications matters with people outside of the private zone. 
In this case, respondents were asked to consider how willingly 
they discussed news about the war with strangers— people met 
for the first time and about whom nothing was known. Such 
encounters might occur on a train or airplane trip, on a 













to foreign radio 15 14.9
No Response __3 --
Total 104 100.0
The very few respondents who indicated any willingness to talk
about the news from foreign radio with strangers reported that
they did so because of highly individualistic reasons:
I was free to speak openly, more or less, because I 
was involved in absolutely no illegal commercial 
activities (speculation, bribing, hoarding, exchang­
ing favors, etc.) as were many people I knew well.
If I were going to get into trouble, it would be for 
selling American blue jeans on the black market, not 
for talking about the news on foreign radio.
There is no reason to be silent or to worry about 
provocateurs. If they want to put me in jail, they 
will just do it. Why worry about it?
. It is impossible to disguise yourself and your true 
feelings from all the people you might meet. People 
tend to want to share their sorrows with me. I must 
have a sympathetic face.
But many more respondents indicated that restraint and discre­
tion were the general rule in making comments in front of
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strangers and in hearing such comments from unknown 
persons:
Sometimes on a train going to the country or some 
other remote location a person will make an anti- 
Soviet remark because he is getting off at the next 
stop. But if you look, you will see all the other 
passengers with their heads bowed, trying to look 
like they did not hear.
Once, I was standing in line for hours to buy 
chicken. They ran out just before I got into the 
store. I said out loud, "Crazy Russian government, 
can’t even feed people chicken!" People looked at 
me and were afraid. I even scared myself.
In chapter 4, reference was made to recent developments 
in Soviet criminal law and procedure which suggest that there 
have been certain developments since the mid-1960s in tlie 
area of social control in the Soviet Union. Though the sub­
stance of his general thesis is new and not accepted by Soviet 
specialists, it may be worthwhile nevertheless to recall what 
Professor Hough had to write about this issue. He had attempted 
to chart the course of the "fuzzy line" which separated accept­
able from unacceptable speech as far as the regime was concerned 
in the 1970s. He classified as "acceptable" in the eyes of 
the regime the telling of political jokes, complaining about 
inefficiency in the supply system, even repeating "VOA accusa­
tions" if it was not done for the purpose of subverting the 
Soviet system as a whole. This posed in my mind a rhetorical 
question: What, in fact, can the average Soviet person get
away with in terms of his own communications activities; how 
far can he go in obtaining and disseminating information from 
unofficial sources such as foreign radio? I posed this
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question directly to some of the respondents. For most, the
rule of thumb was to say nothing that might be in any way
controversial in front of a stranger. For others, saying
more was possible:
You can say things like, "I don't like our interna­
tional political policy. We give too much away." .
Or you can even say, "We should support Israel more 
and the Arabs less." But you can only criticize, 
never blame. You can criticize in the form of a joke, 
or an anecdote or an indirect comment. But you can 
never say that the whole system just is not working 
and say who is responsible for the mess. You cannot 
blame the failure of the system on anybody, especially 
not on the Party or the party leadership.
You can say that Brezhnev is stupid, Khrushchev was 
a fool and Stalin was a beast. But you can never say 
that [President] Carter is better than any of them.
Many of the respondents seemed quick to offer that 
simply listening to VOA, or most of the other foreign radio 
stations, no longer seems to automatically land someone in 
jail or earn them an interview with the KGB. Respondents re­
called incidents where they heard VOA programming coming from 
open windows and when one man was in the hospital recovering 
from an operation, he heard VOA for hours at a time coming 
from some unseen location elsewhere in the ward. Young people 
were seen in public carrying portable radios tuned to rock 
music programming on VOA as early as 1968. Portable radios 
tuned to foreign stations have been played openly in front 
of strangers on the beach at resorts on the Black Sea. 
Apparently, listening to foreign radio for one's personal use 
today carries no official sanction for most people. Ohe 
respondent had an interesting experience in this context:
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In our building, a local Communist Party big-shot 
lived directly above us and a local KGB big-shot 
sirectly to the side. My son used to listen to the 
foreign stations all the time and I would say to him, 
"Shut the door. They will hear it!" One day, my 
son did not shut the door. He just said instead; 
"Father, it makes no difference. They have better 
radios than we have, and I can hear VGA better from
But almost all of the respondents agreed that it was a far dif­
ferent matter to make political conversation with a stranger 
in which one reveals non-conformist tendencies or interests. 
Another respondent, who admitted that he broke one of his own 
strongest rules on the subject, learned the nature of the risk 
one takes in talking to strangers:
I was making a train trip to Moscow to apply for exit 
visas for myself and my family. I was sitting next 
to a high-level engineer from [name of city deleted] 
who was Jewish and going to Moscow for some important 
meeting. We got to talking about Jewish matters and 
I told him of my plan to go to the Netherlands embassy 
to process our applications to leave. I told him that 
I had my son's diploma as a mathematician in hope that 
this would help us get out. When we arrived in Moscow 
hours later, a KGB man met me at the train and simply 
asked for my son's diploma. They held it while I went 
to apply for the visas and gave it back to me when I 
returned to the station to go home. But it all 
could have been much worse.
The data in table 35 attempt to summarize and depict 
graphically the most important information contained in 
tables 30 through 34. The median score is used to provide a 
measure of response, low to high, corresponding with how will­
ingly the respondents collectively communicated news from an 
unoffical source (foreign radio) about a specific event (the 
Yom Kippur War) in five cases involving separate categories 
of people. Each of the five categories— family, friends.
Table 35
Median Scores— Discussion Variables as 
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co-workers, acquaintances and strangers— is meant to represent 
a measure of distance from the individual when these cate­
gories are considered in sequence starting with family. It 
can be seen that somewhere between the categories of friends 
and co-workers, the degree of willingness to communicate unof­
ficial information shifts decidedly in the direction of cau­
tion and discretion. But when the same kind of act occurs 
between family and friends, the emphasis seems tobe on 
openness and trust. In this sense, it appears that the 
private zone, measured by how willingly the respondents dis­
cussed information from an unofficial source about the war, 
did certainly not extend out past the category (or ring) of 
co-workers, and with many of the respondents it probably did 
not extend beyond the- select company of a few good friends.
In these people, the power of the ethnic element appears to 
have been particularly strong.
There may be some good reasons why the private zone 
appears to extend out as far as the dimension of co-workers 
in some cases. These reasons will be considered more deeply 
below. But, at the moment, there seems to be little doubt 
why the private zone appears to fade out with Soviet Jews in 
the same vicinity. The legacy of the Terror, the Doctor's 
Plot, the 1958-1962 campaign against "economic crime," and the 
mushrooming of anti-semitism in the wake of the 1967 Six- 
Day Middle East War have conspired to make Soviet Jews security 
conscious when dealing in matters of personal communication.
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It seemed worthwhile to try to determine how much the 
respondents had experienced adverse contact with the author­
ities over unofficial communications, both first hand or by 
association with a family member, friend or co-worker. The 
idea was to get a feeling for the nature of the pressures 
the regime may have placed on the individual over the years, 
pressures which might have acted to curtail either the pri­
vate zone, or the activities within it.
For the purpose of differentiation, the question was 
divided into halves. First, respondents were asked if they, 
or anyone else to their personal knowledge, had experienced 
adverse contact with the authorities for acquiring or commu­
nicating information from an unofficial source during the 
period of time between the 1967 Six-Day Middle East War and 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This "crime" was defined for the 
respondents as including such acts as listening to foreign 
radio, repeating news from foreign radio, telling political 
jokes or anecdotes, writing a letter containing an ''anti- 
Soviet" statement or remark, signing a petition of protest, 
engaging in any kind of demonstration not sponsored by the 
regime, and so on. The meaning of "adverse contact" will be­
come clear in the context below. Since some of the respon­
dents had made plans to leave the Soviet Union by 1973, or 
were gone within a year or two afterwards, the period involv­
ing the Yom Kippur War is the latest one that the respondents 
could reflect upon as a group. The second half of the
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question involved the same issue, but related to a different 
time period— the one involving the entirety of a respondent's 
life in the Soviet Union, up to, but not beyond, the time of 
the 1967 war. The idea here was to obtain two measures of how 
extensively the coercive power of the regime had been exer­
cised in the area of personal and political communication.
The reasons why the year 1967 was chosen to mark the dividing 
line between the two periods will be mentined in detail below.
Respondents dealing with the first half of the ques­
tion generally found that they were hard pressed to come up 
with first-hand evidence of adverse contact with the author­
ities over communications matters between 1967 and 1973. Of 
the 104 respondents, only 10 (12.2 percent) could remember 
the details of an event. But many more were certain that even 
though they could not cite evidence of people getting into 
trouble for speaking out, or behaving in a non-conformist 
fashion, they were positive that it could happen. As one 
respondent put it, "Just because you don't read about these 
things in the newspaper does not mean they don't happen." 
Evidently, what evidence of adverse contact did get out was 
helpful in instilling a good deal of caution in Soviet Jews;
During 1968, I made a joke that I was a "brother" 
of Moshe Dayan in the sense that all Jews are 
brothers. I also said that Gold Meir was my "aunt." 
The next morning I was called to the office of the 
local party organization. After the "investigation,"
I lost my job and all my pay for six weeks. I was 
ordered to remain in town so they could keep an eye 
on me.
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A girl, a music student in my conservatory, danced 
with some of the Jewish people who were dancing in 
front of the synagogue. She was photographed and 
later expelled from the conservatory.
In 1968, there were two young men who were local 
Komsomol leaders, each about 25 years old. One was 
Jewish, one Russian. Both of them had been reading 
Marx and Lenin very closely and had begun to develop 
doubts about Communism (that it was old fashioned, 
obsolete, etc.). Since they were Komsomol leaders, 
they had an audience to which they expressed their 
doubts. The Jew was sent to jail for three years.
The other man was not there when they came to arrest 
him. We think that he escaped. Since he was 
Russian, they probably just forgot about him.
There were some teenage boys who were children of the 
faculty members at our institute. One year, exactly 
on May 1st, two of them hung a black flag (as opposed 
to a red one) from the top of the institute. The 
father of one of the boys, who was a professor, was 
fired. I do not know what happened to the boy.
In 1973, I was a soldier stationed in the army at 
fa remote location in Asia]. At a political agitation 
meeting, one of our soldiers who had been listening 
to Chinese radio in the Russian language repeated to 
the political officer some of the anti-Soviet propa­
ganda he had heard. We were only about 200 miles 
from the China border and the officer was furious.
He reprimanded the soldier in front of all of us 
and ordered him not to do it again. Then the 
soldier was given extra duty (KP) in the kitchen 
as punishment.
In 1968 or 1969, I went on a vacation trip to Poland. 
When I returned to work a-woman there asked me, "How 
did you like the trip?" I responded "I want to go 
back to Poland," meaning to say that I had a good 
time on my vacation. I was reported [by her?] to 
the "special office" for saying that life in Poland 
was far freer and better than in Russia. The man at 
the special office told me that "You must never say 
what you don't like about this country. You could 
be sent to prison. Now you must thank me for keeping 
you from getting into big trouble in the future."
My job was on a small fishing ship. It was an old, 
dirty, slow and smelly ship. We never fished far 
outside the inland waters of Russia. As a Jew, I 
did not think that I would ever be assigned to one
179
of the newer, bigger, more comfortable fishing ships. 
The new ships are often assigned to fish in the 
Atlantic and sometimes they make calls at western 
ports. Sometimes, if you work on one of these ships 
you can buy foreign goods or get dollars [hard 
currency] to buy foreign goods in Russia. Russians 
who had sailed in the Atlantic, and who listened to 
VOA told political anecdotes [and the like],were 
punished by being re-assigned to m^ ship. I never 
listened to VOA in my life and was already there.
When I was in the army in 1973, one time I was listen­
ing to a Ukrainian language program on Radio Canada. 
Somebody turned me in. I could have gone to jail.
I was ordered to report to a major in "Department 
Number Eight [Secret Service]," and he talked to me 
for hours and hours. I tried to stall— to be 
ambiguous. But he had my file in front of him; he 
had my whole life story. He saw that I had only A's
in school and I guess he decided that I was not a
truly bad man. In the end, he allowed me to write a 
letter of explanation to the commander. He suggested
that I say that I had been misguided when I was a lis­
tener to foreign radio, and that I had learned that I 
was wrong, and that I would never do it again; that I 
fully believed in the Communist Party and would behave 
by all the rules in the future. I think the major 
was happy with this simple solution. But I could have 
gone to jail. The papers were ready. . . .
There seem to be several themes running through this 
testimony about the 1967-1973 time period. First, the author­
ities seem quick to respond to ummistakable evidence of lis­
tening to foreign radio and talking about it publicly, or expres­
sing jokes, anecdotes or other evidence of non-conformist 
sentiment in an overly public forum or manner. (No one dur­
ing this period seems to have been compromised by a family 
member or friend. Only once does it appear that someone 
might have been turned in by a co-worker.) Secondly, the 
authorities seem quick to reprimand, scold, threaten and 
implore people to behave, but there seems to be limited
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evidence that serious punishment (such as a jail term) was 
regularly handed out. Thirdly, when punishment was admin­
istered for engaging in an "anti-Soviet" act of communica­
tion, it seemed to go much harder on Jews than non-Jews.
One respondent felt that he had a comprehensive view on these 
matters. Perhaps his view puts the 1967-1973 period into a 
helpful perspective;
There are no firm rules about these matters— what 
you can do and what you can get away with. But my 
friends and I operated under the following assump­
tions: You can listen to foreign radio for your own
use. It is no problem. But if you have relatives 
in another country, or you try to contact foreign 
visitors and you listen to foreign radio, then they 
will put you under surveillance. If you continue 
your activities, they will call you in and threaten 
you with the consequences. Only one in one hundred 
has the courage to continue after this point. Some 
do. They continue to talk to foreigners, talk about 
the news from foreign radio, read Time magazine, and 
so on. At this point they put you away [in jail].
It's a form of suicide. You have to be very strong 
and believe in what you are doing. . . .
Respondents were asked to deal with the second half 
of the question concerning adverse contact with the author­
ities over personal communications matters and related issues. 
In the second half, they were asked to consider the period of 
time before the 1967 war, all the way back as far as they 
could remember. When one considers that this period is 
likely to include the Terror, the Doctor's Plot and the 1958- 
1962 campaign against "economic crime," it does not seem sur­
prising that so many of the respondents reported that they 
had experienced adverse contact first hand or by association 
with a family member, friend or co-worker. Of the 104 
respondents, 50 (49.5) reported such contact:
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In 1938, my father-in-law was arrested and killed.
He had been a student in Germany in 1918 and this 
was taken as evidence that he was against the 
Communist Party.
In 1938, my aunt went to a concentration camp.
She never had the faintest idea why she was 
arrested and held for eight years.
In 1938, my uncle was a party member and general 
manager of a big factory. He was held in a camp 
for several months. There were no charges. All 
his teeth were knocked out. They were trying to 
get him to confess to something. He never had any 
idea what this was
In 1952-1953, when Stalin was still alive, we lis­
tened to foreign radio with closed doors and were 
very careful. I was very young, but I know that I 
never heard a political anecdote until after Stalin 
died.
In 1952, my friend was arrested. He was charged 
with three things: "Listening to the Voice of
America," "Liking Kipling [the British writer]," 
and "Waiting for American Bombers." He was sent 
to prison for four years.
In 1950 or 1951, I had a cousin who was a college 
student at the time. They thought he told a joke.
There was a portrait of Stalin at the university 
which was hanging crooked on the wall. He said out 
loud, "Looki Stalin is hanging wrong!" He meant 
that someone should come and straighten the picture. 
But someone reported him for saying that Stalin should 
be hanging, not as a portrait on the wall, but as a 
real man with a rope around his neck. This is just 
an average story for that time. My cousin got 
eight years.
Specific first-hand recollections about adverse 
contact with the authorities, in particular over communi­
cations issues, became less numerous as the respondents con­
sidered the years after the death of Stalin. However, the 
penalties for non-conformism did not necessarily become 
less severe:
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Sometime in the late 50s or 60s, a girl I knew got 
fired because she had been typing copies of Exodus 
for distribution to people who wanted to take the 
risk of reading it. Her uncle turned her in to the 
KGB. She refused to tell them who she had been 
typing it for.
In the early 1960s, I had a friend who talked too 
much in an anti-Soviet way. He was sent to a 
psychiatric ward. As a psychologist, I felt that 
when he got out, he was positively schizophrenic.
It must have been the medication. They kept him 
there for three years.
In 1964, Khrushchev changed the price of meat. My 
friend put a placard of protest on his back. He got 
only two blocks before he was arrested. He was a 
talented young engineer who was sent to exile in 
Middle Asia for ten years. He lost his career, 
his wife divorced him, and he became an alcoholic.
The year 1967 was chosen to mark the dividing line 
between the two period for several reasons. First, some line 
had to be drawn if any basis for comparison within the body 
of the political communication experience of the respondents 
was to be established. Secondly, 1966 was the year that 
Siniavsky and Daniel received sharp prison sentences for vio­
lating Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Article 190-1 
was also introduced in 1966, and as I discussed in chapter 4, 
this development seems to be indicative of a certain change 
in the legal-procedural approach of the regime to matters of 
soical control. By 1967, this change may have taken hold 
and have been contributiong to a certain "loosening" of con­
trols within portions of the Soviet political communications 
environment relating to the private zone. Thirdly, 1967 was 
the year of Israel's greatest military victory and the year 
that the current wave of Soviet Jewish emigration began. Both
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events seemed to contribute to a rise in anti-semitism in 
the Soviet Union, and this rise might have contributed to 
repression of the unauthorized political communications 
activities of Soviet Jews were it not for the apparent fact 
that the legal-procedural developments mentioned above were 
in the process of taking hold in the post-1966 time period.
In other words, except for the emergence of the private zone 
in the post-1966 period, Soviet Jews may have had at least 
as much adverse contact with the authorities over political 
communications matters after 1966 as before. But, the testi­
mony above seems to show that this was not the case. For the 
Soviet political communictions environment in general, and 
the private zone activities of Soviet Jews in particular, 
the year 1967 seems to have been a watershed.
Of course, the authorities showed high sensitivity 
to acts of "anti-Soviet" political communication both before 
and after 1967, but they seemed quicker to punish non­
conformists with instantaneous jail terms, internal exile and 
physical maltreatment before 1967 than after. Death, as the 
ultimate penalty, was not out of the question in either case, 
but it seems to have been a more likely punishment in the 
earlier period. And the possibility of being betrayed or 
denounced by a family member or friend seems to have been 
higher in the earlier period because so many more people had 
family members and friends subjected to more extreme forms of 
adverse contact. Naturally, all of these generalizations
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are made with the greatest caution. They have been drawn 
from the experiences of only 104 people who belong to only 
one Soviet nationality group. The matter is further compli­
cated by the fact that many of my respondents were under 
thirty years of age. As a result, first-hand and mature 
recollections of conditions in the Soviet political communi­
cations environment before 1967 are less abundant than those 
relating to the period after 1967.
But it still seems fair to suggest that there is a 
correlation between the apparently less intense, marginally 
less coercive attitude of the authorities in the post-1966 
period toward communication of information from unofficial 
sources and the apparent expansion of the private zone out­
wards from the vicinity of the individual to the vicinity of 
co-workers by the time of the early 1970s. To the degree that 
the private zone may actually have expanded since that day in 
1932 when Pavlik Morozov turned in his father for hoarding 
grain, it may have grown in some part because of a certain 
evolution in the attitude of the authorities toward the handl- 
. ig of matters of social control. But there seems to be no 
mystery why the private zone, as of the early 1970s, appears 
to extend out no further than the dimension of co-workers.
The experience of the respondents during all of the trying 
times, both before, during and after 1967, seems to have been 
too dark for them to have permitted themselves to be comfort­
able in more than marginal increases in the scope of their
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own unofficial communication activities— this, no matter 
what changes in the attitude of the authorities may have 
occurred.
CHAPTER 12
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND THE PRIVATE ZONE
It has been postulated that the presence and scope 
of the private zone may vary according to the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, and the general char­
acteristics of the population from which they have come. At 
the start of part II, these respondent democraphics were pre­
sented in tables 12 through 22 and it was advanced that the 
respondents are reasonably representative of the Soviet Jew­
ish population. The data in table 35 summarizes the evidence 
supporting the case that the private zone exists among these 
respondents, at least to a given extent. The data in 
tables 36 through 40 below are included to amplify and expand 
this evidence. They have been produced by crosstabulating the 
demographic variables of age, sex, place of residence (Asian, 
heartland, or western), educational level (low, medium, or 
high), and occupation (technical intelligentsia, non-technical 
intelligentsia, non-intelligentsia) all with the discussion 
variables associated with the dimensions of the private zone; 
family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances and strangers.
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The amplified and expanded evidence produced by these 
crosstabulations seems to suggest some interesting varia­
tions in the presence and extent of the private zone accord­
ing to demography.
The data in table 36 demonstrate that the presence 
of the private zone seems to vary among the respondents 
according to age. Of the 104 respondents, between 15 to 18 
are not reflected in this table because they were not listen­
ing to foreign radio at the time of the war, or they did not 
respond for some other reason such as "don't know," "don't 
remember." Thus, N varies from between 84 and 88 respondents 
depending on the dimension of discussion considered. Almost 
all the respondents, of all age groups, agreed that they 
"always" discussed the news about the war on foreign radio 
with family and quite a few of all ages also were "mostly" 
comfortable discussing this information with friends. At the 
other end of the response scale, age also does not seem to be 
a factor in whether respondents were more likely or not to 
report that they "never" discussed this information with 
strangers. Members of all age groups seem especially cautious 
with strangers. But when we focus on the middle dimension 
of co-workers, the dimension where the private zone seems to 
taper off, there is clear differentiation of response on the 
basis of age.
The first thing to note in this regard is that no 
respondent in the 51+ age group offered that he ever talked
Table 36


















Always 34 35 10 24 21 8 2 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
89,5 94.6 90.9 61.5 56.8 66.7 5.3 10.8 0.0 2.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mostly 2 1 1 10 11 4 9 4 0 2 1 0 0 1 0
5.3 2.7 9.1 25.6 29.9 33,3 23.7 10.8 0.0 5.1 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0
Sometimes 2 1 0 3 4 0 10 10 4 8 8 1 2 2 0
5.3 2.7 0.0 7.7 10.8 0.0 26.3 27.0 36.4 20.4 21.6 9.1 5.3 5.4 0.0
Seldom 0 0 0 2 1 0 6 9 1 13 9 1 4 1 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 2.7 0,0 15.8 24.3 9.1 33.3 24.3 9.1 10.5 2.7 9.1
Never 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 10 6 15 18 19 32 33 10
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0. 0.0 28.9 27.0 54.5 38.5 48.6 81.8 84.2 89.2 90.9
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“always" or "mostly" with co-workers. By contrast, 29 
percent of the 20-40 year olds and 20 percent of the 41-50 
year old group respectively responded that they "always" or 
"mostly" talked with co-workers. Over 50 percent of the 
51+ group, responding about co-workers, indicated that they 
"never" talked with them as opposed to 29 and 27 percent of 
the other two younger groups respectively. The higher appar­
ent level of caution among members of the oldest group seem 
to be repeated in the dimension of acquaintances. Once again, 
no member of the oldest group offered that he ever talked 
"always" or "mostly" with acquaintances and fully 81 percent 
of the oldest group said they "never" talked with acquaintances 
about the war news from foreign radio. By contrast, a few of 
the two younger groups did say that they talked "always" or 
"mostly" with acquaintances about foreign radio and less than 
50 percent (39 and 49 percent respectively) indicated that 
they "never" talked with acquaintances.
As described earlier in this chapter, the age group­
ing used in this table reflects relative years of life exper­
ience in the Soviet Union under Stalin. No member of the 20- 
40 age group was older than 13 years when Stalin died. Evi­
dence from the comments made by respondents in this group 
indicates that, even as children, many of them were deeply 
affected by the Stalinist atmosphere in the early development 
of their attitudes toward official and unofficial communi­
cations. However, the same kind of evidence seems to indicate
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that members of the two older groups were even more deeply 
and personally affected. Members of the middle group, 41- 
50 years old in 1980, were 14-23 years old when Stalin died 
and members of the oldest (51+) group were between the ages 
of 24 and 53. It would seem rather clear from the data in 
table 36 that age is a factor in whether a person is likely 
or not to feel the presence around himself of the private 
zone. In younger people, caution and discretion in the 
handling of unofficial communications seems to set in later 
and in the most distant interpersonal situations than appears 
to be the case with older persons. In members of the oldest 
group, openness and trust seem more clearly restricted to the 
closer interpersonal contact of family and friends.
Table 37 presents the data produced by crosstabulating 
the discussion variables by the sexes of the respondents.
Once again, there are some differences in response which 
suggest that the presence of the private zone may vary among 
men and women. Respondents of all ages tended to share 
information from the unofficial source of foreign radio 
freely with family and friends and sparingly, or not at all 
with strangers, and this pattern seems also to occur among 
respondents on the basis of sex. However, once again, the 
differentiation is to be found within the dimension of co­
workers and acquaintances. With co-workers, men seem to be 
somewhat more free in their discussion of the war news from 
foreign radio than are women with theirs. Fifty-six percent
Table 37














Always 53 26 39 14 5 1 2 0 0 0
89.8 96.3 63.9 51.9 8.2 4.0 3.3 0. 0 0.0 0.0
Mostly 4 0 15 10 10 3 3 0 1 0
6.8 0.0 24.6 37.0 16.4 12.0 4.9 0.0 1.7 0.0
Sometimes 2 1 4 3 20 4 12 5 4 0
3.4 3.7 6.6 11.1 32.8 16.0 19.7 19.9 6.7 0.0
Seldom 0 0 3 0 13 3 ' 18 5 4 2
0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 21.3 12.0 29.5 19.2 6.7 7.7
Never 0 0 0 0 13 14 26 16 51 24
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.3 56.0 42.6 61.5 85.0 92.3
Column
Count 59 27 61 27 61 25 61 26 60 26
Row Pet of
Column Count 68.6 31.4 69.3 30.7 70.9 29.1 70.1 29.9 69.9 30.2
N = 86 88 86 87 86
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of the women responding said that they would "never" discuss 
news from foreign radio, as opposed to only 21 percent of 
the men who said "never." In the dimension of acquaintances, 
62 percent of the women said "never," as opposed to only 
4 3 percent of the men who said "never." This kind of evi­
dence would seem to suggest that the private zone extends 
out slightly further for men than women when this question 
and this type of measurement scheme is used. With men, cau­
tion and discretion seem to set in at a slightly later point 
than they do with women. Women seem to show less openness 
and trust than men about co-workers, the workplace in general, 
and with acquaintances found in all locations.
Table 38 presents the data obtained by crosstabulating 
the discussion variables with the geographic origin of the 
respondents. Once again, it should be mentioned that all of 
the crosstabulations represent the views of 84 to 88 of the 
104 respondents because a few did not respond in some dimen­
sions of response or were not listeners to foreign radio at 
all in October 1973. In the table, "A" stands for "Asian"
Jews (including respondents originating in Georgia), "H" for 
"heartlander," and "W" for "western." These designations are 
those which Professor Gitelman used to group his 1976 respon­
dents on the basis of geographical origin. "Heartland" Jews 
are those emigrating from areas of the Russian, Ukrainian and 
Byelorussian republics which have been under nominal Soviet 
control since 1917. Western Jews, or "westerners" are those
Table 38
Discussion Variables by Geographical Region of Origin in the USSR*
Dimension of Discussion
Column Pet Family Friends Co--Workers Acquaintances Strangers
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Row Pet 
of Col 
Count 3.5 79.1 17.4 3.4 80.7 15.9 3.5 79.1 17.4 3.4 79.3 17.2 3.5 79.1 17.4
N = 86 88 86 87 86
*A stands for "Asian," including respondents originating in Georgia; 
H stands for "Heartland";
W stands for West.
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Jews emigrating from the Baltic republics, the western 
Ukraine, western Byelorussia and Moldavia— areas which came 
under Soviet control as late as 1939-1944.
The heavy concentration of heartlanders in the sample 
makes it a little difficult to differentiate among respondents 
on the basis of geographical origin. For example, in the 
bellweather dimension of co-workers, there are sixty-eight 
heartlanders and only fifteen westerners reporting. Never­
theless, it does seem that westerners might be slightly more 
comfortable about communicating news from an unofficial source 
in the workplace than heartlanders. Thirty-three percent of 
the westerners reported that they "always" or "mostly" dis­
cussed news about the war with co-workers as opposed to only 
19 percent of the heartlanders who reported that they did so 
"always" or "mostly." Similarly, only 40 percent of the 
westerners said that they discussed the war news from foreign 
radio "seldom" or "never" with co-workers as opposed to 52 per­
cent of the heartlanders who said they did so "seldom" or 
"never." However, westerners seem more reticent about dis­
cussing this kind of information with strangers than heart­
landers. Eighty-five percent of the heartlanders said that 
they "never" discussed war news with strangers as opposed to 
100 percent of the westerners. It would seem, therefore, 
that westerners are slightly more at home discussing informa­
tion from an unofficial source with co-workers and slightly 
less likely to take a chance on a stranger than a heartlander
195
might be. Perhaps the later arrival of Soviet control in 
the western areas, and the fact that heartlanders felt the 
full force of the Terror, make the westerner feel a little 
more comfortable about communicating unofficial information 
in his workplace than the heartlander is in his. Perhaps 
since so much time had passed since the Terror, and since 
forceful consolidation of Soviet control in many western areas 
came some years after that, some heartlanders may have felt a 
little bolder in recent years about making jokes, complaints 
and communicating other forms of unofficial information in 
front of strangers than did westerners. But because the 
private zone does not seem to extend to the dimension of 
strangers in any case, and because the westerners seem to be 
a little more comfortable about communicating unofficial 
information in the workplace than heartlanders, it would seem 
that the private zone has a slightly stronger presence among 
westerners.
The data in table 39 represents the crosstabulation 
of discussion variables with the relative educational levels 
of the respondents. As a whole, the respondents were a 
highly educated group. Most possessed the equivalent of an 
undergraduate or higher degree. Respondents with less than 
thirteen years— that is, the group with the lowest level of 
education— seem to show the highest levels of confidence in 
their family and friends, and at the other end of the dis­
cussion scale— strangers. Respondents with the highest
Table 39
Discussion Variables by Educational Level
















Always 17 47 13 10 34 7 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
100.0 90.4 86.7 55.6 63.0 50.0 0.0 7.7 13.3 6.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mostly 0 2 2 7 15 3 4 6 3 0 2 1 1 0 0
0.0 3.8 13.3 38.9 27.8 21.4 23.5 11.5 20.0 0.0 3.7 6.7 5.9 0.0 0.0
Sometimes 0 3 0 1 4 2 4 16 2 4 9 3 1 2 1
0.0 5.8 0.0 5.6 7.4 14.3 29.4 30.8 13.3 25.0 16.7 20.0 5.9 3.8 6.7
Seldom 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 10 4 4 16 2 2 4 0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 14.3 5.9 19.2 26.7 25.0 29.6 13.3 11.8 7.7 0.0
Never 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 16 4 7 26 9 13 46 14
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.2 30.8 26.7 43.8 48.1 60.0 76.5 88.5 93.3
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level of education, nineteen or more years, seem to be the 
most comfortable about communicating information from an 
official source in the workplace. Thirteen percent of these 
respondents with the highest level of education reported that 
they "always" communicated news about the war from foreign 
radio with co-workers while no respondent with less than thir­
teen years education answered "always" in this regard. Per­
haps not coincidently, persons with the least formal educa­
tion show the highest apparent reluctance to communicate infor­
mation from an unofficial source in the workplace: 41 percent
of the least-educated said they "never" talked to co-workers 
about the war news from foreign radio as opposed to 31 and 
27 percent of the respondents in the next two most highly- 
educated groups seem to have greater reluctance to communicate 
information from an unofficial source with acquaintances than 
persons with the lowest level of education: 60 percent of
the respondents with more than nineteen years education said 
that they would "never" discuss news from foreign radio with 
an acquaintance as opposed to only 42 percent of the respon­
dents with less than thirteen years who said "never" with 
an acquaintance.
The data in table 40 seem similar in disposition 
to that in table 39. The data in the latter table cross- 
tabulate discussion variables by occupational level: non­
intelligentsia (NI), non-technical intelligentsia (NTI) and 
technical intelligentsia (TI). Not surprisingly, there
Table 40
Discussion of Variables by Occupational Level*
Dimension of Discussion
Column Pet Family Friends Co-Workers Acquaintances Strangers
























































































































































Count 17 22 47 17 23 48 17 22 47 16 22 49 16 22 48
Row Pet of 
Col Count 19.8 25.6 54.7 19.3 26.1 54.5 19.8 25.6 54.7 18.4 25.3 56.3 18.6 25.6 55.8
N= 86 88 86 87 86
00
*TI stands for "Technical Intelligentsia"; NTI stands for "Non-technical 
Intelligentsia"; NI stands for "Non-Intelligentsia."
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seems to be a correlation between these occupational levels 
and the low, medium and high educational levels reflected 
in table 39. Respondents with NI occupations, as do those 
with the lowest level of education, seem to have the highest 
levels of confidence communicating information from an unof­
ficial source with family and friends and the lowest level of 
confidence in their co-workers. Respondents with NTI, and 
particularly TI occupations, seem to have a somewhat higher 
level of confidence in their co-workers than do respondents 
with NI occupations, as do those with the two highest levels 
of education. There seem to be a number of reasons why 
respondents with high education and technical intelligentsia 
occupations in particular might feel more comfortable about 
communicating information from an unofficial source in the 
workplace than those of lower educational and occupational 
status. These reasons are essentially systemic and group- 
oriented and they will be addressed in the Conclusion. But 
for the moment, it does not appear that willingness to com­
municate information from an unofficial source such as 
foreign radio is higher among respondents with either high 
education or technical intelligentsia occupations because 
the workplace of these respondents are staffed with higher 
levels of Jewish workers.
Table 41 presents the data obtained by crosstabulating 
information about the educational levels of the respondents 
with information about their work environments. Respondents
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Column Count 24 58 14
Row Pet. of 
Column Count 25 . 0 60.4 14.6
were asked, "In October 1973, at your job, university or 
school, were most of the people who worked (studied) there 
Jewish or not Jewish?" If less than 50 percent of the per­
sons in the workplace were Jewish, respondents were instructed 
to answer "mostly not Jewish." Table 42 presents the data 
obtained by crosstabulating information about the occupa­
tional level of the respondents with information about their 
work environments.
In all cases, the percentage of Jews in the workplace 
is far less than 50 percent. But the greatest percentage of 
Jews shows up where respondents with the lowest level of 
education work (20.8 percent mostly Jewish as opposed to 
7.1 percent mostly Jewish in the workplace of the respondents 
with the highest level of education). Similarly, the
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Table 42
Occupational Level by Percentage 










Mostly Not 19 22 43
Jewish 82.6 88.0 86.0
Column Count 23 25 50
Row Pet. of 
Colnmn Count 23.5 25.5 51.0
workplaces of non-intelligentsia respondents have mostly Jewish 
workers more of the time than the workplaces of NTI and TI 
respondents (17.4 percent as opposed to 12 and 14 percent 
respectively). In presenting these data, I do not presume 
to suggest that the persons with whom the NTI and TI respon­
dents talked candidly in the workplace were invariably, or 
even normally, non-Jews. But the statistical relationship 
between lower levels of Jews in the workplace and higher 
apparent levels of candor in the workplace suggests in the 
aggregate that the ethnic element which seemed to strongly 
color the choice of discussion partner in the dimension of 
friends may be working less strongly in the dimension of 
co-workers, particularly for NTI and TI respondents. In 
NTI and TI workplaces, institutional, systemic and
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group-oriented considerations may have contributed to higher 
levels of candor, helping, in turn, to push the private zone 
to its outer limits. Therefore, we are ready to return to 
these considerations to conclude this analysis.
CONCLUSION
In chapter 8, I concluded the development of my 
hypothesis. I contended that there had been, since the 
death of Stalin, certain developments in the Soviet political 
communications environment. These developments were believed 
to be centered within the apparently high levels of interper­
sonal communication practiced by some groups of Soviet people 
in recent years. What made this communication noteworthy 
was that it appeared to be inconsistent, both in content 
and in execution, with the norms of behavior and the societal 
goals prescribed by the Party. Since the Party had not relin­
quished the power to reassert the kind of Stalinist techniques 
of social control which could have easily curtailed this kind 
of communication, nor had it apparently changed any of its 
societal goals or codes of behavior, I contended that the 
Party had chosen to acquiesce in the fact of these develop­
ments for reasons that were unclear and remain so to this 
point.
Accordingly, I hypothesized that there existed around 
the average Soviet person a private zone in which he was free,
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in practical terms, to communicate information from unofficial 
sources to people within certain categories of association, 
without fear of immediate and arbitrary punishment at the 
hands of the regime. Among these categories of association 
were members of the person's immediate family, his close 
friends, and possibly his co-workers. It appeared that news 
information from foreign radio stations was a popular subject 
for discussion, and I followed the path of some of this infor­
mation through the interpersonal communications network of a 
sample group of former Soviet citizens to determine the 
presence, boundaries and durability of the private zone.
The results of my investigation seem to show that the 
private zone was very much present in the political communica­
tions environment of my respondent group while they lived in 
the Soviet Union. The zone clearly encompassed the individual, 
his family and his good friends. In some of the demographic 
subgroups, mostly those containing respondents with high levels 
of education and technical intelligentsia occupations, the 
zone appeared to stretch out a little further, to include the 
dimension of co-workers. But in no case did it appear that 
the private zone encompassed either acquaintances or strangers.
Most of the 1980 respondents appeared to be former 
members of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia. The fact 
that they seem to have a private zone which is slightly larger 
than that of non-technical intelligentsia respondents is 
theoretically significant in my view. Though members of all
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demographic subgroups seemed more willing to discuss news 
from foreign radio with members of their own ethnic and 
minority groups rather than with members of the Russian or 
Ukrainian majority, the bonding effect of this kinship appears 
to be less strong in the workplaces of technical intelligentsia 
respondents than in the workplaces of non-technical intelli­
gentsia respondents. A possible explanation for this finding 
is advanced several paragraphs below.
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, I introduced a number of 
systemic, institutional and group considerations to set the 
stage for an excursion into the private zone. Foremost among 
the systemic considerations were those recounted by Brzezinski 
and Huntington as growing out of the industrialization and 
urbanization of modern Soviet society.* Globally, these sys­
temic forces constituted convergence, which was further 
advanced as giving impetus to certain forms of change in the 
Soviet Union— change away from political discipline and 
orthodoxy— change in the direction of industrial pluralism.^ 
Brzezinski and Huntington described this process as one in 
which the Party is perceived to yield (de facto) some measure 
of control over the social context of production to the tech­
nical experts upon whom it depends, more deeply every year, 
to carry out its programs of industrial development.
In chapter 5, a number of group considerations were 
introduced to help explain how the development of a modern 
technical intelligentsia may have contributed, in recent years.
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to a certain departure from political orthodoxy and 
discipline at the upper levels of Soviet society. Of impor­
tance in this discussion were the views of Andrei Amalrik, 
particularly his notion of the new Soviet "middle class," the 
"class of specialists." It seemed possible to suggest that 
members of Amalrik's "middle class" might find the workings 
of the party-controlled Soviet press to constitute precisely 
the kind of arbitrary and apparently irrational exercise of 
power that people with a modern, "technological outlook"^ 
might find anachronistic. I hypothesized that such people 
would actively seek out information from unofficial, uncon­
trolled sources such as foreign radio for the purpose of fill­
ing the large gaps in the coverage provided by the official 
media, and for the purpose of making rational comparisons 
between the two.
The political communications behavior of the respon- 
ents as a group clearly confirmed the basic hypothesis: the
private zone existed as of the early 1970s and it had veri­
fiable boundaries which varied according to demographic 
criteria. Since so many of my respondents were former members 
of the Soviet technical intelligentsia, it seems that the 
behavior of this demographic subgroup can bear on some of the 
theoretical questions raised by the systemic, institutional 
and group considerations introduced in chapters 3, 4 and 5.
The political communication behavior in the private 
zone of the technical intelligentsia respondents strongly
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suggests that Amalrik was correct in his belief that there 
existed, in the late 1960s, a middle class which was "in 
[passive] opposition to the bureaucratic elite," Certainly, 
the high levels of listening to foreign radio stations in 1973 
by technical intelligentsia respondents suggests that the 
party-press which served the bureaucratic elite did not hold 
the undivided loyalty of an important segment of Soviet society. 
The strong desire of these respondents to obtain a balanced 
picture of the world, through access to both foreign and party- 
controlled news sources, suggests that they did have a modern, 
"technological outlook," an outlook defined by W. W. Rostow 
as one in which "standards of efficiency are rationally (as 
opposed to politically) evolved." In passive opposition to 
the stated objectives of the regime for the party-press, and 
in passive opposition to the norms of behavior prescribed by 
the Party, the presence of the private zone appears to have 
allowed the respondents, as a. group, to acquire and disseminate 
enough balanced news information to maintain, inwardly at 
least, a view of an important world event which was rationally 
evolved and not totally controlled by the regime.
Because they seemed to show less confidence about 
communicating information from an unofficial source in the 
workplace, respondents who were not former members of the 
Soviet technical intelligentsia appeared to have a smaller, 
less persistent private zone. It would seem that the "techno­
logical outlook," which they were less likely to have.
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encouraged candor in the workplaces of the technical 
intelligentsia respondents, and it extended the private zone 
for these respondents as much as one whole dimension further 
than the dimension of friends. Ethnicity and kinship appeared 
to have been major factors encouraging candor in both the 
dimension of friends and in the dimension of co-workers. But 
it appears that the bonding effect of the ethnic element 
worked no more strongly in the dimension of co-workers to 
encourage candor than did a common technological outlook.
The behavior of the respondents in the private zone 
may be indicative of a certain change in the social context 
of production since Stalin— a type of change addressed by 
Brzezinski and Huntington in their treatment of convergence.
Or, it may be that the former members of the technical intel­
ligentsia showed the highest level of confidence in discussing 
information from an unofficial source in the workplace because 
they felt the highest degree of sensitivity to a change in the 
political atmosphere since Stalin, not to any change in the 
social context of production.
Such a change could easily have been produced by the 
apparent decision of the regime to curtail the kind of large- 
scale, extra-legal behavior on the part of the police agencies 
which was countenanced, if not encouraged, in Stalin's day. 
Therefore, the private zone may not be a reaction to political 
change in the direction of industrial pluralism, just a response 
to an evolution in the party doctrine of social control. This 
seems to be the most likely impetus for the private zone.
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In either case, for these or other reasons, the 
private zone seems to represent territory where some people 
were relatively free, as of the early 1970s, to exercise their 
natural sophistication, awareness and curiosity in ways at 
variance with the norms of behavior prescribed by the Party. 
This seems to be a most noteworthy development since it 
appears to have taken place in a country with a notorious 
totalitarian record. But there is no guarantee that the pri­
vate zone has become a permanent feature of the Soviet scene 
because it does not seem to be firmly linked to any form of 
fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet political 
system. Indeed, as of August 1980 and the labor troubles 
in Poland, large-scale, systematic and continuous jamming of 
western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union began again.
The private zone may already be history.
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P a s p e u iH T e  m h s  n p e A C T a B H T b  c e C a  i i  H a m  y H U E e p c H T e T .
R  n p o c jte c c o p  Kaâ.cAPH n o j iH T H H e c K n x  n a yK  y H i ip e p c H T C T a  O x a a x o -  
I.ÎH 3 H o p i. ta H e ,O K a a x o M a ,H  a  saKHM aiocb i iayH eH H eM  npo<5.^ieM CoDe 
T C K o ro  C o 5 8 a  b  T C H e iine  M n o n ix  a e x .  f l  odp a m a iocb  k  B a x , T a i t  
KaK B h  s n a i l  b C oEeTC itoM  Coiose i i  a  B e p » ,  B h  r t o s e i s  n oM o a b  
i-iaM B p a C o T e  Hauieii K ac^e^pH .
Or h h  IIS H am iix  a c n i ip a H T O B  s a n i iM a e T c a  H syH e H i ieM  s i i s h h  d 
CoBCTCKOM C o io s e .  I lp cA î- ieT  e r o  i i h t ô P e c a - c o B e T C K i ie  r a s e T H , p a -  
RIIO H T eaeB H A G H be , H OH XOHeT- BHaCHHTb, HTO COBeTCKlie  aiOAHHl 
caMOM g e a e  f ly i ia io T  o h h X s
Moero a c m ip a H T a  s c a y T  J îx o h  L la pK . f l  sHaio e r o  b le M e E n e  
i ie c K o a b K H X  a e i j H  o h  o a h h  h s  a y a m i ix  c iy a e H T O B  Hameîi K a ^ e a -  
p H .  Oh x o T e a  6u B C T p e T i iT b c a  c BaMH h s a a a i b  Ban H ecK oabK O  
B o n p o c o B  o BameM Mnennii OTHOCHTeabHO n p o C a e w H  iiH i^opMaiiHH 
B CoBOTCKOM C o io s e .  A . L lapx r o B o p u T  H e M H o ro  n o - p y c c K H , H O  on 
n p e a n o a e a  6u o C n a ib c a  c Ba;.iii n o - a : - i r a H Î î c K H , e c a n  o t o  Baw h c  
T p y a n o ,
B STO HHCbMO BaoseKO oCpameHHe k  Ban o t  ^ . I Ia p K a ,K O T o p c e ,  
OH H a a e e T C H ,B H  O T n p a sH T e  eiQ'" b n p i ia a ra e M O M  K O H B e p T e .
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B 3T0H oCpameniin B h CMOsexe CKasaxB ,x o t k t s  jih B h
DCTpoTiiTbca c KiiH, H KOPffa STO ÔH^o ÔH  yfloÔiiHH B a c .
S.ilapK n o Jij’-HiiJi Ban a#pec t o j i b k o  noToi.iy, h t o  o h  paCoxaeT 
HaA AaKHOii npodJiGîîOii. Ben HH*opMamin jKOXopyK B h CTîoacexe 
c û o d n H X b  e î^ y  6yp,eT a C c o n io x H O  K o i K ^ H A e H m i a n b H o S . K o r f l a  %e  
HCCJieAOBaHHe dysex aasepiueno,o e o  ne Ôygex coAep«axb h m g h  
n i o f f e î i , ( 5 e c e A O B a B n i H X  c a s c o h o m.
T a K  K a K  K O H X a K X H  c ÆIonbMn,SCHBl!IH?.{H B C O B e X C K C M  C o î o s e -  
jryHHHË nyxb nonyEuxb oCbeKXiîBHyio HHAcpHariHio o CoBexcKOM 
CoK)3 e , H H  CyasM HpesBHHaiÎEO CnaroAapHH Ban s a  n c H c n b  h 
E O A A e p %Ky , HHpaacaïonyloo n  b  Bauiei: r o x o B E O c i î i  E C x p e x H X b c n  
c  a c n i i p a E X O M  naneH KaâeApn ^ . M a p K O M *
C yB aK eH H S M





University'of Oklahoma at Norman 
Department of Political Science
Deal
Please allow me to introduce myself and our University to you.
We are the University of Oklahoma, located in Norman, Oklahoma. I am 
a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Oklahoma and I have studied Soviet affairs for many years. I am writing 
to you because you have lived in the Soviet Union and because I believe 
that you can help us in the work of our department.
One of our graduate students is working on a study about life in the 
Soviet Union. He is studying Soviet radio, newspapers and television and 
he wants to find out what Soviet people really think about them.
The name of my student is Jon Mark. I have known him for several 
years and he is an excellent student in our department. He would like to 
meet you and ask you several questions about your opinions on the subject 
of communications in the Soviet Union. Mr. Mark speaks a little Russian, 
but he would prefer to speak to you in English if that is not difficult 
for you.
Enclosed in this letter is a note from Mr. Mark which he hopes you 
will mail back to him in the envelope provided. On this note, you will be 
able to tell Mr. Mark if you will meet with him, and when it might be 
convenient for you to do so.
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Mr. Mark has received your name and address only because he is 
working on this study. All information which you may give him will be 
kept strictly confidential. When his study is completed, it will contain 
no names and no one will be able to find out who talked to him.
Since talking to people who lived in the Soviet Union is the best 
way to get objective information about the Soviet Union, we would greatly 
appreciate your help and assistance in meeting personally with Mr. Mark.
Respectfully
V. Stanley Vardys 
Professor
APPENDIX B
RESPONSE FORM FROM POTENTIAL RESPONDENT
(RUSSIAN)
IIosajiyjiCTa, oTBOTfcTe na d t h  EonpocH h oxnpaEbTe Ban 
0TB6T B npiiJiarae:.îoiî noHiOBOM KOHBcpxe. Sapaiiec Cjaaroaa- 
P» Bac.
XoTHTe JiH B h noKOHb m h 6? fla______ Hex_______
Ecjih ffa,xo KEKaa 113 (Jopu HandoJiee yAoCna Bac?
OxsexHXb Ha BonpocH, CBflsanHHe c HCCJieAOBaHneM,B
c’ecefle____________
OxBexHXb Ha BonpocH nacBMeHHo/B (J)opMe a HKexH/_ _
E c j ih  B h  n p e A n o ' i x e x e  j ih h h v k ) B c x p e v j ’- , n o r y  Jiz a n o s B O H i ix b  B a n ?
RA.  H e x _____
E c j i h  A a ,K a K o e  B p e u f l  HaiiCojiee yA oC EO  p.Jisi a x o r o ^ ______________
H H O K a J iy ü c x a ,A a H ic  m ho  Bam HOMep x e m e ^ o n a ___________ ______________
E c a h  y  B a c  e c x b  K aK ne- j i i îC S o  B o n p o c H  oxHOCHxembHO i j o e r o i i c c . i e -
A O B aH H H ,f l  c yAOBOJIbCXBHCM OXBBHy Ha HHX HHC BHeHHO, HO XBJICcJd 
n y  HJiH B jiH HHoîi (S eceA e .
n o z a j i y H c x a , H a n n m a x G B am a B o n p o c H  Ha:«e n o - p y c c K a  h j ih  n o -  
a a r j r a S c K H .
C yBasenaeM A ® o h MapK
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(ENGLISH)
Please fill in the answers to the questions and return by mail in the 
envelope provided. Thank you very much.
Will it be possible for you to help me? Yes________ No_
If you can help me, what form is most convenient for you?
To answer questions about the study in person____________
To answer questions about the study in writing 
(to fill out a questionnaire) __
If it is convenient for your to meet me, may I call you on the telephone?
Yes No
When is the best time to call you on the telephone?
Please give me your telephone number so that 1 can reach you_
If you have any questions about ny study, I will be pleased to answer them in 
writing, on the telephone, or in person. Please write any questions below in 






SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE - Media Attitudes and the Yom Kippur War 
Interview Number ___________
1. Age_________  2.__Sex_________  ____
1
3.4. Place of Residence in the Soviet Union in Oct., 1973?
(city/town) Union republic
5. Years of formal education in the Soviet Union?
6. Major field of study?
7 . Occupation in the Soviet Union?
8 . There was a war in the Middle East in October, 1973 between 
Israel and the Arab countries. It started very quickly and 
without warning. How did you first find out that this war 
had started? From . . .
Soviet Radio  Soviet Television  Newspaper_____
1 2 3
Someone at Work  Someone in the family  Foreign Radio
4 4




9 . While the war was going on, until the time it was over, how 
did you get most of the news about the war? From . . .
Soviet Radio  Soviet Television  Newspaper
1 2 3
Someone at work  Someone in the family  A Friend_
4 5
Foreign Radio  Other  Do Not Remember_____
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10. At that time (October 1973), was it your habit to listen to
foreign radio broadcasts (frequently, as ageneral rule, etc.)?
Yes No
10




12. (If "yes" on #12) What foreign radio broadcasts did you 
listen to most often?
BBC VGA Deutsche Welle RL
12
Kol Yisroel RFE Other
13. What foreign radio broadcasts did you listen to second most 
often?
BBC VGA Deutsche Welle KL
13
Kol Yisroel RFE Other
Was it easy to hear the broadcasts (was the reception good) 
in #12?
. . . and in #13?
14
15






If reception was not always good, what was the main reason?
16. (12) Weather, Seasonal 
(natural) reasons
J amming/Intrusion





Bad Radio Receiver Bad Radio Receiver
Had to have low volume_ 
Other'
Had to have low volume
Other
When you listened to the news about the war on Soviet radio
(watched Soviet television, read Soviet newspapers, did you _____
think they were telling the truth about the war? Do you think 18 



















When you listened to news about the war on (the foreign broadcast 
service mentioned in #12) did you think they were telling the truth 













When you received news about the war from (18, 19, 20, 12 or 13), 
did you think that they were biased (that they wanted either 
Israel or the Arabs to win the war)?
23.(18) For the Arabs_ 
For Israel
24.(19) For the Arabs  25.(20) For the Arabs
For Israel For Israel
Were Neutral Were Neutral Were Neutral
Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know
Don't Remember Don't Remember Don't Remember











Don't Remember Don't Remember 26
When you listened to news about the war on foreign radio 
broadcasts, did you feel free to discuss what you had heard 
with other people?





















To find freedom for political beliefs
2
To be able to practice Judaism freely___
3
To have a higher standard of living_____
4
To have better opportunities in my occupation/profession^







33. At the time (October, 1973), do you know of a case in which a 
person got into trouble with the Soviet authorities because he 
said something about foreign radio?
Yes No 33
34. At any time while you lived in the Soviet Union, do you know 
of a case in which a person got into trouble with the Soviet 




36. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
Yes, very  Yes, somewhat_____
1 2
No, not very  No, not at all_____
3 4
From your personal experience in the Soviet Union, how would 
you describe the level of discrimination against Jews (anti­
semitism) ?





38. In October, 1973, at your job, university of school, were 
most of the people who worked (studied) there . . .
Jewish or Non-Jewish
40. If most of the people were not Jewish, what percentage of 







41. In October, 1973, were most of your personal friends . 
Jewish or Non-Jewish
42. If most of your friends were not Jewish, what percentage 
were Jewish?
Less than 10%_ 
10% to 25%
2
25% to  50%
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
